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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
During the last decade a few countries like India, Ireland, Israel and Malaysia have 
transformed the infrastructure of their economies to integrate IT infrastructures with a 
profound recognition of the importance of the IT industry and have gained  
revolutionary fast progress in the economic development of their countries[1]. Thus 
software outsourcing has become a very good source of income for these countries as 
well as improving their national standards. Software outsourcing is also a good method 
for more profitable production for first world countries. 
Iran is also among the developing countries that both needs more income and has 
good potential to produce and export software [2]; because during recent years the 
development of university courses and the increase of IT students has made a proper 
background for the start-up of an IT industry and the application of IT in Iran[1]. But 
this country has not as yet made noticeable success in this field. 
Iran also has a great need for software to be used inside the country. Although there 
are no accurate statistics about IT factors in Iran, very rough estimations show that 
Iran needs about 10 milliard US Dollars of software annually, only to meet its internal 
needs [3]1. This estimate can be confirmed by the fact that the country lacks almost all 
kinds of IT infrastructures. There is no nationwide valid electronic money in Iran yet 
and banking services and systems are comparable with that of 50 years ago in 
developed countries. Thus the volume of internet marketing is almost absolute zero. 
Information systems in both state and private sectors are either nonexistent or very 
primitive and existent ones don’t comply with each other. The National registry 
system is not complete and operational yet, and the plan changes totally every few 
years. The TAKFA plan has not been successful and the “electronic government” that 
was a part of that plan, is only a new name that has made relevant procedures longer 
and more expensive compared with the former manual system [4]. It needs a separate 
chapter for itself, if we want to continue this list. 
So, according to Iran’s unexploited capacity for producing and exporting software, 
as well as importing and exporting IT products, it is interesting for many (see 
subsections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 for a list of them) to research about the software and IT 
industry in Iran, both for export purposes and for internal IT development. 
On the other hand, during the last 27 years (after the Islamic revolution) many 
Iranians have emigrated or escaped from Iran. Most of these people have been from 
the educated and/or wealthy classes of the community. So Iran has lost a very large 
group of its human recourses which could have had a key role in its IT and software 
industry, both in its technical and economical aspects. 
                                                 
1 Also look at case 5 in chapter 7, my interview with Dr. Zarei. He confirms these figures too.  
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No doubt, according to the abovementioned great capacity and potentials, and also 
because of the fast progress of technology and the IT revolution in the world, sooner or 
later, the Iranian software industry has to develop drastically. But before this positive 
change, all foundations need to be excavated, prepared and built. 
According to the software export success model (which will be discussed in 
chapter 4, theory overview), these foundations and infrastructures can be grouped in 
three levels: 
• National software vision, strategy that first of all includes a government 
determined on progress (and not restitution, recession and reversal), and a national 
will to reach achievable preset goals that must be organized in the frame of five 
year plans. 
• National software-related infrastructure that includes powerful industrial and 
technological infrastructures such as fast, cheap and reliable internet networking, 
hi-tech servers and an industrially-oriented educational system; an up-to-date and 
modern banking and financial system; and above all, protective laws. 
• National software industry that is made up of an expert work force and 
efficient mangers, which must be protected by a reliable financial system. 
 
Many groups/classes of technocrats and experts are involved in building and 
maintaining these infrastructures and the other levels that are explained in chapter 4. 
State politicians, university professors, industrial, financial and IT managers, software 
experts and IT/IS researchers can all be mentioned within those classes. 
As many members of all these classes have escaped/immigrated from Iran to 
developed countries during the last three decades, the Iranian diasporas or in other 
words expatriates, assume many important and vital roles in the development and 
enfoldment of Iran’s software industry. This research is intended to investigate 
different roles that Iranian diasporas can play in this relation. 
 
 
1.1 Research motivation 
 
Escaping Iranians have gone to all 5 continents and 200 countries of the world. The 
number of the escapees and emigrants is estimated between 3 and 6 million, which in 
other words is about 5% to 10% of the 65 million Iranian populations. 
Many of these people visit their family and homeland annually while many others 
cannot enter Iran or are at least afraid of doing so. But wherever they live, Iranians still 
love their homeland and are one of the most successful and educated minority groups 
[5]. 
 This large group of Diaspora that are scattered in almost all countries can play a 
major role as connectors between Iranian and international software companies 
(provided that other problems can be overcome or at least reduced). These people can 
serve this goal either in the very country of their permanent residence while working in 
the outsourcer company, or by coming back to Iran to work in the outsourced side, or 
as many of them wish, keep both sides simultaneously. In any of these 3 cases, they 
can, and must, also work as the lubricant to reduce the existing frictions between 
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Iranians and the foreign world via lobbying, transferring new methods and 
technologies to Iran, training internal staff, and by providing many other services some 
of which I attempt to mention and describe as a part of this research. A detailed 
discussion of different services that this group can give to Iran, comes in the very last 
chapter, chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion. 
In any case, almost no other country has such an opportunity to have such a big 
group of potential connectors and specialists all around the world (it is estimated that 
only India with almost 16 times as great a population as Iran, and China with almost 
20 times more, have more or comparable numbers of diasporas outside their countries . 
So, Iran has one of the highest percentages of educated and expert Diaspora compared 
to the population. Afghanistan, for example, has a very high percentage of escapees 
too, but unlike Iranians, the majority of Afghans are poor and low-educated farmers 
who have no specialty. Most of them live in Iran and Pakistan and work as manual 
workers. 
In the following subsections I will explain the reasons for which I have chosen this 
particular topic for this research. 
 
 
1.1.1 Significance of the Problem 
 
Here I describe the significance of this topic from different points of view. We can 
distinguish three distinctive factors in this topic: Iran, Iranian diasporas, and software 
industry. These factors are discussed in more details as following: 
 
• Why Iran? 
Iran is one of the biggest countries in the Middle East region and it has all needed 
characteristics to become the leading industrial power in the region. Characteristics 
such as the size of the country land, enormous young and educated generations, 
bountiful natural resources, and  above all strategic location not only in the region, but 
also in the world. 
The last abovementioned characteristic enables Iran to become the IT and internet 
hub of the region. Reza Parsa has discussed the problems in this way and has 
recommended a few points in order to achieve this goal [6]. Figure 1.1 illustrates this 
possibility. 
As a result of the chaotic political history of Iran during the last centuries, and also 
because of the endless reservoirs of oil and gas which have given huge incomes to the 
governments, most of these potentials and resources are not exploited yet. Yet, some 
evidences2 show that a great reform is about to take place in this country and put its 
potentials and non-oil resources to work. One of these possibilities is software export 
which is most relevant to the topic of this research and we follow it in the next 
subsection. 
But, before that I have to add that as I am Iranian myself, it was most desirable for 
me to do my work on Iran; particularly because of lack of research in this area about 
                                                 
2 Look at foot note 6 in page 7 please. 
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Iran. So I decided to work on Nicholson and Sahay’s article on the Iranian software 
industry. 
 
 
 
• Why software industry? 
As Nicholson and Sahay remind us, there are two major challenges facing the 
Iranian software industry: 
“How can Iran adequately meet the domestic demand for software applications of 
both the government and private sector, and at the same time develop capability of the 
Iranian software industry to become globally competitive?” [3] 
The need for internally used software is very high because, as we will see later in 
this thesis, Iran’s information infrastructures are very weak and in fact compared with 
today’s technology which is currently exploited in first world countries, it is almost 
zero; even compared to other developing countries like Turkey and Egypt, Iran’s IT 
infrastructure is very primary. So it needs milliards of dollars of software (as 
mentioned earlier, about 10 milliard US dollars a year) to fill the ever expanding 
vacuum of IT and computerized systems in the country that once was a pioneer of IT 
in the region during 70s.   
In 2002, the Iranian government proposed a program for the “Development and 
Application of Information and Data Technology in Iran” (TAKFA). The purpose of 
this program is to clarify the development of IT policies in Iran [7]. However, the 
budget devoted to this program is insufficient, and, worst of all, most of it is spent to 
buy hardware without developing appropriate software systems to support the 
automation of the system [2]. The reason has been the numerous (more than 20) 
responsible organizations for control of IT in Iran [1] [8], along with wide spread 
corruption in the country [4] that has prohibited expected success and progress in this 
plan. 
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Therefore while the government has to improve the budget plans and apply more 
control over distribution of contracts and budgets; they should put more emphasis on 
software instead of hardware. As Iran’s language is exclusive to the country and lots of 
its young educated people are unemployed, the best solution is to produce the required 
software inside the country. Moreover, while there is always a shortage of budget in 
Iran, the expenses of producing software in the country are by far lower than buying it 
from foreigner companies (even sometimes when the required system is already on the 
shelf in developed countries, it is still more economical to produce and distribute the 
internal version). 
In her article, Neda Dehghani points out that it is now realized that software 
production can save Iran’s IT market and should be set as a basic goal. So the 
government has recently passed a resolution to support Iranian software with copyright 
legislation. Currently, copyright law in Iran is very weak and primitive, and doesn’t 
support foreigner products at all [2]. It is possible to buy any kind of unlocked 
software (and copied movies) just for the price of a row disk without any legal 
prohibition; any visitor can realize this fact during a very short tour in Tehran. 
Therefore, the new legislation will encourage software producers to increase their 
production and implement larger projects as they are hopeful of the return of their 
money and don’t fear that the users use illegal copies of their software freely. 
Dehghani also reminds us that while Iranians are happy to have sold 11 million 
dollars worth of software to foreigners during the Iranian year 1382 (2001, 2002), 
India has exported 6.5 billion dollars worth of software and hardware in only 6 first 
months of 2002, and it has a growth at a rate of 35% a year to reach to 80 milliard 
Dollars until 2008; due to correct and efficient programs and policies [2]. This shows 
how Iranians need to change their methods of management and policies in order to 
strengthen their software production and exportation foundations. 
So we see that in India, as a pattern of progress for the whole world, especially in 
software, the annual income generated through software production and export is more 
than all of Iran’s non-petroleum exports; and is estimated to become even more than 
the income of selling crude oil in Iran in a couple of years [2]. 
It is obvious that any growth needs proper conditions, which means that IT 
foundations and infrastructures need to be built along with correct economic and 
political rules and policies in order to support software production (and exportation). 
As currently IT infrastructures in Iran are very primitive and insufficient, it is very 
important for the government to obtain the best possible policy to construct a proper 
basis and background for the IT and software industry on which other companies and 
private section can begin working; both to answer internal increasing needs, and to get 
a bigger share of the international export market. But first, those good particular 
policies must be developed in a proper atmosphere related to the overall national and 
foreign policy, from which Iran is very far. As we will see in chapter 4, in  a successful 
software export model, national software vision and strategy is the most fundamental 
level. 
Once proper foundations are made and prepared, different companies can act 
efficiently in Iran’s IT and software market. Iranian expatriates can play their role in 
both phases which will be discussed in the last two chapters, 6 and 7. 
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The other very important aspect of the software industry for Iran is the potential 
economic value of its export. It has two major benefits for Iranians: while any kind of 
production can reduce the great number of jobless (mostly young) army3, any kind of 
export can increase the foreign exchange income of the country. Despite the abundant 
reserves of oil and natural gas, foreign exchange has always been a major problem for 
Iranians during the last 27 years4. 
But, there are many big problems and difficulties for Iranian companies to produce 
software. One of the most important of all is the inability of Iranian companies to 
export it to the western companies which are generally located in the United States. As 
Iran is currently under the commercial embargo of the US, American companies can 
not legally outsource Iranian companies. Those few small companies, who do it 
illegally, have major problems to transfer the money to their Iranian contractors. They 
usually use third companies in East Europe or Dubai or places like that, which imposes 
great losses and limitations to both ends. Totally the whole procedure is so difficult 
and insufficient that widespread contraction and interchange between Iranian software 
producers and IT service providers on one hand, and foreigner outsourcer companies 
on the other hand is currently nothing more than a nice dream. 
One of the other problems is lack of human resources at high levels and 
particularly project management [3]. The other one is deep corruption in governmental 
companies, which makes them more tendentious to make contracts with foreigner 
partners as they pay more percentage (bribe). A more detailed discussion on this 
comes in chapter 5, literature overview. 
 
• Why diaspora? 
As the methods and patterns of administration and management in Iran have shown 
themselves to be wrong and very far from efficient, according to the Software Export 
Success Model (explained a little bit later) the first step to increase the software 
production in this country must be to establish a correct policy5 in IT affairs; then 
building infrastructures and also attracting international trust and cooperation as well 
as reduce the high rate of brain drain. But as this area is too vast, I had to limit the 
problem and chose a smaller part in order to focus on it. The following points have 
been my main reasons to choose Diasporas role as the focus point of my research: 
• The highest class of the Iranian community, meaning the educated people, 
high rank managers, owners of big capitals, and in a word most open-minded 
Iranians have continuously escaped the country after the Islamic revolution in 1979 
                                                 
3 As the joblessness is estimated to be more than 20% and this big group has many social and 
economical problems, and is able to cause political problems too, the irony of ‘army’ is not irrelevant. 
4 In order to show the importance of this problem, section 3.1 of chapter 3, “the current situation” is 
dedicated to ‘economy’. 
5 The Webster dictionary mentions few meanings for the word ‘policy’, including: 
1. Civil polity. 
2. The settled method by which the government and affairs of a nation are, or may be, 
administered; a system of public or official administration, as designed to promote the external 
or internal prosperity of a state. 
3. The method by which any institution is administered; system of management; course. 
I have used this word here to convey meanings number 2 and 3. 
( Extracted form: http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/policy ) 
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and resided in all other parts of the world. As human resources have the first 
priority in building any kind of institution in all human civilizations, it is rational to 
begin from the Diasporas. 
• As I am now studying abroad, and I decide to go back home after finishing 
this project, the first question in my mind, and also for all others who know me, is 
this: “What will you be able to do after you go back to Iran?” They have in fact in 
their mind, and more intimate friends say: “Don’t go back and stay here, are you 
mad? You can do NOTHING at all there! Is there any job for you there, do you 
think?” But for me it means: what should I do after returning home? Is there any 
service that I can offer to my country on my return? So the result of this project is 
in fact the answer to the question of my own life. 
• As in today’s international village, nobody can live isolated and manage all 
his problems alone, all countries need the other’s help to improve their current 
situation, keep on going forward and even to survive. No doubt, the worldwide 
Iranian Diasporas are the best answer to this question that “Who can help Iranians 
to improve their software industry?” 
• When I find a good answer to this question –the topic of this thesis- I can 
share it with millions of other Iranians who have the same question in their minds, 
particularly those who believe we can do nothing and those who ask “What can we 
do now?”. 
 
The other important factor in choosing this topic is time. Iran has a very unstable 
economic and political situation today. The recent presidential election and what has 
happened after that has worsened the condition to a high extent instead of making any 
improvements. The free descent that Iran’s economy was experiencing (despite the 
statistics that shows growth) has accelerated: the stock has fallen down drastically, the 
exit of big amounts of money has increased, and the international relations are in a 
serious crisis and much more. According to the limitations of this research it is 
impossible to dedicate much space to this problem, as a new crisis is showing up every 
day. Yet a more detailed overview of such problems is coming in chapter 2, ‘current 
situation’. 
 Despite the disastrous current conditions, a total and fundamental change in the 
political system is expected in the near future. It would be rational for us to hope that 
the country will enter an era of reconstruction and rebuilding during which IT will 
have a very important role. 
On the other hand, some analysts compare Iran’s present state with that of the US 
in the beginning of eighties, when IT was beginning to grow in the country and 
internet boom happened in the next decade6, or Norway in 90’s when some people 
were going to become ‘IT millionaires’. Although in United States and in Norway, 
governments protected national benefits, and software-related infrastructures were 
already present or were being built rapidly (the first two levels in software export 
success model), and in Iran both are absent; yet according to the abovementioned 
evidences, this comparison is not totally irrelevant.  
                                                 
6  See my interview with Mr. S. in case8 of chapter 7 
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Anyhow, the abovementioned analysts believe that any active computer company 
in Iran can gain huge success and money in the coming decades and that it would be 
very beneficial for anyone who invests in the IT sector in this market. Yet in order to 
bring this dream into reality the first step is to plan a good strategy and implement it 
correctly (the very first level in the software export success model). Although our 
focus in this paper will be only on the role of Diaspora in the future of Iran’s IT 
industry, we are obliged to cover other aspects shortly, too. 
 The witness and proof for this prophecy about the forthcoming boom of IT in Iran, 
in addition to those mentioned in footnote 6, is the rush towards the use of computers 
in all possible areas (home, education, trade, industry, etc.) inside the country, along 
with the urgent need of all sectors to mechanize and automate their old and inefficient 
systems. What strengthen this idea, are the multi million Iranian communities in the 
first world countries who are highly educated and have control over an estimated 1000 
billion dollars capital [5]. A very big part of this worldwide spread, rich and well- 
educated Diaspora wish to help rebuild their home country and even go back and live 
there; others wish to do anything they can, although they may never be able to return 
to their birth place. 
Good, modern and efficient management can be the biggest service that the 
emigrant Iranians can give to their homeland if they come back to Iran. But the bitter 
fact is that the power in Iran is in the hands of mafia groups and they have shuffled the 
key jobs between a few thousand of their own members during the last 27 years [9]. 
So, non-corrupted managers who don’t cooperate with the mafia, even with highest 
specialty and best experience and brightest background, eventually can do nothing 
even if they leave their golden position and luxurious life in the West and come back 
to their homeland; while most of them claim that they wish to do so one day. 
In their article “Building Iran’s software industry”, Nicholson and Sahay point out 
that Iran has two major problems that have prevented it from acquiring its proper 
position in the international market. The first big problem is Iran’s weak and wrong 
foreign policy that has made the USA put an embargo on the country, which again 
confirms mismanagement. Such policies are going to make the country internationally 
boycotted too, because of the issue of developing nuclear industries and involvement 
in international terrorism. Thus, any lobbying role that even the most powerful and 
well-known Iranian-Americans can play between the two countries is automatically 
paralyzed. This also means that no patriot Iranian volunteers lobby for the Islamic 
regime. Once again we see that in the absence of the first level of the software export 
success model (national software vision/strategy), building the higher levels 
(international linkage and trust in this paragraph) is impossible; despite the powerful 
and extreme potential forces. 
Again we see that Iran needs a 180 degree turn in both its foreign and internal 
policies, in order to let its adequate, competent and deft diasporas come back to Iran 
and take over control of affairs, or give their services to their homeland from their 
present residences. Iranian specialists occupy some of the highest positions in the US, 
Europe and all other parts of the world. 
Nicholson and Sahay also mention that: “Even though technical skills are high, the 
weakness of project management skills has led to the failure of large projects”. Thus 
the other important problem is the lack of experienced project management in the 
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country, which results in lack of success in all major projects; as mentioned above [3] . 
I have discussed the services that Iranian expatriate experts can give in this regard in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Finally, the last chapter, chapter 8, discusses several different ways in which the 
Iranian diasporas can serve the above mentioned goals; i.e.: 
 
1. Transfer the knowledge and new technologies to promote the scientific 
ability of Iranian IT society, and even laws needed for such activities. 
2. Preparing money recourses and assets to be capitalized in IT industry in 
Iran. 
3. Compensating the lack of human recourses and specialized staff which is 
one of the country’s most important problems, due to the high rate of brain drain.   
4. Importing the culture of using IT based services in daily affairs, to Iran. 
5. Importing the culture of obeying the rules from western societies in which 
people respect the law, and fight corruption and illegal ways of doing all kinds of 
activities. 
6. Reform in the educational system of IT and software courses according to 
the new goal oriented educational systems in developed countries. 
7. Implementing strategic research in IT-related areas. 
8. Cooperate to present Iranian software industry in the international markets 
through software fairs, representing Iranian companies and other methods. 
9. Finding foreigner markets for Iranian products and services. 
10. Establishing international linkage and trust between Iranians and foreigners  
11. Teaching new management methods to the workforce. 
 
 
1.2 Benefits of this research and research problem 
 
In this section I will try to introduce the target groups of this thesis. In this relation, 
first of all I have to limit the wide scope of the word ‘diaspora’, as I only want to point 
to a particular group of people when I mention “the Iranian diaspora”. Then I clarify 
the problem that I am going to solve through this research; and according to that I 
explain the expected benefits of it. Finally the expected contributions of this research 
will be introduced. 
 
 
1.2.1 Diaspora’s scope 
 
Diaspora, which according to the Webster’s online dictionary means “A historical 
dispersion of a group of people deriving from similar origins”, has a very wide 
meaning that includes everybody who comes from the same origin [10]7. This group 
                                                 
7 The same dictionary adds: 
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of people generally has common interests and ties. Halleh Ghorashi quotes this 
sentence from Clifford: “Diasporist discourses reflect the sense of an ongoing 
transnational network that includes the homeland, not as something simply left behind, 
but as place of attachment in a contrapuntal modernity.” [11]8
But obviously our work is addressing a limited group of Iranian emigrants who 
have been born in Iran, or at their present residence from Iranian parents; and have the 
following characteristics: 
•  Live and work in developed countries. 
•  Either work in the field of IT and software industry, or have a kind of 
commercial or cultural activity that can be applied in relation to supporting 
software production and IT industry or promoting use of IT in daily life. 
•  Having high education is not a necessity but is a positive point and most 
members of our target group have this condition. 
 
 
1.2.2 Research Problem 
 
Normally all research topics must cast a question which is to be answered as a 
result of the research. Although this thesis’ topic is not in the form of a question, we 
can consider that it is in fact a short form of this question: “what are the different roles 
that the Iranian diaspora can play in the development of the IT and software industry 
in Iran?” 
In this regard, in the last chapter (chapter 7, conclusion) we will discuss several 
answers that this research has found as possible answers to the abovementioned 
question. I have pointed to them earlier at the end of section 1.1; the next subsection 
contains also few questions that this thesis is trying to find proper answers to. 
 
 
1.2.3 Benefits of this research  
 
Currently, most Iranians are waiting for something positive to happen, and 
obviously they expect somebody else to make that thing happen. Those who are 
residing outside the country, always say that if ‘That’ happens, we will go back and do 
this and do that. So, as the first step I hope that this research may show Iranian ex-
                                                                                                                                                        
  “Since the late twentieth century, the term diaspora (Greek διασπορα, a scattering or sowing of 
seeds), has been used (without capitalization) to refer to any people or ethnic population) forced or 
induced to leave their traditional ethnic homelands, being dispersed throughout other parts of the 
world, and the ensuing developments in their dispersal and culture. 
  Originally, the term Diaspora (capitalized) was used to refer specifically to the populations of Jews 
exiled from Judea in 586 BC by the Babylonians, and 135 A.D. by the Romans. This term is used 
interchangeably to refer to the historical movements of the dispersed ethnic population, the cultural 
development of that population, or the population itself.” 
 
8  Ghorashi has quoted it from: Clifford, James (1994) Diasporas, Cultural Anthropology, 9(3), 302-38. 
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patriots possible ways to serve their country (i.e. the target group Iranians who live out 
of Iran and have something to do with software and/or investment on it). 
But of course nobody helps anybody else, even his own motherland, without 
bilateral expectations. Such expectations should be fair and rational. I may cover a part 
of these rational expectations. 
It is also most desirable to contribute and offer some possibilities to other target 
groups mentioned in the next subsection (1.2.4). In addition to that, this project is 
expected to help develop the country’s software industry which is an essential tool in 
the improvement of both economic and social standards. 
Nowadays, the economic situation in Iran is experiencing some of its worst and 
most critical days in the last five decades9. On the other hand becoming global or 
“Globalization” is also another very important issue not only in Iran, but also in all 
developing countries. Both of these issues involve data and the informatics industry, in 
which areas Iran is decades behind the developed countries. 
In this regard, software production and export can be very important for Iran. It can 
play a major role in the job creation process, can help gain money for the country, and 
is a very urgent necessity for progress in automation of industry and office services. 
Yet the unseen effects of a progressive software and IT industry on easing and 
lubricating all other aspect of social life and business and industry, is far more than 
this. Even if we accept that the return of Iranian emigrants (or foreigner experts if we 
want to be more idealistic) in order to work in Iran and rebuild the country is almost 
vital and urgently needed; one of the most important steps to acquire this goal is to 
upgrade living standards (which are currently very much lower than those of 
progressive countries). Electronic government services also need to be prepared; 
which in turn involves the establishment of metropolitan software infrastructures and 
enterprise software systems10. 
Another important aspect of IT is related to the reconstruction of old systems. 
Many organizations in Iran are trying to renew and automate their antiquated office 
systems and control methods. All these systems need huge amounts of new up-to-date 
hardware, and then efficient software to work properly. This in turn, increases the need 
for internal usage of software and intensifies the importance of developing the 
software production industry in Iran. New methods and services have been in use for a 
long time all around the world, but Iranians have not even heard of their names. As a 
few very primitive examples we can mention new banking systems, extended usage of 
electronic money, electronic governance, electronic trade and finally electronic media 
which is the only item that is already well known and popular in Iran due to extensive 
censorship over internal media. 
The writer of this thesis hopes that this research can have a share in developing the 
IT industry in Iran, as well as encouraging other researchers to work on issues related 
to this country. 
                                                 
9  Even the last president called himself ‘the Robin hood of Iran’ in his elective contest, pointing out 
the deep and large gap between the high classes of the community and the majority of people most of 
whom live under the poverty limit. 
10  The improvement of economic and social standards on one hand, and the entrance of money and 
experts from foreign countries on the other hand, are interrelated in a cyclical manner that amplify 
each other and thus give benefits to all Iranians. 
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Development of Information technology in Iran and the issues of software 
production and export from this country are important for non-Iranian groups too. 
Many software companies are looking for cheaper and efficient outsourcing 
possibilities. Iran, with many educated and unemployed young people, along with rich, 
educated and experienced Diaspora all around the world is a very good choice. 
Research such as this can illuminate their way in pursuing investment policies in the 
long term. 
 
 
1.2.4  Expected target groups  
 
Five groups of people may get benefits of this research: 
 
1. That group of Iranians who live outside the country, but desire to give a 
service to their home land; in other words the diasporas or expatriates. 
2. Those who produce software and feel the need for more qualified staff, new 
ideas, up to date knowledge and who are looking for better markets for their 
products (mainly inside Iran). 
3. Those that produce software and look for better and cheaper sources to do 
the job and consider Iran as a choice for outsourcing and look for efficient contacts 
with and reliable consultants on Iran (mainly outside). 
4. Policy makers in the government structure. 
5. And finally, of course I should add university research groups that assist and 
consult with the three above organizations (items 2-4). 
 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to methodology and I have presented a detailed discussion 
on the methods that I have used and their efficiency, there. In this section I review 
those methods in brief. 
The first point in this regard is the approach that I have chosen to reach the results 
from the findings. As this thesis is originally based on Nicholson and Sahay’s report 
on building Iran’s software industry, I chose their strategy which they mention as 
interpretivist [3]. 
As my work is not a quantitative research I have no explicit numbers to get direct 
results from. Instead, I have used only qualitative methods, so it is very important to 
keep my neutrality against what I have found and what I conclude from the results 
when I interpret my findings. Anyhow, I am an Iranian and it is very natural that I 
have pre-biases towards what is going on in that country. Yet, I have done my best to 
keep fair and as Nicholson and Sahay point out, interpret the role of each actor 
according to his own perspective, and not compare it with my own beliefs. This issue 
is discussed in section 3.1, Nicholson and Sahay’s strategy description. 
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After that I have described all qualitative methods that I have used in my research 
in section 3.2, qualitative methods description. I have mentioned 7 different techniques 
there, but one of them, statistics, is in fact a quantitative method. Yet, as I have 
adopted them from other sources, and haven’t searched for them directly, I haven’t 
separated it from qualitative methods. Anyhow, all used methods can be grouped in 
three major groups: 
 
 
1.3.1 Direct observation 
 
In some parts of this thesis I have used my direct observation as a tool to describe 
happenings. Two of these situations in which I have used this technique more than 
other parts are chapter 2, “Why Iran has so many diasporas” and in case 12 on BIHE in 
chapter 7, case description and analysis. As I haven’t done any of these activities as a 
part of this research, and they have been shaped during a long time in the past without 
any direct relation to this thesis; it may seem that they are in contradiction with the 
‘research’ nature of this thesis. 
But this is not right, because ‘direct observation’ is a qualitative method anyhow, 
and there is not such a rigid limitation on the duration of a study. So I evaluate my 
own information in these fields as valid enough to be used in my thesis. More 
description comes in section 4.2.7 of chapter 4, methodology. 
 
 
1.3.2 Interview 
 
Interviewing those Iranians who are involved in software production or any IT 
affair and/or its outsourcing from Iran (or other countries) is one of the most important 
tools that I have used in this research. I have interviewed 18 different people that have 
a hand in this industry, including Iranians and non Iranians. 
The following subsections in chapter 3 are relevant to this method:  
4.2.4 Interviews 
4.2.5 E-mail Corresponding 
These methods are explained in chapter 3, research methods; and the extracted 
material from interviews and correspondences are discussed in chapter 6, case 
description and analysis.  
 
 
1.3.3 Reading 
 
Another important part of my work to prepare this project has been reading 
different resources. These readable materials are the complement to interviews in order 
to complete the empirical part of the work and prepare proper and sufficient 
information. 
The following subsections in chapter 3 are relevant to reading method:  
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4.2.1 Books and Articles 
4.2.2 Newspapers and Internet News Agencies and TVs 
4.2.3 Relevant Websites 
These methods are explained in chapter 3, research methods; and the extracted 
materials are discussed in chapter 5, literature review.  
 
 
1.3.4 Quantitative method 
 
As mentioned earlier, I have also used different statistics from online sources. 
These statistics are not classified in the above three categories, as they are not 
considered to be a qualitative method. But as I have gained this information from other 
sources and have not gathered them personally, it is possible to classify them in 
subsection 1.3.3. Anyhow, the method’s description has come in chapter 3, subsection 
4.2.6; and the information is mostly used in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
 
1.4 Overview of the theoretical basis 
 
The theoretical basis of this thesis is based on the software export success model, 
used as the theoretical model in Nicholson and Sahay’s article on Iran's software 
industry. 
This model is illustrated in figure 1.2 (page15). As the figure shows, the problem 
of this research is mostly involved with the higher levels of the model (international 
market, international linkages and trust, and national software industry). As the overall 
result of the efforts of the Iranian government in national vision/strategy level has 
obviously been negative11, and IT infrastructures are very weak in Iran, we can 
decisively say that the first two levels of the model are not built yet. This bitter fact 
makes research on the higher levels more difficult and more sensitive. 
Detailed explanation of this model and the theoretical basis of this thesis is given in 
chapter 4, theory overview. 
 
 
1.5 Overview of the empirical basis 
 
The empirical work that I have done for this research, as mentioned in section 1.3, 
can be grouped in four main groups: direct observation, reading, interviewing and 
finding statistics: 
 
                                                 
11 United State’s embargo on Iran, lack of foreign investment in Iran, international problems and 
tensions like the nuclear issue and terrorism, are only a few examples of the negative consequences the 
Iranian government’s strategy. 
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             Figure 1.2: The Software Export Success Model 
 
 
• Direct observation is relevant to the past and I haven’t done it particularly for 
this research, but I have used my personal observations in this thesis. Anyhow, this 
activity is used most of all in chapter 2, the current situation. 
• The reading material that I have used is presented in chapter 5, literature 
review, in detail; and the methods are described in chapter 3, methodology 
4.2.1 Books and Articles 
4.2.2 Newspapers and Internet News Agencies and TVs 
4.2.3 Relevant Websites 
• Interviews and correspondence via E-mail and telephone are mostly presented 
in chapter 7, case description analysis in detail, but a good deal of them is also used 
in chapter 2. Methods used to implement this part are described in chapter 3, 
subsections …. 
4.2.4 Interviews 
4.2.5 E-mail Corresponding 
• And finally extracting statistics which is mostly used in chapter 2, the current 
situation; and the method is explained in chapter 3, subsection 4.2.6. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
 
In addition to this chapter, introduction, this thesis has six other chapters. 
Chapter 2 begins with a short introduction of Iran, and then section 2.1 has a short 
history explaining why there are so many Iranian expatriates. Section 2.2 represents 
few statistical proofs for the previous one. The last two sections give reasons for this 
vast emigration from Iran and explain some of its negative consequences. 
Chapter 3, current situation, first shortly reviews Iran’s current economy and then 
explains the current situation of IT infrastructures. 
Chapter 4 is ‘Methodology’ and explains the different methods that I have used to 
gather the information for this research. It begins with a short explanation about the 
interpretivist approach, which is adopted from Nicholson and Sahay’s article. In the 
second section of this chapter I have explained different qualitative and quantitative 
methods that I have used. 
Chapter 5 is ‘theory overview’ and is dedicated to the theoretical basis of this 
thesis. As mentioned in section 1.4 this research is theoretically based on the software 
export success model, which is again adopted from Nicholson and Sahay’s article. 
This model is illustrated in figures 1.2 and 4.1, and detailed explanation about its 
relation with this research is given in chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 is dedicated to literature review and reviews all the reading materials that 
I have read for this research; including books, articles, newspapers, and also online 
materials. 
Chapter 7, description and analysis, covers the most important part of my empirical 
activities; and that is my interviews and E-mail correspondences. This chapter contains 
both classification and my own analysis of what I have found; and at the end a short 
description of my several interviews are added as case studies. 
The final chapter, Chapter 8, is obviously the conclusion; and introduces a few 
ways in which Iranian diasporas can help their country to develop its fragile software 
industry. As in other chapters, analysis and discussion is added to each 
recommendation. 
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Chapter 2: Why Iran Has So many 
Diasporas? 
 
Iran lies in Western Asia, the region that is called the Middle East, as you can see 
in figure 2.1. Iran is one of the countries in the world with the most neighbors, as it is 
bordered by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan to the north, by 
Turkey and Iraq to the west, by Pakistan and Afghanistan to the east, and by the 
Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea to the south. It also has water borders with Russia and 
Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea, and with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
U.A.E. through the Persian Gulf and finally Oman through the Oman Sea. It covers 
1,648,000 square kilometers and has a seacoast of 657 kilometers along the Caspian 
Sea on the north and 2,043 kilometers on the Persian Gulf and the sea of Oman on the 
south [12]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Middle East and position of Iran in the region [13] 
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According to the latest statistics (November of 2005) announced by ‘the statistics 
Centre of the Country’ Iran has a population of 68,467,000 and it is growing on 
average by a rate of 900,000 people a year [14]. The current political regime is the 
‘Islamic Republic’ from 1979 in which the theocratic Supreme Leader has the ultimate 
power, despite the fact that the country has both a parliament and a president. 
Although the regime is called a ‘Republic’, no political parties are allowed in Iran. 
This chapter gives a short review of Iran’s history, then an analysis of the reasons 
that scatter Iranian elite classes around the world. 
 
 
2.1 History overview 
 
Iran has 28 centuries of written history12. During the first 14 centuries it was an 
empire. During this period Iran was only ruled over by foreigners for 60 years (by the 
Greeks). 
But in the second 14 centuries, beginning with the invasion of wild new Moslem 
Arabs, Iran has been almost always either occupied or ruled over by non-Iranian kings, 
except for few short periods. It has been (and is) divided in several regions and war, 
famine and disease have always been dominant. In such conditions many people are 
either obliged to escape from their birthplace to survive, or they have to move to other 
places in search of a better life and new opportunities. 
So, emigration from Iran in large numbers is not something new. Intellectuals and 
elites and even ordinary people, have escaped from this country in big groups many 
times during the last 14 centuries. But it has never been easy for any of them. Because 
Iranian culture, traditions, society, language and even history and geography is so 
unique, that once one gets used to it, he can nowhere else find such cultural elements 
to satisfy his social needs [15]. Aside from problems and difficulties that all escapees, 
refugees and emigrants have, Iranian expatriates have been facing this problem rather 
more intensively than others13. 
Anyhow, right after the Arabs’ invasion from the west, many Iranians emigrated 
eastwards to India in order to practice their religion freely. Their offspring are still 
called ‘Parsian’ (Persians) and they are one of the high-ranked sects in India’s 
community and occupy very good positions there. 
An outstanding example of them, are the Tata family who are one of the biggest 
owners of industry in India. The Tata Group produces many things, from steel and 
motors and cars, to IT products. The Tata Group comprises 93 operating companies in 
seven business sectors: information systems and communications; engineering; 
materials; services; energy; consumer products; and chemicals. The Group was 
founded by Jamsetji Tata in the mid 19  century. th The Tata Group is one of India's 
                                                 
12 2006 is equal to 2714 from the beginning of the Median Empire. 
13 Mohammad Ali Islami Nadooshan mentions seven reasons for Iran’s particularity and uniqueness in 
his book: “Iran and its loneliness”. He points to these seven factors: geography, history, language and 
culture, religiousness, psychiatrics, power of civilization-making and finally Sufism. 16. Pzhoohandeh, 
About Iranian Identitiy (2), in Payam-e-Baha'i. 2005. p. 25-28. 
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largest and most respected business conglomerates, with revenues in 2004-05 of $17.8 
billion, the equivalent of about 2.8 per cent of the country's GDP [17]. 
When the Mongols invaded from the east, many Iranians escaped west, towards the 
Roman Empire at that time, and Turkey at present. Jalal’eddin Mohammad Balkhi, 
known as Rumi belongs to this period. 
A few centuries later, Safavid kings massacred Sunni Muslims and made those 
who didn’t want to convert their religion escape both ways, to India and Rome. In 
India, ‘Ostad Isa Shirazi’ made the  ‘Taj Mahal’ for ‘Shah Jahan’ [18] 14; and Iranian 
poets of his (Shah Jahan’s) court established the Indian style in Persian literature. 
Thus, with thousand years of history of civilization, in the early twentieth century 
(in 1925 when the Qajar dynasty changed to Pahlavi) there was only a population of 
about 10 million left in Iran. This was due to long-term wars, shrinking of the borders 
and continuous famine and infectious epidemics15, in addition to emigration. During 
the last 80 years this number has grown to about seventy millions, yet the rate of 
emigration is one of the highest ever seen or remembered. It is estimated to be between 
5 to 10% of the total population (in the last three decades) and it may grow to more 
than 10% as it is growing continuously. 
If we want to know the reason for Iranians’ movement in large numbers; first of all 
we should remember that in general there are two main reasons for emigration: either 
from the fear of tribulation and discomfort, or in the hope of luck and a better life [20]. 
Those who escape because of fear, will find safety and those who move in search of 
luck, will find new opportunities. Now, as both reasons are valid for Iranians, they get 
both benefits. So it is very natural that everybody who is able to move, tries his fortune 
outside the borders. 
In order to have a more specific look at the trend of Iranians’ emigration from Iran, 
its shape and its side effects on the software industry, we first have to split the time 
period into two distinguishable parts: before the revolution (until 1977) and after the 
Islamic revolution (from 1978 and later). 
 
 
2.1.1 Emigration from Iran before 1978 
 
Before 1979 emigration from Iran had a normal trend and didn’t happen in large 
groups. Those who wanted to have more social freedom, or a more modern and 
luxurious life, used to move from Iran to Europe or USA. Yet both this reasons could 
be categorized in the ‘hope of luck and a better life’ category. Relatively speaking, 
there was no serious threat for political opponents of the regime (I don’t claim that it 
was zero); and those who desired a better life, had enough hope to stay inside Iran and 
wait for a better future. So compared with what happened in the 80s and 90s, 
emigrants proved to be a very small group. 
                                                 
14 Amazingly, the Taj Mahal of 20th century, the Baha’i temple of New Delhi which is like a lotus 
flower, is also built by an Iranian architect, Fariborz Sahba. [19. Zargarpour, H., The Ethernal Lotus, 
Ibid. p. 37-43. 
15 Only from 1880 to 1920, an estimated number of half of the population have died from famine and 
epidemics. 
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Many students were studying abroad, but a big majority of them used to return 
home as soon as their studies finished. 
Some members of religious minorities left Iran, Jews to Israel or USA, Armenians 
to California, and Baha’is to all other continents to teach their religion. Yet, because of 
regeneration, their communities were growing rather than shrinking. 
Finally, future events showed that the trend in the 70s and before that, was very 
slow and had little or no negative effect on the cultural and economical life of the 
country. 
During this period, at least in the 70s, Iran was a frontrunner in the use of 
technology and particularly IT in the Middle East. All American companies, and above 
all IBM, had active branches in Iran at this time. 
 
 
2.1.2 Emigration from Iran after 1979 
 
By the beginning of unrest and rebellions in 1978, many people felt danger and 
began to exit the country. Most of these people were the owners of big capital and 
major industrial assets. They took with themselves whatever they could and left the 
rest to be later confiscated by the ‘revolutionary courts’. After the overturn of the 
monarchy in February of 1979, horrible waves of arrests, execution and confiscation of 
assets overshadowed the whole country. So, a big wave of escape and emigration 
began among the higher classes of the society; those who had big assets or high 
positions in the previous regime tried to reach ‘the other side’ and save their lives as 
well as saving the rest of their money; meaning the part that was not confiscated and 
was transferable into cash money. The direction of the entrance of money into the 
country reversed and money began to exit the country rapidly. Owners of many 
factories escaped and their industrial units lost efficiency or bankrupted and closed 
down. The economy began to descend and the value of the US dollar, along with all 
other prices, rose up16. Those who were outside Iran in order to study or for other 
temporary reasons thought twice about returning. 
On the 4th of November of the same year, few extremist students occupied the 
American embassy in Tehran and took 52 of its personnel hostages for 444days. 
Instead of punishment, the hooligan students received many thanks and 
encouragements from ayatollah Khomeini, the clergy leader of the Islamic revolution. 
In this way the diplomatic relationships between the two countries were cut off and 
have not recovered ever since. As the US is the superpower of technology, science, 
industry and of course money in our time, good and near relations with this country are 
very important and even vital for all other countries on the Earth. Instead of creating 
positive relations, Islamic revolutionaries demanded that damages from the US 
government be paid to their country, but these that have never been recovered and 
don’t seem likely to be compensated in the near future. 
Americans’ first reaction was putting an economical embargo on Iran which has 
not been revoked until now, as Americans extend and renew the sanction whenever it 
expires. The direct result of the US embargo on Iran has been the continuous 
                                                 
16 In fact the value of money unit began to collapse, but every body deciphered it in the other way.  
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weakening and descent of its economy17 along with many other political and 
sociological negative side effects. As we will see later, the software and IT industries 
in Iran have suffered their most serious losses from this sanction which doesn’t allow 
transaction of technology, products and money from both sides; particularly in relation 
to high tech and strategic knowledge and products. 
The revolution itself, and secondly the US embargo had two lethal effects on Iran’s 
young IT industry. First of all the new government fired and deported all American 
(along with many other western) experts and advisers, the presence of whom was vital 
for the Iran’s software industry. Remember that in the 70s, software was a very high 
specialty and not very many people were able to run the main frames of that time. 
Although Iran had a few programmers and programming courses were planned in a 
few universities, yet they were working under the management and leadership of 
foreign managers and were not still independent and “standalone” (particularly in 
military fields). 
Secondly, America’s embargo prevented Iran from importing new high technology 
and it made Iranians move around in circles for a long time and fall decades behind the 
world in many ways, particularly in IT that has been developed faster than any other 
technology18. The boom of PCs happened almost a decade later than in developed 
countries in Iran. The software industry has never had a noticeable output, and still the 
most important software projects in Iran are average size Database projects. The boom 
of internet has not happened yet in Iran, as the government wants to control the stream 
of news and information into the country. 
Another very strong reaction by Americans was their support and, as many analysts 
believe, encouragement of Saddam Hussein to attack Iran which caused innumerable 
damages to both countries. 
The other revolutionary move that caused great damages for the science and 
technology, and as a result for the software industry of Iran, was closing down all the 
universities for 3 years (1981 to 1984) under the name of ‘the Cultural Revolution’. 
After the reopening of the universities very many professors and students were fired 
(many of them were also imprisoned and even executed) and many textbooks were 
censored or altered. The lack of software experts at that time, made a big problem for 
the very few computer companies that were active at that period [21]. 
The following social belief got shaped and spread after the revolution: “Leave Iran 
as soon as and in any way you can, only fools stay in here. It’s not a place of living 
anymore.”! 
 
The war begins 
Less than one year after the occupation of the US embassy, on 22nd of September 
1980, while American hostages were still imprisoned in Iran, the 8 year war between 
Iran and Iraq began, a war with no result that killed between 450,000 to 1 million 
young Iranian men (depends on who gives the statistics) and almost the same number 
                                                 
17 The value of the Rial, the Iranian money unit is a good example. One US Dollar was about 70 Rials 
in 1979, and now (March of 2006) it is 9150 Rials. This has happened while the value of US Dollar is 
now by far less than its value at 30 years ago, due to inflation. 
18 Other causes that supported this negative effect were mismanagement in all levels and weak 
economy. 
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of Iraqis. The descent of economy and money value accelerated and life became more 
difficult day by day. More and more factories and companies were bankrupted and 
closed down, more money went out, hundreds of billions of dollars burned and 
destroyed as a result of this war; and worst of all, the drain of brains and assets 
increased drastically. Those who were temporarily staying in foreign countries decided 
to change their nationality and reside there permanently. 
The majority of single escapees during this period have been young men, due to the 
danger that threatened their life on the warfronts, and the vague and uncertain future 
that was awaiting them. Although this factor was added to the death of young men on 
the fronts and changed the demographic balance between male and female in Iran, 
most families were still too conservative to let their single daughters leave the country 
alone and live in a culturally different atmosphere in which they were able to do 
whatever they want. 
In 1985 Iranian forces suffered serious defeats on all fronts and Khomeini was 
obliged to “drink the cup of poison”, as he himself pointed out to his acceptation of the 
peace. The war ended with no particular result apart from hundreds of thousands of 
dead and disabled people, most of them young men, and huge destruction and the last 
but not least, the seizure of the monopoly of power by mafia groups shaped by mullahs 
and their family members and close friends. 
In 1978 one US dollar was equal to 70 Rials which had not changed for the last few 
decades. At the end of the war, in 1988 it was about 1000 Rials. In August, after the 
declaration of the end of war, dollar prices suddenly decreased to 500 Rials in a short 
time but eventually went back to the same price and even more in few months. This 
sudden unexpected shock had very much many negative effects on the economy. 
Although a few people gained money, the majority suffered huge losses, on both the 
decreasing and increasing trends. Many companies and people became so badly 
bankrupt that a few people committed suicide; even though period the powerful Rial 
lasted only a very short time. 
At this time PCs were still not so popular in Iran and the pervasive technology, 
even in the universities and governmental companies, was still that of the late 70s. 
First of all, because PCs were still rather expensive, as the economy was not good in 
Iran. Secondly because the wartime atmosphere prohibited the majority of the 
community from buying and exploiting something that was still considered more of a 
luxury than a tool of production and business. So software companies were still limited 
and software experts were scarce. Iran was no longer a leader in IT (and anything else 
except for fundamentalism) in the region. 
Less than one year later, on 4th of June 1989 the 90 year old ayatollah died and the 
president at that time, Ali Khamanei, became the supreme leader. 
 
Hashemi Rafsanjani seizes power 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani won the presidential election in 1989 and called his 
government ‘the construction government’. He meant that his first priority was 
reconstructing the destruction that remained from the 8 year war. Because of his vast 
power and dominant control over all affairs of the country, he was called ‘Akbarshah’. 
He had assigned his family members to key positions and had (and still has) vast 
incomes from all kinds of corrupted economical activities. 
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During his 8 year government, mafia groups continued their cancer-like 
development and tried to eat up whatever seemed to be profitable in the country. Thus, 
lack of economic safety made more and more big assets escape from Iran and find 
safer places around the world, beginning from Dubai near to the southern shores, to 
Australia and Canada at the other ends of the world. 
It seems that this government built a little bit, and changed the face of the country. 
But the bitter fact behind all these constructions was that they cost too much for 
Iranians. Any healthy leading system would have been able to build a “Norway” in 
Iran with the amount of money. The Islamic republic’s leaders and managers wasted in 
national assets in whatever way they could: all of them have noticeable bank accounts 
and other assets in foreign countries. Almost all of the high rank managers of the 
Islamic regime, who are in fact members of a few mafia families, overpay any foreign 
(or internal) company to raise the amount of the contract, in return for a good share 
that they receive. You witnessed a bribery scandal between Hashemi’s son and StatOil 
just last year in Norway. This way lowest quality jobs are done with the highest price. 
So the system has to scatter lawful and reliable qualified managers and give high 
positions to non- qualified people, who are ready to cooperate with the mafia, in order 
to continue having illegal incomes.  
The gap between poor and reach became too deep and the average class of the 
society went down so much that it turned into a poor class in fact. The price of US 
dollar was about 1000 Rials at 1987 when Hashemi became president and 9000 Rials 
at the end of his presidency in 1995. 
During these years, the Islamic government which had international problems to 
execute its opponents openly, tried to get rid of them by terrorizing them either inside 
or outside the country. Although this was not a new method, a decrease in the 
executions19 resulted in an increase in terrorizing and assassination activities. Many 
writers and political activists were killed serially without any further investigation by 
the police (both inside and outside Iran). 
So, during this period, all hopes for the recovery of democracy, human and social 
rights, economic progress and eventually a better Iran after the war, died in the hearts 
of all those people who believed that the war was the reason for the country’s endless 
problems. They used to say the ‘Islamic Republic’ will become democratic and 
modern as soon as the war ends and Iranians will witness freedom and economic 
development afterwards. But after a few years it became clear that Hashemi and other 
mafia heads had prolonged the war in order to misuse the unstable situation and obtain 
more power and money. So a new wave of immigration began. This time there was a 
big difference: not only those people who disagreed with the regime and hated the 
mullahs, but also many of those who agreed and even cooperated with the regime and 
loved Islam, found Iran no longer a place for living. 
Although during this period the use of PC computer at homes and in offices 
became popular and widespread, but the new technology of big computers still didn’t 
enter Iran, and the use of PCs was also limited to small data bases, primary graphics 
                                                 
19 The climax of executions was in the summer of 1987 just after the end of the war. During few weeks 
thousands of political prisoners (estimated to be between 3 and 12 thousands), were executed without 
prosecution. Most of them were sentenced to limited imprisonments and many had suffered their 
sentences completely and should have been freed in a short time. 
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and game. Even today if you go to Iran and observe big enterprise’s Databases, like 
banks and governmental companies, you realize that the architecture of the system is 
not proper for the size of it and it follows small business architecture. The reason may 
be the lack of experts and enterprise projects managers or even poor economy that 
prohibits the success of big projects, but above all the reason may be deep corruption 
in the high levels which prohibits good choices. The high level managers have not 
enough specialties and the broad vision required for their positions. They even choose 
the winners of the contracts according to the bribes they receive or the family relation 
that they have, not according to the real qualification20.  
The internet boom, in 1995 was only a legendary tale in Iran and most computer 
users had only heard something about that, let alone the ordinary people. So it is 
obvious that no institution offered web services at that time. Even now after 10 years, I 
don’t know any company that offers a real web based service21.  
 
‘Reformists’ win the election in 1997 
In 1997, Mohammad Khatami who was previously a moderate minister in 
Hashemi’s cabinet, won the presidential election with the slogan of reform and social 
freedom. Again, all those who thought that it is possible to reform the ‘Islamic 
Republic’, hoped that Khatami will give them enough social freedom to breath, and he 
will lead the country to decrease the tensions with the rest of the world; and then 
economic development will follow that22. But even if Khatami was truthful about what 
he promised (now that many doubt it) conservatives didn’t let him to do his job and 
made too many obstructions to his program in order to defeat the reform and 
reformists. Once it was said that Khatami has encountered averagelone crisis every 
fifth day. 
Fanatics did whatever they could in order to embarrass Khatami, but in fact they 
put more pressure on ordinary people and made many of them escape the country. 
Although Khatami managed to keep the dollar’s price between 8000 to 9000 Rials, but 
the inflation rate was always more than 10% per year, even sometimes more than 20 
percent. Eventually all his economical corrections resulted negatively instead of 
making anything better, just because of the mafia’s determination to embarrass and 
discredit him. 
He tried to give a little social freedom to people, but fundamentalists did their 
outmost to undo what he did. He even arrested the governmental serial murderers, but 
none of them was prosecuted and after a short time all of them came back to their 
previous positions. 
                                                 
20 Once I had got my bachelor newly, I received an offer to mechanize a big petrochemical complex’s 
selling system. A friend of me had got the offer, just because his father had a position in a 
petrochemical factory, and his partner was a member of ‘sepah-e-pasdaran’. I rejected the offer as it 
was too big for us (and I was the only member of that teem who knew something about software 
engineering), but it was completely possible for us to get the contract and sell it to another teem who 
was not necessarily qualified for that job again. Such a method is valid for almost all projects and 
contracts.  
21 There may be few problems that prohibit companies to offer web services. There exists still no 
electronic money in Iran, cheating’s rate is too high and the culture of web based services is not 
established yet. The number of internet users is also less than that of developed countries. 
22 Many called him ‘The Gorbachev of Iran’ at first, but it was just a great expectation. 
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Eventually Khatami, like all his predecessors and colleagues, disappointed 
everybody and made many Iranians, most of all educated and qualified and 
experienced ones, leave the country in search of a better life and a free atmosphere to 
live in.  Almost everybody came to this conclusion that it is utterly foolish to wait or 
even hope for a better life in Iran. 
Despite his government’s slogans of renewing the country’s infrastructures and the 
fast progress of the IT in the world, IT had no measurable progress in this period. The 
slow and insufficient progress and improvement in the IT atmosphere of the country 
was due to the irresistible improvement wave of the hardware and networking 
technologies, not a structured national vision and effort to build the IT infrastructures. 
In fact, previous problems continued to bother the software industry and prohibit the 
implementation of big national projects like the banking system, national registry 
system, tax system and so on. 
A very major negative factor for IT in Iran in this period was the discovery of 
Canada as a country willing to accept emigrants, particularly educated and experienced 
young people23. Almost all the owners and managers and senior programmers of 
software companies that I knew, have emigrated to Canada during the last decade. The 
only exceptions either have had an opportunity to go to the US, or have gone to Dubai, 
or are preparing to go to Canada in the near future. Having an open (under process) 
application in the Canadian embassy among the elite class of the Iranians, is nowadays 
an obligation like having a car or a mobile phone. 
 
‘Conservatives’ counterattack 
At the end of Khatami’s 8 year presidential period (two 4 year periods), the 
conservative wing of the Islamic government decided to stabilize the monopoly of the 
power in their own hands. So during a corrupt election, a notorious member of the 
‘Sepah-e-Pasdaran’ (the army of patrols) called Mahmud Ahmadinejad was assigned 
as the president. 
Ahmadinejad attended the election with the slogan of improving the life of poorest 
classes and called himself the “Rabin hood” of the Islamic Republic. He gave his word 
to fight economical corruption and cut the hand of the mafia families off the oil 
industry24. But the mafia is more powerful than him and he has withdrawn from all his 
claims until now (March 2006). 
Moreover, ascending trend of the economical indexes has accelerated. The index 
price of stock market of Tehran which had fallen down from 16,000 units to 12,000 
units during the whole eight year of Khatami’s presidency, fell down to bellow 10,000 
in only three months from the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s time. This index is still 
descending, but slowly and now (March 2006 at the end of the Iranian year 1384) it is 
about 9,800 units [22]. The value of transactions of the Tehran stock market has 
dropped more than 8 billion dollars (70%) only form March to October 2005. the value 
                                                 
23 In 1991 a friend of mine got Canadian residence with 9 years experience as a depot keeper and 
without a high school diploma. In 93 another one got residence with a technical high school diploma 
in electronics. In 95 applications without bachelors were not processed at all. In 98 my friend who got 
Canadian immigration had two masters in telecommunication and physics. Now you can not apply 
without at least master and years of experience. 
24 He obviously meant Rafsanjani family by this. 
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of the national money unit (Rial) is falling steadily down and inflation is estimated to 
be more than 15% [23]. 
One of most troublesome activities of the new president has been his claims against 
the benefits of the western powers. He has intensified three major problem areas in 
which the Islamic Republic has been involved in for a long time. First of all he has 
requested elimination of Israel from the map. In this relation ha also has denied the 
holocaust as a rational reason for Israel’s existence. The second intensive problem is 
Iran’s nuclear program which at the time being is still controversial and has doomed 
the future for all Iranians. Now that Americans want to put the Islamic government 
under pressure, supporting and involvement in the international terrorism is the third 
issue that they put forward in order to make the Islamic regime’s dossier heavier. 
Khosro Pakbaz, the Iranian economist who resides in France, describes each 
speech of Ahmadinejad as a nuclear bomb on the Iranian economy [24]. He has caused 
an acceleration of the exit of assets and brains from Iran in less than a year from the 
start of his presidency and as you see, the situation worsens everyday. Another 
discussion on Iranian economy comes in chapter 3. 
 
 
2.2 Statistics 
 
As a proof of the above statements on immigration of Iranians from Iran during 
different periods we can look at the statistics of their emigration to Norway. These 
statistics are extracted from the official site of Norway's statistics central office (SSB) 
[25, 26]. 
The first chart in figure 2.2 shows the number of Norwegians of Iranian origin in 
1970, 1980, and then from 1986 to 2005. As you see, the number of Iranians before 
1979 has been very little, and until the end of the Iran-Iraq war it has been less than 
1000. The first wave comes with the end of the war. It is not possible to judge the 
exact rate of escaping from Iran according to this chart, because Norway's emigrant 
accepting policies have affected it too. But it is obvious that a constant stream of 
emigrants have come out of Iran ever since the Islamic revolution. 
The second chart in figure 2.3 shows exactly the same data as in the previous one, 
but discriminates between men and women. This one shows that while in 80s the 
number of men has been twice, or even in some years three times more than that of 
men; in 90s this tow numbers have become closer to each other and after 2000 women 
have exceeded men. In 2005, 227 men and 250 women have immigrated to Norway; 
the same statistics show that the above numbers are 2103 men and 2234 women from 
2000 to 2005. 
The third one in figure 2.4 shows Iranian residents in Norway (without changing 
their nationality) from 1977 to 2005 discriminating between men and women. It shows 
a rush towards Norway after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, but it is difficult to separate 
the Norwegian governments’ policies from Iranian’s tendencies and attitudes. Some 
similar statistics are extractable from official sites of statistics institutes of other 
countries too, that show more or less similar patterns. But quoting them here makes 
this section too lengthy. 
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Figure 2.2: The number of Iranian immigrants to Norway from 
1970 to 2005 [25] 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The number of Iranian immigrants to Norway from 
1970 to 2005, separating men and women [25] 
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The main problem in showing the trend of immigration and escape from Iran, is 
that Iranian official authorities release no statistics on such themes, and all opinions 
are more rough guesses rather than accurate statistics. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The number of Iranian residents in Norway from 
1970 to 2005, separating men and women [26] 
 
 
2.3 Summing up the reasons 
 
According to our short review of Iran’s recent history, we can sum up the reasons 
of Iranians huge emigration during the last three decades as following: 
 
1. Arrest, imprisonment, torture and execution of those who are accused 
of disagreement with the regime without fair prosecution or any acceptable 
proofs: The unbelievable frequency and number of such occurrences after the 
Islamic revolution has made such an atmosphere of horror and terror, that not only 
have many escaped from Iran, but also many of those who are outside and have 
some political records, are afraid of coming back to Iran. Many of these people 
even don’t talk to Iranians who work for the embassy or government, or are 
suspicious in any way (this is one of the problems for me to interview Iranians). It 
is noticeable that anybody who disagrees with the regime, is called ‘enemy’ of 
Islam and nation and even God. Although the reformist government of Khatami, 
tried to attract many members of these expatriates and convince them to come back 
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to Iran, still many of them cannot rely on the Islamic government due to bad 
experiences for a few of those who have returned. 
 
2. Lack of social freedom: This one, along with economic problems are two 
major reasons for the majority of Iranians who have left their birth place that are 
categorized in the second group according to Mardiha; and in fact the other items 
that I mention here are secondary reasons. Economical problems limit the amount 
of pleasure that can be attained and lack of freedom doesn’t allow such pleasures to 
be consumed [20].  
One of the most important problems in Iran that is classified in this category is 
lack of freedom for women, particularly their clothes and cover. During the first 
decade of Islamic regime most of the single escapees were young men. This was 
both because of the war that was a threat mostly for young men and also that many 
families were still too conservative to let their young daughters live alone in a 
western community. Yet the number of the girls rose up by and by, such that the 
latest statistics show that the number of women among Iranian emigrants is more 
than that of men [27]. My own personal experience shows that many Iranian men 
who live in other countries are somehow desirous to go back to Iran and live there, 
but their wives are generally reluctant and disagree with this idea. Ali, a friend of 
mine who is a 50 year old software engineer, lost his job as a programmer in a 
software company in Oslo. Even though he wanted to go back to Iran and establish 
his own software company, his wife disagreed and now he is running a ‘Narvesen’ 
shop in Oslo. His brother-in-law has somewhat the same situation too. 
  
3. Lack of fun and entertainment: One of the most important kinds of 
freedom that Iranians have lost is ‘happiness’! The paraphrase of Shi’i mullahs of 
Islam says that God doesn’t like happiness as it either is created by a sin, or may 
result in a sin or both. Drinking, dancing, having or attending a party and even 
listening to ‘happy music’ may result in serious kinds of punishment if detected, 
from whiplash and prison to huge fines. TV programs and cinema movies are 
censored and don’t satisfy the audience. Many use CD/DVD or video or satellite 
programs, but the latter is illegal and the former has only recently been partially 
freed. In general fun and happiness are considered to be negative and sinful in Shi’i 
beliefs, so everybody in Iran is always under a sort of mental pressure. 
 
4. Mourning and remorse based beliefs of the Shi’i government: The 
abovementioned pressure is doubled when the Shi’i rules recommend mourning 
and crying as something positive which God loves and pays after-death rewards for 
if you do it for Shi’i religious characters. The religious mourning days in a year are 
by far more than celebrations in the present Iranian calendar and it makes 
everybody depressed and tired of living in Iran. 
 
5. Endless economic problems: As I will have a more specific discussion 
about this topic in chapter 3, I leave this one here and I just mention that the ever-
falling economy of Iran is one of the most important reasons that makes people 
leave the country in search of a better life and a prosperous job.  
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6. Lack of safety for assets and capitals: Owners of big capital must invest 
their money and assets somewhere that they feel it is safe for their money. Iran has 
been shown to be one of the most dangerous places for investment. According to 
the United Nation’s Commerce and Development Conference Organization, Iran is 
the 88th most attractive country for investment [23]. This means that Iran is not 
attractive at all and it is not appropriate for investment. This was in late 2005 and 
the situation has become worse since then as a result of wrong and aggressive 
policies of the Islamic government.   
 
So, during the last three decades, since 1978 when the rebels began in Iran, the 
trend of money movement has always been continuously outward. Estimations 
declare that hundreds of billions of dollars have exited the country during the 
Islamic era. The reasons for the escape of assets are lack of both legal security and 
industrial security. So the foreigner investor doesn’t come to Iran, and the internal 
one either escapes or goes towards the black market and underground activities 
[23]25. 
It is very natural that the owner of the money moves with his money, 
particularly since many capitalists were executed during the first years of the 
Islamic Republic because of “corruption on the Earth” and “war with God”. 
Endless numbers of wealth and assets have been confiscated; and the same trend 
still continues. Another problem for those industries or companies that do develop 
well, is that the mafia calls their owners and says that want to be your partner. You 
know of course that nobody can say ‘no’ to the mafia’s offers. So, in a way, who 
ever passes a certain level of success and is not a member of, or connected to the 
mafia already, has no other choice rather than leaving the country and continueing 
his job somewhere safer. 
 
7. Occupation of high positions by inadequate and incapable people and 
the marginalization of adequate and qualified specialists: Right after the victory 
of the revolution in early 1997, the revolutionary winners began to substitute the 
country’s managers at all levels from the cabinet members down to small industry 
managers. But, the newcomers assigned only those people who were committed to 
the revolution and these people were not necessarily specialists, but also to a high 
extent they had no profound knowledge about their new job at all. This problem, 
made those specialists who worked under the management of illiterate managers 
resign and mostly leave the country. This, in turn created more vacancies for 
inadequate members of the regime’s fanatics’ mafia and the cycle continued 
inexorably. You can see that after the recent president came to power, he 
substituted very many high-level managers and even diplomats with members of 
his own mafia family, ‘Sepah-e-Pasdaran’ or ‘the army of patrols’. Another 
negative side-effect of this procedure that encourages or makes people escape from 
                                                 
25 It is estimated that between 200 and 400 billion dollars have gone to UAE with 300,000 Iranians 
who have over 4,000 companies there, and about 600 to 800 billions to US with more than a million 
Iranians in it; let alone the rest of the world 23. Pakbaz, K., Economical Report, in Ba Alireza 
Meybodi, A. Meybodi, Editor. 2005, AFNL: United States.. 
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Iran, is the widespread corruption that this group of the country’s management has 
caused. 
   
8. Nervousness, lying, people’s dishonesty and in sum, the degeneration of 
social and human values: All the above problems have put the majority of Iranian 
population under such huge mental pressure that their social values have weakened 
and their mental health has been endangered. So many people leave the country 
hoping to find a calmer society to live in; and of course they do. Also many of 
those few emigrants who decide to return to Iran and spend the rest of their life in 
their birth place, find it too difficult to cope with the irrational people and systems 
and return to their foreign residence sooner or later. 
 
9. Low living standards: In the same way, all living standards, economical, 
health, social and even educational standards have gone down during the last 3 
decades. But in almost all other parts of the world, particularly developed 
countries, living standards have had and still have positive growth. This has made 
the difference of living inside Iran and outside of it too different for the majority of 
people, even the most wealthy of them to resist the temptation of living in a 
‘progressive country’, whether it is Dubai just on the other side of the Persian Gulf, 
or USA, Canada or Australia on the other side of the Earth. 
Two of my interview mentioned this factor as the reason that they have left Iran 
and live in Norway26. Kamran said that in Iran bureaucracy is so dominant over all 
aspects of life that you should spend a whole day for very small jobs like a 
payment in the bank, or get a small amount of cash from it, or insure your car. In 
Norway you can do all these jobs in a few minutes at your home from your 
computer. Hamid has exactly the same opinion and says that I want to live in a 
country that has a “correct system”. It is interesting that both these men have 
married Norwegian girls and never think of returning to Iran. 
 
 
2.4 The effects of emigration on Iran’s population 
texture: 
 
As I mentioned earlier, there are two reasons for emigration. One group escapes 
from the fear of tribulation and discomfort27, and the second group seeks fortune and 
pleasure. 
While moving for the second reason happens everywhere28 in the world and it is to a 
high extent voluntary, it still has a few negative side-effects like putting stress on the 
emigrants and their families, imposing cultural and economical problems on the new 
                                                 
26 I haven’t reported my interviews with these two in case studies of chapter 7, because the most 
important points of their opinions is mentioned here. 
27 Even trial, imprisonment, torture and execution 
28 As you know, in the recent centuries, European emigrants have populated the new world in America 
and Oceania 
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environment and loss of resources for the old place. However, when emigrants are obliged 
to move from their birth place for the first reason the negative side- effects are in all ways 
greater than in the other situation,  
Even for those leaving to seek fortune and pleasure the negative effects may be 
great enough in themselves.  For this group, despite the enormous differences between 
life in Iran and outside of Iran, they feel obliged to move as they have to suffer bigger 
problems and miss many opportunities if they stay in their homeland rather than if they 
leave it. 
The number of the first group is limited of course, and the majority is with the 
second group. Normally, emigration of this group of elites, all around the world, is 
from the countries with ‘low pleasure production’ to the countries with ‘high 
beneficial backgrounds’ [20]. Maybe it seems that according to ‘pleasure gross 
product’ and ‘per person pleasure product’, Iran is not too much different from similar 
countries in its class29, so it shouldn’t have much more emigrants than the others. But 
the high rate of the elite emigration from Iran, confirms that its fundamentalist 
ideologist regime, has created an environment in which an important part of the 
“pleasure produced” is not consumable. 
Such powerful motives to exit from Iran have increased the emigration rate 
drastically and continuously ever since the beginning of the Islamic revolution in 
1978. This in turn, has imposed many negative effects on the country. Few of these 
effects ore obvious, such as brain drain or escaping of talented youth and experienced 
specialists along with owners of big capital and assets (with their assets transferred 
into money of course). We call these the ‘elite’, and their leaving eventually leads to a 
weakening of the society’s human and economical resources. But there is also a hidden 
side effect and that is the deforming of the population texture or demography. It means 
that those who have escaped from Iran have not been equally distributed among all 
social classes, but because of the following reasons they have been from the highest 
classes of the society: 
1. People in lower classes have less probability to get residence permit in other 
countries. As you know, in order to get residence permission in any country you 
must have some kind of social priority which includes higher education, a high 
degree of specialization, great experience, big assets or a prosperous business. The 
more you have of any of these, the more points you will have in an evaluation of 
any residence application. 
2. During the first years of the Islamic regime, members of lower classes felt 
fewer problems with the regime and thus had weaker motives to leave the country. 
The more the economy fall down, the more members of all classes and particularly 
lower ones decided to seek a better place to live in. Yet still the members of higher 
classes have more chances to find one. 
3. From the very beginning of the Islamic revolution, its leaders pretended to 
have socialist beliefs and leftist biases or tendencies and a serious determinations to 
support lower classes and poor people. So they made open and direct attacks 
towards higher classes of the community and even called them ‘taghooti’ which 
means ‘related to Satan and devil’ or ‘rebellion to God’ in Arabic. Thus the higher 
                                                 
29 Despite its bountiful natural resources, and the success of its diasporas that shows Iranians are 
capable of having a high degree of wealth and welfare, Iran is among the poor, third world countries. 
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classes and elite were clearly encouraged to leave the country in order to escape the 
revolution’s consequences. 
4. those people who have a kind of progress, either educational or economical, 
eventually reach to a point that they can make no more progress in Iran; a dead end 
in fact. So they are the most motivated to move to firs world countries in order to 
keep going forward. 
In order to illustrate this deformation of the population’s demography, let’s 
compare the demography of social classes with a pyramid, the top of which represents 
the higher classes and the bottom shows the lower classes. It means that the higher 
somebody’s position is in the society –according to his education or wealth or 
important job or social status - he/she belongs to a higher social class; and his/her 
position in the pyramid in figure 2.5 is higher. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Pyramid of the texture of community’s classes 
 
In normal situation most of the members of the society are grouped in the middle 
classes, so the demography of the classes against the number of the members of each 
class is not like a pyramid. This normal curve is shown in figure 2.6. But Iran does not 
have a normal economy, so the distribution of social classes cannot be normal either. 
Wrong policies of the Islamic government have pushed the majority of the population 
towards lower economic classes (despite the fact that the number of highly educated 
people has risen drastically), and disturbed the normal form of this curve. The 
disturbed curve is shown in figure 2.7 in which most of the population are grouped in 
lower classes rather than the middle class. In fact we can interpret this effect in this 
way too: the Iranian middle classes have shifted into the poor classes after the Islamic 
Revolution. 
The abovementioned wrong policies are those that have scattered the elite groups 
of the community and have made them escape the country and take out their movable 
wealth; thus have lowering the average wealth per person in Iranian society. The exit 
of assets, brains and managers in turn has lowered the production and decreased both 
GDP and GNP30; distributing ‘poverty’ in the community. Another reason for the 
                                                 
30 Under such circumstances, foreigner investors don’t investigate in Iran too; and GDP decreases as 
well as GNP. 
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deformation shown in figure 2.7 is the unfair distribution of wealth in Iran which has 
given the control of GNP and national wealth into the hands of a very small group of 
very wealthy and powerful people, called the ‘Ultra Rich’ in figure 2.7. In fact, despite 
the statistics show that Iran has a high rate of economical growth of 6% [28], the 
majority of people experience a harder life every year because the produced wealth is 
not distributed fairly among all classes of the Iranian community. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Demography of community’s classes in 
normal and healthy economic situation 
 
Figure 2.5 is in fact the reversal of figure 2.7 where the places of the vertical axis 
and horizontal axis which represent population and social class, are exchanged. In 
order to clarify this pyramid, look at it like the hierarchy of an army. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Demography of community’s classes in 
disturbed and unhealthy economic situation 
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The generals are at the very top and the soldiers are located at the very bottom. The 
higher one’s rank is, the higher is his position in the pyramid. The same as an army 
can do nothing without generals and officers even if it has millions of soldiers; a 
nation needs good managers and powerful policymakers in order to increase its 
national product, regardless of the number of its work force. So, we see that the 
members at the top of this pyramid have a more important role in any kind of 
production as they represent the capital, knowledge and specialties. 
Now that the intensive human resource loss in Iran has mostly scattered members 
of the top of the pyramid, the balance of wealth, knowledge and specialties in the 
country has been disturbed31. It means that brain drain and capital leakage are 
decreasing the total ability of the country as well as the average ability of each person 
to engage in production. As the trend of escaping from Iran still continues, the 
situation gets worse and worse everyday [29]32. 
Our special case, software production, depends to a high extent on educated, 
talented and experienced human force as well as sufficient capital to develop proper 
infrastructures. In other words we have no manual or unskilled worker and almost 
everybody in this job is a member of the elite group; who can escape the country more 
easily than others. So it is not so strange if drain brain and capital leakage have a very 
negative impact on it. The positive aspect of this trend could be the international 
relations that Iranian expatriates can provide for Iranian IT industry, if it wasn’t 
doomed because of the mistaken and destructive foreign policy. 
While this present picture of the software industry is depressing enough, the view 
of the future is not hopeful either. Morteza Mardiha believes that in terms of science it 
may be claimed that the scientific production of Iran is heading towards zero and if 
nobody finds a solution for this problem, in the near future, the scientific environment 
of the country will be limited to those who have not been able to find a position 
outside of Iran due to their weakness of knowledge33. The best Iranian students leave 
the country to continue their studies abroad, but they stay there after they finish their 
studies and never come back. It is growing so much that the granting of scholarships 
by the government is going to stop34. Although Iranian students have recently 
performed very well in the scientific Olympiads, and they can enter the universities 
without entrance exams, more than 90% of them leave the country sooner or later [20]. 
In this relation, Mohammad Ali Islami Nadooshan, writes in his book “Iran and its 
loneliness” that lack of rationalism has resulted in Iranians wanting knowledge and 
science not for its own sake, but rather for the narrowly defined benefits that they get 
from science. This is one of the biggest reasons for the huge brain drain from Iran. 
Because according to the reasons mentioned in section 2.3, educated people don’t find 
this priority in their own homeland as much as they have it in first world countries; and 
on the other side it is easier for them to seek residence in other countries. Following 
                                                 
31 This is another way that Islamic republic has in fact transferred the average class of Iranians into the 
poor class. Look at the figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
32 It is estimated is 150000 educated people exit Iran every year 29. Nourizadeh, A., Ba Alireza 
Nourizadeh, A.R. Meybodi, Editor. 2005, AFNL: United States. 
33 Although I agree with this completely, it contradicts with the Islamic republic’s claim that says Iran 
has a very high position according to the number of scientific articles. 
34 This has no use, as good students can get the scholarship from foreigner universities anyhow. 
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his abovementioned opinion, Nadooshan continues that until Iranians haven’t found 
this background and attitude and mentality to love the knowledge and truth and want 
to discover the truth, Iran won’t be able to join the caravan of global scientists. 
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Chapter 3: Current Situation 
 
We cannot describe the roles of Iranian diasporas mentioned in the last chapter of 
this research without knowing about the economy and IT infrastructures in Iran. This 
chapter covers a short description of the country’s economy followed by a descriptive 
report of the current position of IT infrastructures with focus on the internet in Iran.  
 
 
3.1 Economy Overview 
 
3.1.1 Overview of economic structure 
 
The structure of the Iranian economy underwent fundamental changes after the 
1979 Islamic revolution. All former laws or any sections thereof that violated the 
principles of Islamic law were declared null and void. Many industries, major sections 
of foreign trade, private banks and insurance companies were nationalized and brought 
under state control. The war initiated by Iraq against Iran in 1980 inflicted huge 
damage to the country’s economy and impeded progress. A dramatic fall in imports, 
stagnation of industries, restriction on foreign exchange and increased price levels 
were all the results of the war. 
At the end of the war with Iraq in 1988, Iran inherited a highly centralized 
economy. Most of the economic resources were administratively allocated through the 
vast public sector, widespread price controls, administratively mandated rates of 
profits and charges on loans, credit allocations, extensive trade and exchange 
restrictions, heavily subsidized energy and petroleum products, multiple exchange 
rates, and monopolies over large sectors of the economy, including the financial 
system [12]. According to the latest report of Heritage, Iran has the 156th place among 
157 countries regarding economical freedom and its place will go down from 4.21 in 
2005 to 4.51 at the end of 2006 [30]. It is noticeable that in this report 1 means the 
highest economical freedom and 5 means least freedom. This report adds also that Iran 
is only above North Korea which stands on the 157th step. It is stated that 
governmental economy along with high unemployment and inflation rates, high level 
of subsides and the inefficient private section are the reasons for decreasing 
economical freedom. All these decrease the levels of trade and foreign investment. 
The abovementioned centralization has delivered the monopoly of power and 
wealth into the hands of a few mafia families and groups and this in turn has led to 
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deep corruption, deepening the gap between poor and rich, and eventually total 
destruction of the economic foundations and the exiting of talented people to countries 
with successful economies. 
These distortions were compounded by Iran’s excessive dependence on the volatile 
oil exports, which actually account for 85% of export receipts and 42% of government 
revenues. 
Over the past fifteen years (1989/90 – 2004/5), the authorities have attempted to 
address the distortions and restore sustained economic growth, by implementing three 
five-year development plans. The direction of liberalization was reemphasized under 
the third five year development plan. However the opening of the economy continued 
at a slow pace. The period of the second five year development plan (1994/95-
1999/2000) was characterized largely by macroeconomic instability and declining 
economic growth. As a result the authorities policy priorities shifted in order to rectify 
the macroeconomic and external debt imbalances, while the much needed structural 
reforms were delayed. The recovery of oil prices during 1999/2000 significantly 
strengthened Iran’s external and fiscal positions. Thus international official reserves 
increased, external debt was reduced and further progress was made in trade 
liberalization and exchange rate reform. 
The main challenge ahead is to build on these accomplishments with decisive 
structural reforms to sustain higher rates of growth and employment creation to absorb 
the rapidly increasing labor force in a context of declining inflation and financial 
stability. The introduction of value-add tax, the restriction of tax administration, the 
reduction of budget reliance on oil revenues and the eventual reduction of subsidies 
will be among the future liberalizing programs. Reducing the size of government and 
the role of the state in the economy, encouraging private sector activity, can be done 
through restructuring and privatization of public enterprises, streamlining the 
regulatory environment for private sector investment, enacting the new foreign direct 
investment law, liberalizing labor laws, as well as minimizing impediment to the 
growth of small and medium sized private enterprises. 
 
 
3.2 The current state of IT in Iran 
 
Although OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) defines 
ICT as a sector which comprises the manufacturing of information technology and 
telecommunication goods, the provision of information technology and 
telecommunication services, IT in Iranian economy is pertinent to hardware, software, 
training and maintenance, in computer networks [12]. 
There is not yet a declared official definition of IT in Iran. In the third development 
plan it is envisaged that the Secretariat of the High Council of Information (HCI) will 
undertake studies in order to provide a precise definition of IT in Iran. The council will 
also study the topics, factors and IT- related categories and fields with the aim of 
determining thrust areas where implementation of development programs could bridge 
the digital gap. 
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Neither is any clearly-determined responsible for IT industry and IT market in Iran. 
Arya Irani, mentions 26 different organizations that are responsible for IT affairs in the 
country in his article “one grape and 26 hungry men” in which the ‘grape’ is “the ICT 
industry and market in Iran” and the 26 hungry men are the mentioned organizations 
[8]. 
Now, in order to have a look at the level of information infrastructures, let’s have a 
look at some indicators regarding communication, broadcasting, computer, and the 
internet. 
 
 
3.2.1 Communication 
 
As regards to telecommunication development, the Middle East Economic Digest 
(MEED) reported that Iran was investing about 2.3 billion US$ per year in main 
telephone systems until the end of 2000, which has been the second highest in the 
Middle East and north Africa after Turkey [31]. Thus Iran was among the world's top 
five countries initiating telecommunication development. 
 
Phone Lines 
According to the Technology Achievement Index (Asia Pacific), the number of 
telephone lines in Iran was 12.5 per 100 inhabitants in 1999. The International 
Telephone Union (ITU) figures for 1995 shows 7.57 main telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants. ITU's projection for year 2000 put this number at 17.03 per 100 
inhabitants. According to The Statistical Center of Iran, this number has reached 28.5 
per 100 inhabitants in the fall of 2005 [32]. 
 Current total percentage of digital main lines is estimated to be over 85%. 
According to the Statistical Center of Iran, the number of installed main telephone 
lines was 10,699,408 in March 2001 of which 9,486,260 were in use including 
7,815,181 in housing units, 1,243,512 in commercial and industrial units and 395,337 
in public units. The above number reached 19,429,000 by the end of 2005 [32]. The 
diffusion of telecommunication had not been confined to the urban areas, 28,062 
villages had joined the national telecommunication network by March 2001, of which 
11,813 villages had long distance facility. But in December of 2005 it has had reached 
46,630 villages. 
 
Mobile Phones 
The Iranian mobile phone network is based on GSM9OO standards. The network is 
managed by the Telecommunication Company of Iran. The number of subscribers of 
mobile phones in use had been 962,595 up to March 2001. By the end of 2005 it had 
reached to 8,015,000 users; resulting in 11.8 mobile phones per 100 inhabitants [33]. 
There are plans to subscribe more than 6 million new mobile lines by the spring of 
2007, and also introduce the second mobile company in 2006 [34], which will raise the 
number of mobile line subscribers to more that 15 million users. The existing network 
was set up by Nokia, with a capacity of 300,000 lines in the early 1990s. The capacity 
was later improved by Alcatel to 450,000 lines. After another development contract 
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with Alcatel in December 1999, a contract with a Turkish company worth 35 million 
US$ was signed by the Iranian Telecommunication Company, then one with Ericson 
for an additional 350,000 lines as well as for network design, delivery of base stations 
and L switching connections.  
 
New Satellite Mobile Phones 
In 2002 an Emirates-based Soraya Satellite Company's agent who is in charge of 
the new satellite mobile phone project in Iran announced that distribution of a new 
generation of imported sim card and mobile phones will start shortly after the related 
software system's design completed and the distribution began in 2003. According to 
assessments, the price of new phones is about 1,000 US$, and the cost of using these 
phones is around 75 cents per minute. Additional fax, data and connection to internet 
will increase the cost to 1.25 US$ per minute. New generation of mobile phones will 
provide communication services to 99 countries. 
 
Channels 
Intercity microwave channels were expanded to 405,997 channels by March 200l. 
International channel assignments have also increased to 8.483 channels by March 
2001. This means that more than 2,500 cities and towns in Iran can have access to 
international telecommunications. 
 
Broadcasting 
Bearing in mind the fact that according to the Islamic Republic’s constitution, 
private TV broadcasting is not allowed, some quantitative development in the number 
of domestic networks and their international coverage was planned and implemented 
in 90s. IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) has six central networks covering 
government religious programs and also numerous other provincial channels covering 
science, education, movies, sports, cartoons and local current affairs; adding up to 15 
local and international TV channels and 15 radio channels, which are all governmental 
[35]. The parliament banned satellite reception equipment in April 1995, but the ban 
has been enforced with varying intensity and almost nobody follows it. 
 
TV Ownership 
Though no official figures are available, it is estimated that there is one TV per 
four inhabitants. 
 
Cable TV 
No cable TVs exist, because no private TV company is allowed according to the 
constitution. IRIB, the governmental TV company, broadcast all its more than 10 
channels on UHF and VHF channels for free.  
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3.2.2 Computer 
 
First computers were imported to Iran in 1962. From 1971 to 1981 there was a hard 
competition for providing hardware and setting up huge software systems and training 
personnel. After the revolution, computing was an area that attracted considerable 
attention. Both hardware and software branches have been developed gradually. It 
should be noted that the effect of the U.S. embargo on Iran has made the acquisition 
and maintenance of powerful servers, work stations and satellite communication 
equipment difficult, if not impossible in certain cases. 
 
Hardware Production 
From 1981 till January 1998, 272 industrial permits were issued for the production 
of computers and its components; 48% of which was in Tehran. The mentioned 
permits were issued for the production of 3,102,700 units of computers, 251,500 units 
of printers, 514.300 monitors, 214,000 keyboards, 60,000 cases and 69,350 power 
supplies. The capacity of producing computers, which was 18,000 units in 1982, had 
reached 681,550 units by 1996/97. Later in 1997/98, 49 permits were issued for the 
production of 133,380 units of computers. It is estimated that the number of imported 
computers up to 1997/98 was 528,863 units. If we add the number of legally imported 
and also smuggled personal PCs to the above figures, the number might be doubled to 
1.057.726 units by 1997. Despite considerable growth of the number of computers in 
use, no recent evaluation has been made in this regard; but estimates are about 800,000 
to 1,000,000 machines sold annually. 
Dr. Ghandi in his article named “Information, communication and technology and 
knowledge management in Iran” wrote: Iranian computer industry could be termed at 
best, as being paradoxical in nature. With the exception of specialized market niches 
dominated by brands such as Compaq, Sun and Macintosh, most computers in Iran are 
assembled inside the country. There are a number of computer parts supermarkets as 
well as specialized malls where a customer could have his/her computer custom built 
as he wishes, with the peripheral components such as scanners, printers, and monitors. 
There is a significant manufacturing capacity. Iranian Business Machines35, for 
example, produces monitors and printers under license from Japan and Korea. 
Recently a 50 million dollar laptop production project was started in Kish Island. 
Investment will be provided by a group of Iranians residing in the USA. It is estimated 
that it will initiate in initiate 1,400 job vacancies. This also shows another aspect of the 
role that Iranian expatriates can play in the IT industry in Iran. According to the topic 
of this research, it is noticeable that investment in software production needs less 
money but more specialties comparing with hardware production. 
 
Number of Computer Companies 
544 computer companies were listed by High Council of Information (HCI) by 
March 2001. HCI put the total number of computer companies including those listed 
by this council, at 1,501 companies in 1997 more than 500 of which are software 
                                                 
35 This company has nothing to do with IBM and has been established after the US embargo on Iran by 
the members of the mafia families. 
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companies. The number of their workers was estimated to be more than 11,000. It 
should however be born in mind that the number of unregistered companies is much 
more than this. 78% of these companies were located in Tehran. Other centers of 
software production are Isfahan, Mashhad, Tabriz, Rasht and Shiraz. Some of the 
companies have received ISO9001 and TickIT certification; and many more are on the 
way. Almost all of them use known methodologies, mainly structured and Object 
Oriented. The OO methodologies are getting popular; and frameworks such as .NET & 
J2EE are popular. Finally according to Magfa site all of them have tracks of successful 
projects[36]. 
 
 
3.2.3 Internet 
 
The first link to the internet was established by the Institute for Studies in 
Theoretical Physics and Mathematics (IPM) in early 1990s. At the primary stage, the 
link was through the BITNET network and Iran's membership in Trans-European 
Research and Educational networking Association (TERENA formerly EARN). It later 
developed into a full-fledged internet link with the assignment of 500 IP addresses to 
the country and acceptance of Iran as a class C node [37]. 
Primary users of the connection were academics and research institutions, all being 
served through their own connections to IPM. Over the past few years, domestic 
Internet connections have grown very rapidly placing Iran among the top countries in 
terms of the rate of growth of Internet access, while anxiety about negative cultural 
aspects is persistent among the authorities. It was after 1994 that private companies 
started their activities as ISPs. Before that Telecommunication Company of Iran had 
made a futile attempt to set up a national information network. 
Although there is only one Communication Company in Iran, and that one is 
governmental, access to internet is provided by Internet Subscription Provider 
companies or ISPs and not by the telephone company itself. Many of ISPs are private, 
but the biggest and most successful ones are related to the government. This diversity 
makes the services slower and with lower quality, as the internet equipments are not 
installed inside the telephone centres. It makes the data path twice longer, once from 
the ISP to the telephone central, and once from the central to the user and vice versa.  
As a result of this disorder, access to internet in Iran is a burden. Until two years 
ago the only internet access method was dial up with its own limitations and problems. 
Now that the quality of the lines has improved and they function by far better than 
three years ago, lines are still noisy and dial up connection in still not reliable enough. 
 
Internal Internet Connectivity 
The infrastructure of Iran's internal connectivity is based on two major networks. 
One is the Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) to support connection based on 
modems. PSIN provides a connection for end-users to ISP's over mostly digital voice 
lines. The second major internal internet connection is provided by the Public Data 
Network (PDN) operated by DCI as an independent subsidiary of the 
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Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI). 
 
National Data Network 
In order to provide a national backbone system, a plan concerning implementation 
of a national net-work called ''National Data Network'' was designed by the 
Telecommunication Company of Iran. TCI acts under the auspices of Ministry of Post, 
Telegraph and Telephoned (this name changed to the Ministry of Telecommunication 
and Information Technology). 
According to the plan, the number of Data network users at the end of phase one 
(March 2002) would have been: 
Internet users: 1,000,000 
Intranet and VPN (Virtual Private Network) users: 1,000,000 
Common users (both Internet and VPN): 600,000 
Total number of end users: 1,400,000 
Also, about 39% of the bandwidth was planned to be dedicated to Tehran, and the 
rest to the other cities. The main characteristics of the Data network are: 
Providing Data network services in 420 centers in more than 180 cities 
Providing necessary infrastructure for Intranets and point-to-point connection with 
a capacity of 7000 ports and with a speed of 64kbps to 2mbps with a covering 
capability of one million end users 
Providing Internet services and national network IP all over the country with a 
capacity of 10,000 ports and a covering power of 1,000 ISP and one million end users 
Providing more than 200 Asymmetrical ADSL ports with a speed of up to 8mbps 
in eight main cities for multimedia and live video services 
Iran's IP-based public Data Network (upgraded IRANPAC) is currently in 
operation nationwide. 
 
Satellites 
To provide data communication services to both private and government sectors, 
satellite communications through two VSAT hubs have been promoted by the 
authorities as well. This was followed by a third hub and 850 VSAT terminals in the 
last phase with goal of meeting the needs of private businesses with high-traffic data 
communication application. But none of these services are open to public use as 
satellite receivers are illegal for ordinary people in Iran. In case somebody wants such 
a service, he can have illegal access to other satellites36, but the price is not worth it, 
especially because the user is still dependent on a dial-up line for sending data. 
 
Fiber Optic Cable Project 
A fiber optic cable project which is a joint investment project with a foreign 
company was implemented in two different phases. The first phase with an estimated 
cost of 3,750,000 US$ was done in Tehran, and the second phase covered Isfahan, 
Shiraz, Mashhad and Tabriz. Flag Co., which started its activities in Tokyo, has 
already linked Tokyo to New York with a fiber link. The company laid 2.020 
kilometers of fiber optic link between Tehran and Jask which was later linked to 
                                                 
36 It means that the embassies, banks, IRIB and other governmental organizations can use satellite 
receivers legally; and all other people must, and do use it illegally. 
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Fojaireh in UAE by submarine cables in 2005. This way Iran’s National Fiber Optic 
Network was officially opened after 10 years of implementation on 10th of June 2005 
[38]. 
Also another plan to link Abadan to Kuwait is under study. It is forecast that 
through Flagnet Iran is able to render transit communication services to neighboring 
CIS countries. It was also forecast that the implementation of the fiber optic cable 
project in parallel with Data services would result in an increase in the number of end-
users, as well as faster access to internet and lower tariffs, by the end of 2004. While 
the number of end users has increased, and the tariffs for the ICPs were halved in 
2005, they haven’t felt the lower tariffs given to the ICPs yet because the expenses of 
data subscription is only a small fraction of ICPs’ total expenses [39]. Up to the end of 
2004, external internet connectivity was provided exclusively through satellite links. It 
was forecast that after implementation of the 18,500 km fiber optic cable project, the 
ISPs will increase to 10,000 and 18 million people will have access to the internet. 
In case of fulfillment of the goals of The Fourth Development Plan, Iran will have 
22 million internet users, and in that case Iran can act as the internet hub of the region 
[40]. This possibility is illustrated in figure 1.1 in chapter 1, page 4. 
 
External Internet Connections 
Until 2003, Iran's major external internet connections were as follows: 
IPM (Institute of Physics and Mathematics studies) 
DPI (Data Processing of Iran) 
DCI (Data Communication Company) 
IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) 
MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
ISC (Information Services Company) 
ISIRA (Information Systems of Iran) 
Sirjan Special Economic Zone 
Others 
The number and bandwidth of external links has been growing during the past ten 
years. 
 
High Speed Services 
Iran uses the European standards for T1 and E1 [41]. It contains respectively 30 
and 32 high-speed link cables and it is used only by the Telecommunication Company 
of Iran. In Tehran there were over 140,000 subscribers in 2002, and an additional 
420,000 applicants were on the waiting list. Also 14 other cities were scheduled to 
have 170,000 lines.  
ADSL lines have been in use from 2004, but the quality and prices are not 
satisfactory yet. It doesn’t cover the whole country yet and it was expected to cover 
Tehran completely by March of 2006. It is also planed to give high speed internet 
services to at least 1.5 million Iranians by the end of The Fourth Development Plan 
[42]. 
So, generally broad band internet has come to Iran, in fact to Tehran and big cities, 
but it is limited and too expensive and with very low quality. Ministry of 
communication had promised that until the end of the previous Iranian year (1383 
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which ended at 20th of March 2005) they would have given ADSL lines in all parts of 
Tehran, but even now (April of 2006) their promise is not fulfilled completely and it is 
promised to be done by the end of this spring, which ends at 20th of June 2006 [43]. 
Those who have ADSL are not satisfied with its quality at all, because it is slower than 
its named speed, it has several cut offs, and it is very expensive (about 200 NKr for 64 
and 128kbps up to 1000 NKr for 1Mbps and few thousand Krones (up to 3200 NKr) 
for static IP [44]. Worst of all, it is not reliable at all, and is extremely filtered. 
In the recent years government has imposed a very strict filter on all internet lines 
to limit the access to data for Iranians. Although opener cards are available at about 
10$ per month, this filtering has a very negative impact on the usage of internet in the 
country [45]. 
Anyhow, the quality gets better gradually and the filter becomes thicker. The 
reason that ADSL lines are not ready yet, is government’s obstructionism. 
Government has allowed the private internet companies that many of them give dial up 
services currently (not all of them are private in fact, for example Pars Online is 
governmental), to install ADSL equipment and give broad band services; so many of 
them have bought such equipments. But the communication ministry doesn’t give 
them a proper place to install them, neither inside, nor near telephone centers. So, 
those who are related to the government like pars Online, cover a wider area than the 
others, as well as they charge by far more expensive than others. 
My own analysis on this strange procedure is that government tries to limit the 
flow of information into the country in order to keep the people unaware of the news 
and putting limitations on the internet, as much as possible, in according to this policy. 
Governmental companies have priority, because they are easier to control. But anyhow 
internet is opening its way into the country slow and steady. 
The other possible way to access broad band internet is wireless broadband. Some 
of those ISPs that provide ADSL, have wireless equipments too [46]. In fact wireless 
was the firs broadband internet subscription in Iran, as it needs no cabling and 
installing its equipment is rather easier than cabled internet. Yet, its price is higher 
than ADSL lines and the covered area is very limited [47]. advantage of this system is 
its mobility and the ability to log in from different places, while logging in to an 
ADSL is not possible from anywhere else. Because each ADSL line is bound the 
ADSL modem that the company gives and the user ID and its password, none of them 
can work without the others. 
The last possible method to have broadband and somehow reliable internet is use a 
receiver dish and subscribe a data service. Open Sky is one of the companies that give 
such a service [48], but there are few disadvantages in this method. First of all a 
receiver dish is illegal in Iran, although almost half of the people use at least one. The 
allowed monthly download and daily number of pages browsed are limited and the 
price is very high. For example it is about 40€ for 800MB/month and about 100€ for 
2000 MB [http://www.broadsat.com/opensky/]. Also the user is still dependent on an 
unreliable dial up connection to send the data. 
The Communication Company of Iran has announced that they have reduced the 
internet prices to half of it at the spring of 2005, but the end user hasn’t touched it yet. 
Dr. Mohammad Suleimani, the Minister of Communication and Information 
Technology believes that it is ISPs’ fault, as they pay half of the previous price for 
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their internet services, but charge the end user as much as before. He hopes that they 
can make it cheaper for the end user too in 2006 [49]. 
But I believe that the problem of internet’s price in Iran is the big gap between 
demand and supply. While demand is always more than supply, users have to pay 
whatever the ISPs claim and the price won’t have a sensible drop. 
Saber Feyzi, one of the chief managers in the Communication Company of Iran, 
has said that fast internet with international prices will be available in Iran at the third 
year of the forth development plan, meaning two years later (2008). He has added that 
until Iranians consider IT and communication as something luxurious, the problem of 
communication and internet will not be solved in Iran. The fact is that the government 
is responsible to help developing the culture of usage of IT and then private section 
after that. Otherwise, imternet usage will be limited to E-mail and chat [50]. 
So, if the government really wants to make internet services cheaper and better and 
more reliable, they must increase wide band subscription lines, widen the band width, 
increase the quality of their lines in order to satisfy the users and prevent them of 
paying whatever price that ISP declares. While mixing the data services with the 
telephone central will lower the level of the lines’ noise and increase the speed and 
eventually will improve the quality; as there is only one telephone company in Iran, it 
may result in lack of rivalry in the market and lower the quality and raise up the prices. 
Finally, opening the filters will be a sign of government’s good intention and its 
commitment to satisfy the user and giving proper services. Inversely, the government’s 
strict intention to limit the information flow in any possible way, either software 
filters, or bad quality of the line or even prosecution of the weblog writers shows their 
intention to limit and control the flow of information. Under such conditions 
development of IT industry is very difficult. 
 
International Stations 
Iran's digital network is equipped with two international switching centers. The 
total capacity of the network was 23.250 main lines including 12,360 incoming lines 
connected to national network and 10,890 two-way lines in 1999. Iran had established 
direct and transit connections with 223 countries of the world through three satellite 
telecommunication centers (Shahid Ghandi, Isfahan, and Bomehen), undersea cables 
(Jask-Fojaireh in UAE), TAE fiber link systems, and land microwave network, at the 
time. 
 
Number of Internet Hosts 
The number of Internet hosts in Iran is estimated to be 271. 
 
Number of Internet Users 
Even though there are no official published figures regarding Internet usage in Iran, 
some unofficial [Shahriar Shahin: Managing Director of Sepand Computer Co.] 
estimates put the number at around 418,000, growing to 1,326,000 by March 2003. 
The estimated growth rate of the number of Internet users during 1996-2000 was more 
than 300 percent per year. Amir Taheri in his article named “Electronic war in Iran” 
published in “Alshargh Al Osat” [12] estimated that 2.2 million persons have access to 
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Internet in Iran. 
 
Number of ISPs 
Total number of ISPs was estimated to be around 300-500 in 2001. 
 
Number of Coffee-nets 
Currently about 500 coffee-nets are providing access lo internet for 2 US$ per 
hour. But coffee-nets are becoming more popular and their number is increasing 
continuously; so there is no official statistics or accurate estimations available. 
 
Academic Internet Access 
An academic internet access is available to almost all universities and research 
centers in the country. The national academic network was known as IRANET. The 
Ministry of Science, Research and Technology (MSRT) had pushed ahead the project 
to have Iranian Academic Network (IAN) fully operational and tested before the end 
of 2000. All universities and research centers have been included in this network. But 
student dormitories are not covered fully by this network. The network standard is 
TCP/IP and is essentially a combination of intranet/extranet. While most of IAN users 
can access internet, universities and research centers can modify their existing network 
as required. 
 
Commercial Internet Access 
Commercial Internet accesses are available through several Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs). The most important among them is the Data Communication 
Company of Iran, Neda Rayaneh, CompuServe, IRNET, Apadana, Virayeshgar and 
Pars Supaleh. Data Communication Company of Iran (DCI) is the arm of the state 
telecommunication company of Iran, which provides Internet access throughout the 
country. Various large governmental organizations such as the national Iranian Oil 
Company, Iran Air, Budget and Planning Organization of Iran, Ministry of Energy, 
with DCI's help have setup networks in order to communicate with their various 
branches, as well as attaining access to outside databases. An example of a DCI-
assisted outside link is the Iranian central Bank which is now on the SWIFT network 
(Society for Worldwide Financial Telecommunication) with access to some 3,700 
main branches of foreign banks. DCI is also offering CompuServe services in Iran. 
 
Degree of Information Use 
No published information about PC spending, PC communication spending, 
Internet spending, cellular phone and telephone spending are available. But according 
to IT experts, Iran is still far from having an affordable internet service. Although 
affordable is a relative term, it can mean about 150 hours of 56 kbps internet access 
per month for 10 dollars. 
Actual cost of access to internet is about 10% of a normal salary, whereas it 
constitutes only 1% of the same in Europe. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
In this section I am going to describe the scientific methods I have used to 
implement my research. The methods I am going to mention here are based on the 
methods used in qualitative researches which I have already studied among my 
courses. But first I will point out to Nicholson and Sahay’s method used in their article 
on Iran's software industry in 2003 [3]. 
 
 
4.1 Nicholson and Sahay’s strategy description 
 
As mentioned in chapter one and repeated in chapters 5 and 6, this research is 
based on, and made following Brian Nicholson and Sundeep Sahay’s article, Building 
Iran’s Software Industry [3]. Although I consider my research as to be qualitative, and 
not quantitative of coarse, I found it useful to have a look at their method, mentioned 
in their article as follows. In the methodology section authors call their strategy as to 
be interpretive: 
Our overall research strategy could be categorized as interpretivist guided by 
the knowledge of reality as socially constructed by individual human actors 
(Walsham 1995). An interpretivist approach tries to understand the perspective 
of different actors towards the IT situation in Iran, without trying to give the 
status of “truth” to one interpretation over another. Instead, the approach was 
to try and understand the multiple perspectives and why the interpretation of 
one person differed from another’s on similar issues. 
As a matter of fact, I have also used the same approach, except that my focus is on 
the view from which the Iranians who reside in first world countries look at the 
network; as actors that have left this network. I am trying here to show the ways that 
they can come back to this network, even without leaving their present place of living, 
and share their sources with their homeland. Even it is possible to seek and mention 
the ways in which they are making further harm to the network of Iranian software 
industry, and mention them; in order to remind them at least stop to weaken the 
network that they don’t strengthen it any longer. 
For me, it doesn’t matter if different people look at the same thing in different ways 
and from different angles, or even be in contradiction with each other; as long as they 
have no problem and do not struggle with each other. Every human actor in this 
network can have his/her own truth, but the same time work with the others and take a 
share in Iranian software industry, or at least as mentioned above, do not harm it. 
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So while I am not seeking to find an absolute answer for a question, which is the 
normal way to do a scientific research, I will try to give some recommendations on 
do’s and don’ts. Every body can look at this results from his/her own point of view 
and agree or disagree with them, but what is important for me, is obtaining empirical 
results that have practical usage and value. 
 
As my work is not a quantitative research I have no explicit numbers to get direct 
results from them; except once in chapter 2 that I have quoted few tables from 
Norwegian statistical institute, SSB. In fact this research can be basis of a quantitative 
work for checking the percent of different types of people that are mentioned or 
referred to them in here and some other numbers that are not clear in this thesis; and 
thus the practicality of the roles that are mentioned at the end of this thesis. 
Contrary, I have used only qualitative methods, so it is very important to keep my 
neutrality against what I have found and what I result from them while I interpret my 
findings. Anyhow, I am already an Iranian and it is very natural that I have pre biases 
towards what is going on in that country. Yet, I have done my best to keep fair and as 
Nicholson and Sahay point out, interpret the role of each actor according to his own 
perspective, and not compare it with my own beliefs. In other words, despite I am 
myself concerned to a high extent with the main topic of this research and some other 
subordinate topics that are mention in it; I have done my best not to fake the data and 
the results, but to implement the research as just and unbiased as possible. 
It is also noticeable that according to approaches mentioned in Creswell’s book, I 
consider my approach towards this research as being pragmatic rather than other 
methods. Because comparing to what Creswell writes in the first chapter of his book 
‘Research Design’ [51]: 
• I am not committed to any system of philosophy and reality. 
• I have freely chosen any method that best meets my needs and purposes. 
• Truth for me is what works at this time. 
• The problem is most important for me. 
• And finally, I look at ‘what’ and ‘how’. 
 
 
4.2 Qualitative Methods description 
 
In this section I will review the methods that I have used in order to implement my 
research and find the facts that I have written in this thesis. These methods are totally 
qualitative research methods, and I have tried to use them as correct as possible, in 
order to invalidate the results I get from them. 
Also I have tried to overcome and disregard my personal bias as much as I could, 
in order not to deviate my analyses or the results that I extract from my findings. If 
ever I felt that I am not completely unbiased and I am getting the results that I wished 
from the findings, or I am extracting the data that I like, or leading the current of 
research to the path that I want; I have disregarded the case and revised it later again, 
in addition to reading and revising the whole thesis thoroughly for few times. So I 
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reassure the reader that this is the best and fairest I could do, despite the harsh accent I 
have had in some cases. 
Here are the details of what I have done to prepare this thesis, including reading 
texts, direct observation, interviews, and corresponding with some Iranian it experts. 
 
 
4.2.1 Books and Articles 
 
A part of my studies in this research has been reading books and articles. As a 
matter of fact I haven’t used so many books as the references of my research, but the 
several books that I have read here during my study years, have inspired me and 
shown me how to do the research. For example Jeoff Walsham’s “Making a world of 
difference” [52] was one of them. 
I have used one of the books that I have read on IT situation in developing 
countries to extract statistics about IT situation in Iran. It is a set of twelve articles 
about small IT enterprises in twelve different Asian countries published by Asian 
Productivity Organization in 2003 with the topic of “Application of IT in Asian Small 
Enterprises” [12]. I have extracted a part of needed information from this book, which 
were rather old, and added the information that I have got from other sources 
(mentioned in subsections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.6) about the last years to them and made 
the section 3.2, the current state of IT in Iran, in chapter 3. 
As I have mentioned earlier and repeated later, the most important articles that I 
have read are works of Sundip Sahay, which I have explained in detail earlier in this 
chapter and will be reviewed in chapter 6, Literature Review; section 6.1. 
 
 
4.2.2 Newspapers and Internet News Agencies and TVs 
 
I have read a large number of newspaper articles relevant to the general topic of IT 
in Iran or other countries, at least three every day during the last few years; as I have 
spent few hours daily to review newspapers and news websites during my residence in 
Norway. 
Although I haven’t used most of them in this thesis, the general information that I 
have used in most parts of this thesis is extracted from these news sources. In addition, 
still a large number of references point to these news articles which have been mostly 
from the following newspapers or websites: 
• Kayhan newspaper of Tehran  http://www.kayhannews.ir/[53] 
• Kayhan weekly of London  http://www.kayhanlondon.com/ 
• Hamshahri newspaper of Tehran http://www.hamshahri.org/ 
• Iran newspaper of Tehran http://www.iran-newspaper.com/ 
The first four ones are ordinary newspapers from which I study economic and 
technologic parts from their online versions. The fifth one is IT News Agency that puts 
detailed news Iran’s IT every day on the net and the sixth one is the official news 
website of MAGFA. 
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• ITNA http://itna.ir/ 
• MAGFA http://newsletter.magfa.com/main.asp 
Also the following site puts the programs of an Iranian satellite TV network from 
Los Angeles on the net; from which I have got economical and political 
information. 
• AFNL http://www.afnl.com/ 
All above sites are in Persian. 
 
 
4.2.3 Relevant Websites 
 
All software companies have official websites that explains a lot about their 
activities and can be referred by researchers like me who want to get information about 
their works. But unfortunately in case of my research topic, they had not much to 
present. Yet I have used few of them to introduce to their activities and their staff in 
order to correspond with them and ask about their relationship with relevant diasporas 
of their country; with almost no response. A more detailed description comes in 
subsection 4.2.5. 
In the same way, all other companies and organizations have specific websites; 
from which, few Iranian governmental organizations helped me a lot. 
Also, I have used few other sites to obtain statistics or other information about 
Iranian diasporas around the world. The following examples are among those that I 
have used: 
• Arsham Koosha software company in Tehran http://www.arshamkoosha.com/ 
• Computer World online magazine http://www.computerworld.com/ 
• Iran Trade Point Network http://www.irtp.com/ 
• Iran trade Promotion Organization http://www.tpo.ir/ 
• International money Found http://www.imf.org/ 
• NASSCOM http://www.nasscom.org/default.asp 
• Persian Investors http://www.persian-inventors.com/ 
• S.O.S. Iran (the Movement of Tomorrow’s Iran) http://www.sosiran.com/ 
• SANARAY Software Export R&D Co. http://www.sanaray.ir/ 
• TAKFA National ICT Agenda http://www.iran-ict.org/Portal/ 
 
 
4.2.4 Interviews 
 
Actually the most important and useful tool in my research has been interviewing 
to those IT experts whom I knew in Iran or Norway and one in US, one in New 
Zealand, and one in England. I have totally interviewed with 16 people that four of 
them were non-Iranians, all in Oslo. From the other twelve, six were in Norway, Three 
others in Iran, and three in New Zealand, England and USA. Generally my 
interviewees helped me very much, as either their work is in direct relation with my 
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thesis’ topic or they are involved in a way in related activities. Every single person 
showed me a new angle that others didn’t mention it. 
I have also contacted eleven others in Iran, Norway or US that they either didn’t 
give much help or didn’t interview or even didn’t answer my message at all. Any how, 
as a total problem, interviewing Iranians is in a way difficult because of the following 
three reasons: 
1- As a very large part37 of economic activities in Iran and/or with Iran is rather 
illegal and involves a kind of corruption38 or underground activities [54]39, the actors 
in this network avoid expressing the facts of their job formally. Even if you ensure 
them that all information will be kept safe and no name will be published, still this 
belief is overcoming that “Don’t fix it if it is not broken”.  
2- Iranians generally, and those who reside outside the country particularly, are 
afraid of the government lest they become arrested or get into trouble because of 
something they have said. Thus, they don’t rely on somebody who is not familiar to 
them. Especially, those who go to Iran and come back regularly are very careful when 
they encounter a stranger who wants to ask them strange questions, in order not to 
have any trouble during their residence in Iran, particularly at the airport. 
3- Nowadays Iranian expatriates are divided into too many different political 
groups and none of them confides in the others. Even those who are politically neutral, 
are normally afraid of all others and many of them avoid each other. 
The above problems make it very difficult to make a formal interview appointment 
with anybody and it is by far so much easier to gather any kind of information during 
friendly informal chats. But this solution needs previously known contacts; and 
obviously my network is not strong enough here in the Europe to follow this method. 
All interviews in Norway have been done through face to face talking. But in case 
of the others, I first initiated an appointment by sending the interviewee an E-mail, and 
in case of positive respond, followed it by telephone or online chat or few more E-
mails. Despite that this procedure was rather difficult to follow and in some cases took 
over a month to complete, all such cases were the most useful and relevant ones. 
Most of my interviewees were my own acquaintances, but I found two of them 
with the help of the cultural attachment of the Iranian embassy in Oslo. Of course, I 
requested to meet the economical attachment at first, but he had nothing to do with IT 
industry and software export, but he introduced me to the cultural attachment, and this 
one knew only tow Iranians in Norway that their job is in relation to IT, from which 
only one was relevant a little bit to my topic. 
A detailed and rather complete description of my interviews is presented in chapter 
7, discussion and analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
37 This part is estimated to be more than one third 54. Amoozegar, J., The Underground Economy of 
Iran, in Kayhan London. 2003: London.. 
38 Such as bribery or smuggling or breaking USA’s embargo … etc. Last year’s scandal of Stat Oil on 
bribing Hashemi’s son to win an oil contract is a well known example of this problem. 
39  This one is mainly in order to escape tax and custom taxes. 
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4.2.5 E-mail Corresponding 
 
One of the methods I have used in order to gather information from those people 
that I had not near access to them, was sending them an E-mail; either to get a short 
answer or to introduce a longer connection. But after a few messages I understood that 
I repeat few questions from every person, mostly about their personal identity and 
characteristics. So, in order to make my work easier, I prepared the following template 
for my E-mails to ask the receiver few common questions. Of course, in each case, 
according to the job and position of the receiver, I modified this message:  
 
Dear Sir/Madam (or) Dear Mr. X 
I am Farhad Zoljalali, master student of informatics at the University of Oslo. 
[I have got your Name from my supervisor Mr. Sundip Sahay.40] The topic of my 
thesis is: "The role of Iranians who reside out of Iran (Diasporas/Expatriates) in 
the development of the Iranian software industry." You can see Mr. Sahay’s web 
page at: http://folk.uio.no/sundeeps/ and if you click on Supervision you will find 
my name there. 
It would be very nice of you if you kindly answer questions attached to this 
message or whichever that you can/want (I don’t expect that you put too much of 
your time on my request, even a very brief answer will be a big favour). 
I remind you that your name and your company’s name won’t be mentioned in 
my thesis; I will use surnames, or even won’t point out to you and your answers 
directly if you prefer. 
For your convenience, I have attached my questions as a word document that 
you can write your answers in the same page and return it to me. 
I will also be very thankful if you introduce me any kind of sources or materials 
(article, webpage, book, etc. in relation with my thesis topic) that you may 
remember. 
 
I am waiting for your kindly reply and Thank you very much 
 
Farhad Zoljalali 
 
Of course I didn’t send the whole message for everybody, but trimmed it according 
to the case as mentioned above. In first messages there was no attachment. A few 
questions where added at the end of message as following: 
 
A- Can you please introduce yourself a little bit at first?  
 
1- Sex:    male            female 
2- Age: 
3- Education:      Bachelor       Master     Doctor 
4- Permanent Residence: 
                                                 
40 This sentence was added only to those whom Mr. Sahay had introduced to me. I some other cases 
that they didn’t know me already, I introduced myself according to the case. 
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5- You work at:   University    Software Company        Else (please mention) 
6- The name of above institute (for my own reference only) 
7- Your position at the above institute is: 
8- Your field of specialty: 
 
B- Is there anything that you want to remind about your institute? 
 
C- Are you aware of any projects in Iran that Iranians in other countries have a 
major role in that project? If yes, do you work in that project yourself? 
 
D- Can you write your own opinion about the roles that Iranian IT experts in 
other countries can play in Iran’s software industry and the problems in this way? 
 
E- Do you have any other comments for me? 
 
But I got almost no answers from these messages. So I decided to ease the 
receiver’s work in order to encourage him to reply to my questions. So I separated the 
questions part and put them in a .doc file that was easier for the receiver to fill in and 
send back; and attached the file to the main message. 
The following questions are those attached to the message that I mentioned above 
and pointed out to them in the message. But first, it is very important to remind that 
this short list of questions was in no way intended to act as a ‘questionnaire’, because 
it is far shorter and simpler than to be called a questioner or used as one. Also, my 
intention hasn’t been to gather data from numerous people through this form, but it 
was used in the first place to introduce the receiver with the nature of my thesis and 
my work and in fact establish further contacts with them; and make them ready for an 
online (telephone or internet) interview. Here it comes:  
 
Sex 
 
Male  
Female  
 
Age 
 
20-29  
30-39  
40-59  
60+  
 
Education 
 
Bachelor    
Master       
Doctor  
 
Work situation 
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University      
Software Company       
Else(please mention)  
 
1-Your position at the above institute is: 
 
2-Your field of specialty: 
 
3-Is there anything that you want to remind about your institute? 
 
4-Are you aware of any projects in Iran that Iranians in other countries have a major 
role in that project? 
 
Yes  
 
No  
 
If yes, do you work in that project yourself? 
 
5-Can you write your own opinion about the roles that Iranian IT experts in other 
countries can play in Iran’s software industry and the problems in this way? 
 
6-Do you have any other comments? 
 
Thank you for your time and that you answered this questionnaire. 
 
This one got few more hits (more than zero I mean), but still les than what I 
expected. In sum, email corresponding was only successful with those who knew mw 
already, and it didn’t work with those to whom I wanted to establish a contact for the 
first time. Even in few cases that such people replied to my message, finally they 
didn’t give me much information, may be because lack of trust. 
 
 
4.2.6 Statistics 
 
In few occasions in chapters 2 and 3 I have given quantitative information that I 
haven’t gathered them directly. In fact I have extracted most of these information from 
statistical organizations’ websites, news agencies and in one case in chapter three from 
a book. The following web sites are those that I have used them more than others: 
• Statistical Center Of Iran http://www.sci.org.ir/ 
• Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå) http://www.ssb.no/ 
 
 
 
4.2.7 Direct Observation 
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As an Iranian, I have used a good deal of my own direct observation of what has 
happened and what is now going on in Iran in different parts of this research, 
particularly in chapter 2, “Why Iran has so many diasporas” and in case 12 on BIHE in 
chapter 7, case description and analysis. I have also used my own information in many 
other places of this thesis; yet as I have used many other sources and opinions of many 
other people in preparing this paper, using this amount of my own observations 
doesn’t bother the research identity of the work at all. Moreover, as I have lived in the 
place for more than 30 years and observed many different aspects of historical, 
political, social and technological changes in that country, I have considered my own 
memories a valid source to refer to and citing, at least not less than opinions of those 
with whom I have interviewed. 
On the other hand, the process of producing software and what some particular 
people do during that process, has not many mechanical actions to be observed 
directly, and is more abstract rather than physical. So I could have not used direct 
observation technique more than what I have done. Because, generally software 
producers think about something and put the result on paper, or implement it on their 
computers. The role of some people outside a determined country is even more 
abstract than that. So, in fact we should observe these peoples thoughts rather than 
activities. Thus, in order to observe thoughts, you can not watch something; but you 
have to talk to people who own those thoughts and/or read their writings and/or 
observe and analyze the effects of their activities; which I have did to a high extent. 
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Chapter 5: Theory Overview 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main article that is basis of my research is: “Building 
Iran’s software Industry: An assessment of plans and prospects” by Brian Nicholson 
and Sundip Sahay [3]. So it is most natural and useful to use the same theoretical basis 
of that article as the basis of this research. I have also reviewed this article in chapter 
7, literature overview. 
The theory model used in the above mentioned article is called the “Software 
Export Success Model”. The authors have proposed it as the “Theoretical Frame” of 
their research. We see the model in figure 4.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Software Vision/Strategy 
 
Government     Industry 
National Software-Related Infrastructure 
 
People          Technology          Finance          R&D          Other 
National Software Industry 
 
Clusters                    (Competition)                    Collaboration 
Trust International 
Linkages 
International Market Demand for Software 
 
            Figure 5.1: The Software Export Success Model 
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The authors explain that this model: “…reflects their respective empirical 
experiences and associated academic and practitioner literature on the “first tier” 
software exporters, the Indian, Irish and Israeli software industries or 3I s. This 
process enabled common factors to be derived which were grouped into categories 
considered central to the development of success of these three countries. The model 
was then applied to three “second tier” nations: Russia, China, and Philippines.” 
Thus, in order to follow the same pattern, I try to apply this model to Iranian 
software industry characteristics here. Also I have tried to apply the same theory to my 
other findings in this thesis and compare them with, and discuss them on the basis of 
this model. 
According to Nicholson and Sahay, Software export success model has five 
categories: “demand for software, national software vision and strategy, international 
linkages and trust, national software industry characteristics, and national software-
related infrastructure”. The authors have discussed each category briefly, but I skip 
that part and only compare them with the characteristics of present Iranian software 
industry and political and economical situation. 
The first category which is located higher above all is “demand for software’, at 
which I think Iran has no problem. Almost all Iranian Diasporas with whom I have 
interviewed, have declared their ability or at lest their wish to outsource Iranian 
companies and initiate software commercial dealings with Iran, or give any other 
services that they can to the Iranian software industry; provided that the problems be 
solved first. Foreigner companies also desire to get low price services from Iranian 
companies, but they have more hinders rather than their Iranian counterparts. I will 
explain these problems in detail later in chapter 7, but let’s mention here that the most 
prohibiting one is the American Embargo on Iran. 
By the simplest estimation we can consider that the world is going towards 
developing IT systems and services, so the demand for software will grow up in the 
coming decades, thus Iran can have a good share of this expanding market if its rulers 
take up proper policies. 
The second category, which is the most critical one in case of Iran as I believe, is 
“national software vision and strategy” at the very bottom or in fact the foundation.  
The week results of Iranian software export plans along with international tensions and 
many other problem, show big problems I this area. Although Iranians have already 
designed two national IT plans, TAKFA and TAKFA2 [55], and they have established 
Sanaray to develop software exports 41[56], the pure fact that Iran has gained no 
sensible progress yet, while pioneers like India are doubling their income through 
software export every other year, shows that Iranians policies have not totally been 
correct and their efforts has not worked as expected. 
If we compare Sanaray with the organizations that were established in 3Is, like 
NASSCOM in India and others in Israel and Ireland, we easily notice that in those 
countries all other organizations have had the same direction; or at least if they didn’t 
cooperate with them, they didn’t bother and hinder international trust too. In case of 
Iran, while Sanaray is formally responsible to export software, the total policy of the 
government is to weaken international bonds and make tensions in the whole world; 
                                                 
41 Sanaray is in fact established by private sector software companies, but governmental sector has also 
a part of its share. 
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which is in obvious contradiction with a vision on any export plan, let alone the 
software. 
The government should also prepare accommodations for software export in the 
Iranian embassies in developed countries. Once I had gone to the Iranian embassy in 
Oslo to ask them about Iranian software experts in Norway, I also asked them if there 
are any conveniences for export software from Iran, or even import software and IT 
products to it. But much to my amazement the answer was that their work in embassy 
is limited to oil and few other important items; and IT cases are so rare that nobody 
knows about existent regulations and limitations and conveniences. In fact they have 
no preparation to give any kind of service In relation to software export from Iran. The 
economic attachment only introduced two websites to me In order to find the answers 
to my questions in them. 
Now, in April of 2006, we are waiting for the UN’s Security Council to put rigid 
punishments on Iran. The new government is trying to make the country’s relation 
with the rest of the world dark and critical, and of course this hinders development of 
exports; regardless of whatever that the responsible organizations do. As I mentioned 
before, despite the formal efforts of Khatami’s government to recover the relationship 
with the west, the present government openly tries to make and signify tensions, and 
worsen all foreign relationships. Iran’s four major issues, the nuclear program, 
terrorism, disturbing peace in the region and disturbing human rights, hinder all efforts 
to establish good relationships with first world countries. 
This growing tension, directly affects on the third category which is international 
linkages and trust, and I described the impact of government’s bad policies on these 
two factors that have most to do with the diasporas. Although the topic of this research 
is the role of diasporas in the Iranian software industry, I have to claim that the 
government’s behavior and most above all the new president’s “outrageous claims” 
[57] has in fact paralyzed them for the time being and I most of the recommendations 
that I have, are only valid and possible to implement in absence of such a government. 
Anyhow, the experiences of successful countries and particularly 3Is, shows that 
diasporas’ role has been critical in this category: 
International linkages were also key to the development of the 3Is which refers 
to making and sustaining linkages with markets and customers overseas. The 
Diaspora was critical in forging ties between firms in the home country. Linkages 
were also built through marketing operations set up by industry associations such 
as India’s NASSCOM. Another issue is trust which was facilitated by the diasporan 
links and by the reputation of famous companies such as Microsoft or Intel who set 
up subsidiaries. 
Once Iranians change their ‘world-confronting’ methods and settle down their 
international tensions and recover ‘international linkages’ and gain more ‘trust’, their 
powerful Diaspora can play a very good role in connecting the two sides to each other. 
Forth category is national software industry characteristics. According to the low 
level of IT services in Iran and lack of nationwide IT infrastructures, it seems that the 
Iranian software industry hasn’t done its job well enough even to respond the internal 
needs of the country, let alone exporting software. It is roughly estimated that 
comparing with international prices Iran needs about 10 billion US$ per year software 
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for its own internal usages in the next decade42. Yet, IT section in Iran has also many 
power points, and exporting software will make them more powerful, that makes it 
more noticeable and worthy to invest on43. 
First of all we should remember that the private IT sector is not to blame for the 
lack of IT development in Iran. Consider that in absence of helpful government, 
correct policy, proper infrastructures, great investments and most above all skillful 
human resources, even IBM and Microsoft might be nothing more than small 
enterprises today and America was a non-developed country like Iran and Iraq today, 
according to IT industry. Iranian companies are in a real shortage of all 
abovementioned primitives to develop their national IT industry. 
But as for the power points, let’s first look at the power pints of 3Is according to 
the authors’ point of view: 
In the 3Is, clusters forged competition and collaboration between firms using 
world-class telecommunications. Knowledge transfer and other synergies provided 
by clustering were also key success factors. Availability of skills and the cost of 
labor as well as English language skills were also important. 
Iran has a noticeable work force, but the problem is that the more one is skillful, 
the easier he/she can immigrate to first world countries. So in terms of ‘availability of 
skills’, I have to say that skillful work force is abundant in Iran, particularly in the last 
decade the number of university graduates has grown up so fast, due to establishment 
of the numerous low quality universities all around the country. But the Islamic regime 
scatters them as soon as they pass an acceptable threshold, with a rate that is faster 
than producing them. So the quality of education in Iran goes downer every year in 
comparison with the previous year. In the same way, there is not enough time for the 
new generations to acquire skills and experiences of the more experienced generations 
before they leave the country. This problem is most critical in IT field, as IT 
technologies become obsolete every decade and university texts and methods must 
become updated every semester. Particularly, project management is a skill that must 
be thought and transferred via face to face cooperation. 
It is obviously a too great expectation from the Diasporas that they go back to Iran 
and work there before a fundamental change in the conditions of their homeland. This 
fact magnifies the role that they can play and their duty in educating new generations 
and training the working human force and transferring the knowledge; because it 
involves a kind of sacrifice that almost none of them is ready to do. A detailed 
discussion on the role that diasporas can play in remote education and training comes 
in case study 12, the experience of BIHE in chapter 7, analysis. 
The problem is exactly the same in case of “English language skills”. Although 
many educated Iranians know and learn English language very good, most of them 
intend to use their ability in seeking better life and opportunities in developed 
                                                 
42 One of my sources for this estimation is Dr. Zarei; to whom I interviewed. Look at case 5 in chapter 
7.  
43 According to the nature of this research which is finding the ways in which Iranian expatriates can 
improve Iranian software industry; most of the focus of this study has been on the shortcomings and 
problems. Thus, unfortunately, the positive points have less contrast. If this thesis was trying to 
describe the characteristics of IT and software industry in Iran, then it was easier to look at positive 
and negative points to the same extent. 
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countries. So again, the skillful foreign language speakers turn into diasporas when 
they pass an acceptable threshold. Again we encounter the role that diasporas can play 
both in connecting Iranians to the foreign markets, and in training the human force. 
Low cost of labor, which is Iran’s biggest priority, goes under veil because of the 
dark political relationship between Iran and America. While the average income of IT 
experts is at least one tenth of that of Americans, it is no big deal for American 
outsourcers because of the US embargo on Iran. American companies can not work 
directly with Iran, and if they accept all problems and risks, and work with an Iranian 
staff through a mediate company in some other countries, the resulted overheads cover 
all the difference and spoil the potential opportunities that Iranians could have had. 
Even in case of fundamental changes in Iran and melting the ices between the two 
countries, the labor cost in Iran will rise up gradually and decrease the contrast, I 
believe. Thus this priority is in fact spoiling. 
Anyhow, the strategic situation of Iran both in the Middle East and in the world, 
and also the big number of university graduates in IT inside Iran, and finally the big 
number of IT Iranian experts spread all around the world, are so high potentials that 
although are not exploited properly yet, promise such a bright future for the Iranian IT 
industry that researchers, investors and outsourcers can not ignore it. 
Moreover, the new market of IT which due to lack of developed IT applications 
(like those applications and usages that we see in developed countries) has a very large 
space to expand and grow up, strengthened with the numerous and ever-growing IT 
users; is another guaranty for the profitability of investment on IT and software 
industry in Iran. 
Finally we reach to the category of “national software-related infrastructure” that is 
still too weak in Iran. I have written a good deal about the current situation and IT 
infrastructure in Iran in chapter 3, current situation; so I skip it here. 
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Chapter 6: Literature Review 
 
In this chapter we will review the texts that I have read them to write this thesis. 
Few of them have been works of Sundeep Sahay, which I put them first, and then I 
review other books and articles.  
 
 
6.1 Sahay’s Works 
 
The importance and priority of Sahay’s works or and common works is in this fact 
that I have based my research on his works; and in fact I have chosen my research’s 
topic from the two articles that I discuss them first, as follows. 
 
 
6.1.1 Nicholson and Sahay: “Building Iran’s software 
Industry: An assessment of plans and prospects” [3] 
 
This article is the main text that my research is based on it. It is written by Brian 
Nicholson and Sundeep Sahay. This article is the report of their travel to Iran in 
October 2002 in order to observe the country’s IT situation directly. Although they 
have given some recommendations at the end of their article, actually this article is the 
report and analysis of what they have seen in Iran. Although this article has not much 
to do with Iranian Diasporas, I begin with my own review of it according to this 
study’s point of view and try to express my own analysis on it and relate it to our own 
topic; because this article is the main text that I have began my research with. 
The article begins with the authors’ reminding that Iran’s software industry has 
‘some high level potential in some regional and international markets’; yet few 
problems have inhibited the country of being mentioned among giant IT exporters. 
They point out to the following major problems: 
1. Regional and domestic instabilities 
2. The USA imposed trade embargo 
3. Outdated technologies 
4. Lack of international quality standards 
5. And finally ‘endemic piracy’ 
According to the first mentioned problem, regional instabilities, following news 
related to Iran on TV and internet has shown to me that ‘regional instabilities’ (I mean 
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instabilities in neighbouring countries and Middle East) are not the major problem. In 
fact instability inside Iran –let’s say domestic instability- is so high, that all other 
problems in neighbouring countries seem to be of less importance in comparison with 
that. Many political analyzers believe and claim that Islamic Republic is responsible 
for many problems in the region, so calmness in Iran may make the whole region 
calmer and more reliable and more stable. 
If we look justly, we see that two of the biggest giants of IT, India and particularly 
Israel are located in the same region and they have also some domestic and regional 
tensions and instabilities too, particularly with their neighbours. What prioritizes them 
over Iran is their internal stability and democratic atmosphere that has enabled 
potential forces to grow up and show up so successful in the international fields. If Iran 
has become one of the most unreliable countries to attract foreign investments [23], it 
is because of its own internal instabilities and tensions that make everybody, either 
native or stranger, to escape from Iran and avoid it. Almost nobody will cooperate with 
a member of ‘the axis of evil’ until that country exits from the black list. 
The second one, USA embargo is the mother of many other problems, including 
the other three problems that are mentioned here by the authors. We can understand 
the importance of this problem when we read in this article that in case of India, “the 
bulk of demand comes from the USA … and to a lesser extent … from Europe.” Also 
we should remember that USA is the centre of many –if not all- technologies and 
cervices that in order to have access to them, one should have good political 
relationship with US as well as international good fame. But unfortunately the current 
Iranian government lacks both of them. As a very simple example we can mention 
UNIX servers that are illegal to enter Iran from both American and Iranian sides (look 
at cases 2 and 3 in chapter 7 for a detailed discussion on this). United States is also the 
centre of investment. Any country who wants to attract foreign investments should 
have acceptable foreign relationships, particularly with America. Continuing the list of 
technologies and cervices needs a separate study and this section doesn’t afford that. 
While the first two problems need a very deep and foundational change in the 
system to be solved, Iranian Diasporas can play an outstanding role in order to solve 
the second two problems. I will have a more detailed discussion on this at the last 
chapter. The fifth one requires improvement in the law and establishment of a 
powerful copyright low in the country to be solved. 
 
Another point mentioned by the authors is the Iranian government’s hope to reduce 
the brain drain of Iranian young, low cost highly educated people by a strong software 
industry. In fact the relationship between the Diaspora, brain drain, and the IT industry 
is like a closed circle. It means that when the IT experts -or brains- escape the country 
and change into Diaspora, the IT industry of the country becomes weaker and weaker 
everyday. This in turn makes the new generations of experts and elite classes to be 
attracted to the well ordered and comfortable foreigner communities that owe a very 
high degree of their comfortable lives to the progressive IT infrastructures in their 
countries. 
Reversely, if Iranians develop electronic government in their country, and make 
people’s lives more comfortable and more ordered, not only they can prevent the 
highest degree ‘brain drain’ of the world which is happening in their country, they can 
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also attract the Diasporas to come back to the country and help to promote and develop 
the use of IT and its culture in their homeland.  
I remind the reader the pyramid of population texture that I used in section 2.4 of 
chapter 2; and the emigration of elite groups from the top of the pyramid. Now 
consider a pot that contains boiling water and is heated from the bottom. If we cover 
the pot’s top, the temperature in the pot rises up steadily, proportional to the heat that 
we give to the system. But if we leave the pot’s top open, hot groups of water 
molecules come up from the bottom as bobbles and finally evaporate from the surface. 
Thus the temperature of the pot won’t pass the threshold at which water evaporates. 
This way whatever heat that you give to the system, only evaporates more water and 
gives no higher temperature to the pot itself. 
We can consider Iran as that pot, and education as the heat, and the elites of the 
community as the evaporating molecules that escape the pot. In prosperous countries 
when people graduate, they generally stay there and push forward their own 
community. But in third world countries a big part of educated people immigrate to 
developed countries and this phenomenon slows down the growth. In Iran, the rate of 
evaporation, or immigration, or brain drain, is the highest in the world and doesn’t 
allow the country to develop as fast as it can do. The high growth rates that statistics 
show is due to oil incomes. If Iran had not the highest rate of brain drain in the world, 
it was able to experience much higher and more sustainable growth and development 
rates. 
 
The other point that attracted me in this article, was the writers’ pointing out to this 
fact that “Iran is largely unexplored in the information technology literature”. This fact 
is one of the points that few of my interviewees also remind that. For example Dr. 
Behrooz Zarei, the manager of the electronic government project in Iran, reminds that 
there is very little strategic research on IT issues in Iran. Shahram44, who is 
implementing a research on Iranian diasporas in Norway and the media as his doctoral 
project in the University of Oslo, also reminds that he has found nobody in Iran to do a 
serious research project. He was very dissatisfied that he had found all noticeable 
researchers only outside Iran. I believe that one of the most important duties of the 
Iranian IT experts in the international research centres and universities is doing more 
strategic research on the issue of IT industry in Iran. Another proof for the lack of IT 
researchers in Iran, is inviting the authors of this article to Iran in order to implement 
their research and write this article. It shows that there are no experts like them in Iran. 
This item is one of the roles that are mentioned in chapter 8, conclusion. 
 
In another part Nicholson and Sahay claim that “Iran … is largely unmentioned in 
the global IT domain and is reported mostly on its political development.” As an 
Iranian, I have to say that the political atmosphere of our country has gone centuries 
backward during the last three decades and all the abovementioned news have been 
nothing but fail propaganda and wrong promotion. In fact, if Iran had undergone 
political development, it wouldn’t have the highest rate of brain drain and eventually it 
had a better reputation in the international IT market; let alone Iran’s reputation in 
                                                 
44 I haven’t included my interview with Shahram in chapter 7, as it was very short and the above 
quotation is the most important point in it. 
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international relationships. Also it shouldn’t have become the 88th country to attract 
foreign investments [23]. The new president and his government’s behaviour and talks 
confirm my claim on lack of political development and return backward in the time. 
Also lacks of “public domain information about the IT industry” and “difficulty of 
getting statistics and details” that are stated in the same article are other hallmarks of 
closed political conditions and lack of development in information area. Notice that 
eventually more information means more awareness, more criticism, and more 
unrevealing of the weak points and corruptions; and in one word it means more 
thinking. All these are in complete contradiction with the benefits of the current rulers 
of Iran; so they have to limit information in whichever way that they can. 
As another witness, we can look at the 3Is that all have democratic regimes and all 
other eastern European and other countries that Nicholson and Sahay believe they are 
‘emulating’ 3Is, have recently experienced a good degree of democratization and 
political development. For example, India is the biggest democracy on the Earth. 
Another paradox that authors have quoted in their article is this sentence: 
 “Iran is an Islamic republic, with an Islamic constitution and legal system run 
according to ‘Sharia’ law in which the clergy officiates as judges but the country is 
a republic and a democracy.” 
Although this matter is not in direct relation with our discussion, it is necessary to 
remind that governance of a particular group, even though a majority, is in complete 
contradiction with democracy; which is supposed to include all groups of a nation 
regardless of their colour, language, race religion and belief, to the same extent. Now 
that in Iran the rulers are fanatic and fundamentalist, the country’s system is too far 
from democracy and it is obviously a dictatorship and fascistic regime.  
In order to understand why ‘brain drain’ is so serious in Iran and what is the feeling 
of Iranian diasporas towards their country, it is important first to make clear that it is 
impossible to have a ‘republic’ and ‘democratic’ system that is based on a particular 
ideology, and make it clear that the expression ‘Islamic Republic’ is nothing more than 
a disastrous fallacy. Almost all Iranian expatriates love their country and wish to go 
back there or at least give a service to their homeland. But it is impossible for them to 
live there under the current conditions, and very difficult to cooperate with the 
country’s system; because the ultimate decisions are made by clergies and not 
technocrats and experts. 
As a very obvious witness we can compare these two sentences written in the 
article not far from each other. The first one is quoted just a few lines ago: 
“…and legal system run according to ‘Sharia’ law in which the clergy 
officiates as judges…” 
And the second is about India: 
“Furthermore, anti-piracy measures and a legislature that can be relied upon 
to adjudicate fairly also facilitate trust. India’s legal system based on the British 
system provided some level of reassurance in this respect. The software export 
success model suggests strategy should be focused on creating a climate conducive 
to foreign investment.” 
As we see both important conditions mentioned in this quotation are missing in 
Iranian Islamic system: 
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• While authors recommend a legislature that can be relied upon to adjudicate 
fairly and facilitate trust, Iran’s legislature has shown to be unreliable and 
unfair. The current situation of Iran is the best witness of this claim. 
• While India’s legal system, for example, is based on the British system 
which has a worldwide honour and has proved to be modern and efficient,\; 
Iran’s system is based on fanatic ideas of a limited group of clergies. 
• The placement of Iran at the very bottom of the foreign investment 
reliability table [23] is the best proof that Iranians’ strategy has been on of the 
most wrong strategies in the world. 
 
Another witness of the wrong strategy is “the amount of negative reporting on 
Iran” that the authors were ‘struck’ with and mention it as the second important 
problem after lack of information and statistics. It is implied in the article that 
diasporas are the best and most powerful force that can “counter this negative image” 
as the authors point out their critical role in establishing international linkages and 
trust, provided that the atmosphere cooperates with them. Iranian immigrates are one 
of the most educated and successful minorities wherever they are and have a very good 
reputation [58]. But the problem is that the Islamic government and its attaches don’t 
let the Diaspora to gain and transfer that reputation to their homeland; as they do a new 
embarrassment every day. 
Just now the Islamic republic in confronted with four major issues that 
international authorities try to condemn this regime for them: the nuclear issue, 
involvement in international terrorism, disturbing peace in the Middle East and 
disregarding the human rights. The new president makes the situation worse every 
time he opens his mouth. Right now that I am writing this lines, his most recent claim 
is this: “We want to control the whole world from Qom45 46 and this is our duty ”. Thus 
we see that whatever the Iranian Diasporas do, they can not buy any reputation for the 
current regime; and their first duty is to convince people of the world to discriminating 
between the Iranian nation and the Iranian government, which is a very difficult task. 
 
In another position we read the authors’ pointing out the liberalizations that 
happened during Khatami’s presidency, in order to reduce reliance on oil revenues. 
But eventually, as it is stated in the article, this trend led to failure due to several 
reasons; and most above all disagreements from a part of fanatic and conservative 
actors of the Islamic government. Authors state that: 
“This drive to liberalization has led to polarization of the conservatives and 
reformists in Government causing tension and uncertainty about which course 
the government will take.” 
But all analyses on the history of the Islamic Republic show that these two wings 
have been existent in the Government long before Khatami’s election and even from 
the time of Khamanei’s presidency in 80s. 
The issue that made the two wings of the regime stand in front of each other, was 
not reforms and liberalization; but it was the old will of conservatives to acquire the 
                                                 
45 Qom is a religious city in the middle of Iran, which is also the biggest Shi’e clergy training center in Iran. 
46 He means that they must convert everybody in the world to Shi’e Islam; and then Qom will be capital of the 
world! 
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monopoly of power, and they only found a good reason to do what they wanted, when 
Mr. Khatami began his liberalization programs. So, Khatami’s efforts only transferred 
the war of power in the Islamic Republic to a new period, but did not split the 
government; as it was already a bipartite structure. 
Conservatives were afraid of losing their complete power as result of following the 
pattern of the Soviet Union and witness the fall down of the Islamic Republic after 
enforcement of the liberals and reformists. Even at the beginning of Khatami’s reign 
many analysts compared him with Gorbachev. So they did whatever they could in 
order to reverse the current that Khatami had initiated; and succeeded in their will 
completely. After election of Ahmadinezhad, they celebrated the death of reforms and 
reformists. 
In fact “tension and uncertainty about which course the government will take” has 
always been a characteristic of Islamic Republic; and a good witness for this claim is 
Iran’s low level of development despite its abundant natural wealth and oceans of oil 
and gas and tens of millions of young and educated human force. 
In addition to the gap in views and political goals of the Iranian politicians, we can 
mention following two reasons for the defeat of reformists’ efforts in liberalization: 
1. The innate corruption in all systems in Iran, turned ‘privatization’ into 
mafia’s share distributing ceremony. Governmental companies that were 
confiscated from their owners at the early years of revolution, or established later 
by governmental assets, were mostly sold to corrupted members of mafia families 
at very low prices47. The new owners that are not necessarily real technocrats and 
good managers can not satisfy the goals of liberalization and privatization. 
2. In Iran, unlike developed countries with open and free economy, the private 
section must follow the government’s policies that are dictated to them; and not the 
rules of the market. Thus, privatization only means substitution of ‘state assets’ 
with ‘private assets’ and not substitution of policies and decisions; so liberalization 
doesn’t happen eventually with the meaning that it has in the rest of the world. 
Under such conditions, good and efficient managers and big capitalists don’t enter 
this game and they prefer to try their lock in free countries. 
48Again the same closed circle  can be seen here: closed and governmental 
economy sends private managers out of the system and turns them into Diaspora. 
Exit of brains and assets leaves the space for the state and the economy becomes 
more exclusive and monopole. Khatami’s efforts to break this circle only ended in 
a big defeat. 
 
As told earlier, this article mentions the following reasons for lack of success in 
building international software trade and relationships: 
1. The US-imposed trade embargo, 
2. Poor perceived image of the country in USA and Europe, 
                                                 
47 In many cases the bankrupted factories were sold to the governmental manager who was responsible 
for the bankruptcy. 
48 ‘The same’ means that I have used this notion a few other times in this thesis. I have used this 
concept when two concepts, for example ‘a’ and ‘b’, are proportional. When ‘a’ increases, ‘b’ 
increases too. This in turn increases ‘a’ and the circle repeats. In the same way, when one of them 
decreases, the other one decreases too and the circle repeats again and again. 
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3. A general level of Middle Eastern instability. 
Here I remind the ability of diasporas in contributing to solve the second and third 
problems, by lobbying and marketing and holding/attending IT exhibitions and 
representing good views of their homeland and its people; only in case of cooperation 
of the Iranian government. And the latter is not possible without solving the first 
abovementioned problem. And the experiences of three decades of Islamic Republic in 
Iran, particularly the 8 year experience of Khatami’s presidency, show that a turn over 
of the regime and a complete and fundamental change in the governors’ group is more 
possible and expectable (and efficient of course) rather than reform and unity in it. 
 
Authors mention two key challenges in front of Iranian software industry: 
• How can Iran adequately meet the domestic demand for software applications 
of both the government and private sector? 
• And at the same time develop capability of the Iranian software industry to 
become globally competitive? 
These two challenges are completely inter-related and in no way can be considered 
separately, because any progress in each of them both is required by, and will result in, 
a progress in the other (again we see the closed circle of two factors that amplify each 
other). So they must be managed the same time and forwarded step by step with each 
other. 
Nicholson and Sahay suggest three crucial levels to address this challenge, in 
which we can consider following roles and services for the diasporas: 
1. The Policy level, which involves compiling data and strategic research. As 
we have discussed in other sections, Iran is very weak at data and statistics 
gathering and strategic research49. Also because of long term embargo new 
technologies and methods haven’t entered the country. Iranian students who have 
educated in foreign universities have also mostly stayed in relevant countries and 
turned into diasporas; thus haven’t returned new knowledge with themselves. Thus 
this area is very vast and clear for the diasporas to offer their services to their 
homeland by implementing different kinds of relevant researches and introducing 
new and more efficient methods of gathering and managing industrial data and 
finally transferring experiences of developed and/or successful countries (like 3Is 
for example) in designing correct policies and enabling proper conditions for 
growth of IT industry. 
2. The Industry level, which includes both producing and marketing. Diasporas 
can play critical roles in both areas. As for marketing, they can be the best 
representatives for Iranian companies at an international level, as they are familiar 
to both ends’ atmospheres, know both ends’ languages, can understand both sides’ 
cultural gestures and differences, and they posses many more priorities over those 
who come from one of the sides. 
As discussed earlier the most important share that they can have in production, 
is in project management, training staff and transferring knowledge, in addition to 
economic help and capitalizing. 
                                                 
49 In one case, the managers of a data gathering company were arrested and prosecution by the 
conviction of selling information to foreigners. The data that they gathered, showed that Mr. 
Khamanei (the supreme leader) is the most hated political character in Iran. 
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3. The International level, which includes Iranian expatriates, software 
providers and users globally. As this level is discussed in details in some other 
places, I skip it here. 
 
In a section of this article, Nicholson and Sahay mention USA as the best and most 
important target of software export, from which Iranian producers are deprived, and 
after that Europe and Japan. But in the Middle East they recommend Afghanistan as 
good target for Iranian software export because of common language. But very 
recently Ali Asghar Halali, the director manager of Arsham Koosha Co. has written an 
article on this issue in which he has warned that Iranian companies are loosing the 
proper time and passing of the time will spoil Iranian companies’ priority for their 
Persian language [59]. 
In his article, Halai reminds that first of all having the same language is not a big 
point. In addition to common language, Iranian companies should have equality with 
other rivals according to quality of products and availability of services and prepare all 
required conditions; in order to have priority over foreigners using the good and near 
relationship between Iranians and Afghans. He adds that presently many foreign 
companies have made special teams using the numerous educated Iranian (and 
Afghan) emigrants in western countries and have entered Afghanistan’s market. Many 
others have joint ventures with Iranian companies, but Iranians are second or even 
third hand contractors. Some others, like Indians are teaching Persian language to their 
work groups; which is very easy for Indians. On the other hand English language is 
spreading in Afghanistan as the second language and presence of Americans in that 
country accelerates this. So to sum up, the passing of time is not in favor of Iranian 
companies in using this priority. 
Secondly, as Halali says, Afghans are building a new country and they need 
everything and will accept any project proposed to them, but the fact is that they don’t 
have any cash to pay for that. In fact most of the companies that are implementing 
their projects in Afghanistan, and among them software companies, are paid from the 
non-refundable aids of their relevant countries to Afghanistan. 
Then he gives some recommendations on what Iranian companies should do to 
obtain a better position in Afghanistan’s market that in two of them, Iranian expatriates 
can cooperate: 
The first one is to talk and cooperate with those foreigner companies who want to 
be present in Afghanistan and have a budget from their own; or get the budget from 
their governments to invest in Afghanistan. This can be done as a common project or 
as the second hand contractor. 
Moreover, Halali recommends Iranian companies to make themselves better known 
in Afghanistan and make contacts easier using some techniques that one of them is 
hiring foreigner experienced marketing companies. He says that Iranian consulting and 
marketing companies don’t have enough experience in IT industry and particularly in 
international markets, so using the experiences of European and American companies 
will be very useful and even inevitable, despite its very high expenses according to 
Iranians’ incomes. 
Mohammad Servati, deputy manager of the Industry Center of the Ministry of 
Industry and Mining, also claims that Afghanistan’s IT market is important and 
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precious for Iran; but Iran’s successful presence in that market needs accurate planning 
[60]. 
Ghasemi, a member of the executive council of computer organization of Tehran, 
claims that the abovementioned planning begins in March 2006 by election of an 
executive council from 15 companies that will present their products in Afghanistan; 
and it is going to be finished after 11 months [61]. 
Servati, in a report printed in Hamshahri newspaper about 10 months before 
Halali’s article in ITNA, claims the same priorities and hazards that Halali mentions. 
Moreover, he adds that Iran’s government has agreed to give every year 50,000$ US to 
Afghanistan to be expended in IT field; and it is most natural for Iranian companies to 
get the relevant contracts.  
 
Another point in this article is the problem of visa to Iran. Very recently, the 
parliament has passed a legislation to grant a short time visa to any foreigner who is 
coming to Iran at the border. On 11th of April 2006, Hamshahri, the morning news 
paper of Tehran, reported that the cabinet has extended this visa from seven days to 15 
days. The number of airports has also grown to 9 from 6 [62]. 
 
Once again, in relation with Diasporas’ role in making international ties and trust, 
we read: “However, in nearly all cases of existing software export linkages there was 
some involvement of Iranian expatriates”. In absence of all needed infrastructures, 
Iranian expatriates are the only possible linkages between Iranian companies and 
international markets. Some examples of abovementioned structures are accredited 
standards, international and permanent software fairs and exhibitions, systematic 
marketing and most above all a helpful government and proper policies 
 
It is also mentioned in this article that: “It was also felt that the government 
demand was not well defined and hard to convert into specific projects that could be 
contracted out.” Once again we encounter lack of project management and specialty in 
high levels in Iran, while there are many Iranian experts serving in different companies 
in all levels in developed countries, many of whom are ready to give best services to 
their own country. 
These lines also confirm the same idea: “Even though technical skills are high, the 
weakness of project management skills has led to the failure of large projects”; and: 
“Within the software development community there is an eagerness to develop 
outsourcing relationships, but lack of expertise on how to do so and also the 
handicaps of dealing with a US trade embargo”. This lack of experience can be 
compensated by the Iran’s experienced expatriates. 
 
I have also extracted a little point about my methodology and the main part of the 
theory part completely from the same article, which are discussed both in chapter 1, 
introduction and in relevant chapters. Methodology is the topic of chapter 4 and theory 
overview is that of chapter 5. 
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6.1.2 S. Krishna, Sundeep Sahay, and Geoff Walsham: 
“Managing Cross-Cultural Issues In Global 
Software Outsourcing” [63] 
 
This article is the article that inspired me the topic of this thesis when I read it. It 
discusses how to address the cross cultural difficulties of global software outsourcing. 
In ‘staffing issues’ section of this article the authors suggest to use “people who bridge 
cultures” in order to solve cultural problems. The authors’ first choices for this 
position are diasporas. But it is also noticeable that “it is unrealistic to expect 
expatriates in any country to be able to think and act like locals”. 
Then the authors introduce to complementary solutions for this issue. First, they 
recommend to use somebody that has grown up in the country of the outsourced 
company and has educated and lived for a long time in the outsourcer country to be 
sent back as the project manager to the outsourced country. Secondly, they recommend 
the client company to maintain a mixed cultural team in their company. 
The interesting point in this article that I encountered it for the first time here, is the 
outstanding role of the diaspora in both sides. Before reading this article I used to think 
that in case of an outsourcing project, diasporas have a major role only in the client 
country; but this article shows their important role on both sides of the contract. 
 
 
6.2 Other Books and Articles 
 
In this section I review only a book and an article and leave the others for the next 
section and the rest of the thesis. 
 
 
6.2.1 Nasrin Farzaneh Poor: “Application of IT in Asian 
small enterprises” 
 
A book that helped me very much to prepare and then develop the material for 
chapter 3, was “Application of IT in Asian small enterprises” published by the Asian 
Productivity Organization in 2003 [12]. This book contains 12 articles about SMEs 
(Small and Medium-size Enterprises) in 12 different Asian countries. One of these 
articles is written by Nasrin Farzaneh Poor about SMEs in Iran. I have got the 
initiative data to prepare chapter 3 from this book and the developed and updated it. 
There is also an explanation about this book in section 4.2.1 of chapter 4, 
methodology. 
 
 
6.2.2 Halleh Ghorashi: “How dual is translational 
identity?” 
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Another article that helped me to obtain a better conception about diasporas was 
“How dual is translational identity? A debate on dual positioning of diaspora 
organizations” [11]. The author is Halleh Ghorashi, an Iranian researcher in Holland. 
Her article is about Iranian traditional celebrations that are held in south California by 
the Iranian expatriates in order to keep their Iranian identity. 
According to Ghorashi, Iranians of Orange County in South California have 
established an organization (The Network of Iranian Professionals of Orange County - 
NIPOC) for themselves in order to help each other to solve their business problems. 
But afterwards this organization has takes over the responsibility of all gatherings of 
Iranian Americans, including national celebrations. 
 
As we saw earlier, It industry has no determined guardian in Iran [8]. On the other 
hand many Iranian expatriates do not rely on Iranian existent organizations like 
Sanaray and don’t want to work with them. For examples of such people look at 
chapter 7, case studies number 6, 7 and 9. Under such conditions, Iranian diasporas 
can gather to each other in organizations like NIPOC and put their common efforts on 
a portfolio of small services that Nicholson and Sahay have mentioned in their article 
[3]. These gathering and organizations can be of big help for Sanaray’s activities in 
case of solving the political problems between Iranians in the future. 
Another interesting point about Ghorashi is her pointing to this fact that she has 
found no serious Iranian researcher among those who are inside Iran50 51. Shahram , one 
of my interviewees, quoted from her that all reliable and serious Iranian researchers on 
the issue of Iranian diasporas have been in foreign universities. This point confirms the 
lack of strategic researchers in Iran; and magnifies the role of diaspora in this regard. 
 
 
6.3 Newspaper Articles 
 
After my interviews, the newspaper articles have been the second important source 
of the data that I have gathered for this research. I have used many of these articles in 
different chapters of this research, particularly chapters 1, 2 and 3. I have also gathered 
many more articles that due to the limitation on time (and place) I didn’t use them. In 
fact I gathered more data than I had time to use them. Thus I skip reviewing them in 
this section. 
 
                                                 
50 She has not written this in her article. I heard it from one of my interviewees; but I think this is the 
best place to cite this quotation. 
51 This person is one of those interviewees that I haven’t reported him in chapter 7. Shahram in case 
description 9 of that chapter is another person. 
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Chapter 7: Case Description and Analysis 
 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 4, methodology, I have gathered most of the 
material I use here in this thesis, through several interviews; and after that, reading 
articles- particularly news- has been the second important tool that I have used. 
I have discussed several of the points that I have seen in the articles, earlier in 
chapter 6 and other chapters, and generally the information that I have extracted from 
the articles and newspapers, are distributed and referred all through this thesis. 
So, in this chapter I will focus on the interviews I have done and discuss the points 
that I have extracted from them. In this regard I will explain my findings in the first 
sections and then mention the most important interviews in the last section as case 
studies. 
 
 
7.1 Problems That Limit Software Export 
 
Although the topic of this research involves the role of diasporas, explaining the 
problems that hinder the production and export of software can make the role that they 
can play clearer and more distinguishable. So in this section I mention the problems 
that I have found during my interviews and news readings. 
 
 
7.1.1 Problems in relation with USA 
 
As the most important problems in this regard, are due to the American embargo 
on Iran, so it is more rational to begin with this one: 
 
Problem of sending money to Iran 
According to the United States’ economical sanction on Iran, direct transfer of 
money from US to Iran is illegal and the sender will be under prosecution. To solve 
this problem, a mediator company in Canada, Europe or Dubai can be the contractor 
with the American company on one side and the Iranian one on the other side. 
Apparently according to low, if the American client be unaware of the existence of the 
Iranian contractor, there is no problem; otherwise it would be a case of smuggling and 
money washing. 
 
Problem of sending consignments between the two countries 
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According to the mentioned sanction sending high tech consignments like UNIX 
servers and so on to Iran, is illegal and preparing such goods from other sources is not 
easily possible in some cases52. There is no problem with sending books and 
educational material. 
On the other hand importing computer accessories from Iran is illegal in the United 
States, so making hardware in Iran and exporting this to America is confronted with 
this problem53. This problem too, can be solved by sending hardware goods to a 
mediator country, like UAE (Dubai), and repacking and resending them to the United 
States, which of course increases the expenses. Sending software, and in general 
‘Intellectual Property’ through internet is easily possible. 
 
Relationship problems 
Working and cooperating with a person who is a resident of Iran, is illegal for 
American citizens and connections must be established carefully. 
 
All these problems make working with Iran too difficult and unwise and unworthy 
for American companies. Currently, almost only those Iranian expatriates in the 
United States that have near relative in Iran and want to do him a favor accept this risk 
and undergo the procedure. This fact signifies the role that Iranian expatriates can play 
in case of normalizing the relationships and solving the problems. 
 
 
7.1.2 Economical problems 
 
High inflation rate in Iran 
54The very high inflation rate  and unstable economy of Iran, makes planning very 
difficult. For example the real inflation rate which is about 20%, results in the 25% 
approximate growth of the salary, which is not proportionate with foreign markets. 
The artificial stability of the price of foreign exchange at Khatami’s period has caused 
direct reflection of this inflation in project’s expenses. 
 
Too fast growth of market (programming wages and salaries) in Iran 
The rapid change in the government’s view towards IT, has evoked many programs 
to develop and capitalizing in this industry. These programs have caused rapid rising 
in the wages of IT experts in Iran, despite its late decreasing trend in west55. On the 
other hand, simultaneous implementation of project in governmental and private 
section and spending high and irrational budgets on these plans, has caused too high 
prices. This in turn, makes the use of Iranian experts expensive and uneconomical 
                                                 
52 Instead of solving this problem, the current Islamic government intensifies it by insisting on the 
nuclear issue of Iran and other debates. 
53 Some simple and small hardware parts can be produced in Iran with cheaper prices; the same as 
many other countries and above all China, are doing that successfully. 
54 It is declared to be about 15% by the government, which is coming down toward 12%. But 
independent sources estimate it to be more than this, nearer to 20%. 
55 Anyhow the salaries in Iran are about one tenth to one twentieth of that in developed countries. So 
they are still not comparable, even if this rises and that shrinks a little bit. 
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comparing with Indian and eastern European forces. So it is not profitable to use 
Iranian engineers for those companies who have branches in few other countries. Yet, 
small companies that do not afford running a foreign office for themselves, may be 
good commercial targets. 
 
Project overheads 
According to Sanaray’s report, direct salary overhead for software projects in Iran 
is 45%, operational overhead is 62% and non-operational overhead is 33%. According 
to the expected benefit, tax and project risk, the final reported overhead reaches up to 
240% which is very high comparing with that of other countries. 
 
 
7.1.3 Management problems 
 
Lack of talented, educated, and experienced management in Iran 
One of the major problems in front of software production in Iran is the weakness 
of project management and technical management. There are very few people who 
have studied management and are capable of managing human forces in Iran. From 
this few, a smaller part of them are familiar with IT management. In the same way, IT 
experts have no familiarity with management. Just to make the picture even darker, we 
should remember that those who gain high levels of experience, tend to leave the 
country and find better jobs and lives in better countries. 
 
Remote management 
Remote management has low efficiency and it is required that the managers be 
familiar with the particular conditions of the place of their work. Many of such 
managers are obliged to travel to the place of project few times a year and become 
familiar with the conditions directly; but this is too costly and problematic and 
moreover it is not possible in some cases. Actually, this method is not practical and 
economical because of its communication overhead and low accuracy and low 
efficiency. 
Thus, this is one of the best services that fit the situation of Iranian expatriates who 
are good software project managers and want both to reside in a western country and 
visit their homeland every now and then. This way they can both lead successful 
projects in Iran and transfer their knowledge and experience to the Iranian staff as is 
mentioned in the next paragraph. 
 
Remote management education 
According to the above problem, the first solution is educating the local managers 
while they are working. This procedure requires putting time and expenditure from the 
foreigner managers. It means that the local manager must be in continuous contact and 
consultancy with the foreigner manager and learn the management practically during 
this process. But most of the foreigner managers, in addition to the management of the 
remote sit, have very heavy responsibilities in their own office that prevents them of 
spending enough time on this process. 
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Again in this case, it fits Iranian expatriates who have near relations in Iran and 
want to do a favor to them and are ready to sacrifice their position in order to give a 
service to their family and homeland. These three cases are discussed in the next 
section in more detail in case studies 2 and 3 of chapter 7, the interviews with Hooman 
and Aziz. 
 
 
7.1.4 Cultural problems 
 
Team work 
Producing software in a large scale needs a very good organized and continuous 
team work, which its cultural background in Iran is very weak. Culturally Iranians are 
accustomed to individual work, and can not harmonize themselves with others. In case 
of attending a group work, many want to be the leader and expect all others to accept 
their opinions, and sometimes they interpret the opposite situation as an insult to their 
personality and ca not share their efforts with others. 
 
Different points of view and expectations 
The general view of people towards work and production in West is different with 
that in Iran. The recent cultural changes in Iran have intensified these differences, and 
it makes working with the foreigners more difficult. For example this slogan: “The 
customer is always right!” is really valid and working in West and the contractor does 
everything to satisfy and attract the customer or client. But in Iran, it is the client that 
has to cope with the contractor’s conditions. For example delay in giving service or 
delivering the product will result in recompense and penalty payment and losing the 
job in west; while in Iran delay is completely normal and contractor expects the client 
to know about that already and accept the new conditions easily. Under these 
conditions, working in the rivalry international market in which each day of delay 
costs so much and destroys the reputation, is very difficult for Iranians. 
 
 
7.1.5 Communication problems 
 
Communication overhead 
This item includes the expenses and extra time that are used for communication 
between the project implementers and the taskmaster or contractor over remote 
distance. This factor will decrease by giving more order in the works, signing the 
contracts and few more experience, but it always exists. Relatively high internet prices 
in Iran increase it. 
 
Internet problem 
Access to the internet is both very expensive and too unreliable in Iran. The 
problem of cut off or improper connection of the internet lines usually causes high 
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communication overhead and long delays in giving service. Internet problem is 
discussed in detail in section 3.2.3 of chapter 3. 
 
Inadequate English language 
The weakness of English language among Iranian personnel increases the overhead 
of remote communication. Learning English language along whit working can reduce 
this problem. Generally, educated personnel know elementary English. A common 
desire to go abroad among this group, encourages learning better English. Watching 
English movies on video, DVD and satellite TVs has raised average level of English 
knowledge among Iranians in the recent years too.  
 
Time zone difference 
The difference of workdays and work hours in Iran and western countries increases 
the communication overhead. In Iran (like in many other Islamic countries) Thursday 
is a half time workday, half time holiday and Friday is completely holiday and 
Saturday is the first day of the week; while in the West Thursday and Friday are 
complete workdays and Saturday and Sunday are holidays. This difference limits the 
overlapping workdays to only three days. Yet still the 2.5 hours time difference 
between Iran and central Europe and 8.5 to 11.5 hours difference between Iran and 
USA makes the communication more difficult. 
Of course there are some solutions to reduce this effect. Asking the staff to work at 
Fridays and rest on Saturdays, as well as working later at evenings are too examples of 
such solutions. 
 
 
7.1.6 Other problems 
 
A- Sometimes the taskmasters prefer to implement those projects in Iran that are of 
low importance, and are not so urgent and critical. Such projects put lower pressure on 
the implementer team and it makes them think that their job is not very serious. This in 
turn leads them to lower efficiency that is eventually harmful from both individual and 
group point of view. 
 
B- Taskmasters generally tend that the education of the Iranian team be as 
individual studies and on out of the project’s process. The foreigner contact also 
prefers to spend a short time to communicate with the local manager. But 
unfortunately this kind of education has not an acceptable efficiency. Because first of 
all the educational material is not relevant enough to the daily work of the staff. 
Secondly too much time is wasted for the education and the project’s progress speed 
slows down. On the other hand, the local manager will be deprived of consultancy and 
practical learning of management because he has to put his focus on training the staff. 
 
C- Some of the employers prefer to hire the Iranian team without social security 
insurance and tax expenses, and merely as employees that are not registered formally; 
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56in order to minimize the financial overhead of the project and make it acceptable . 
This kind of contract is not only illegal, but also puts the whole responsibility pressure 
on the shoulders of the local manager and distracts his focus from technical aspects of 
the project to the legal issues of the work. 
 
D- According to the relative ease of global software outsourcing, and abundance of 
software experts comparing to hardware experts, most of the foreigner outsourcing 
projects are software projects and there is very little consideration to the proper 
potential of Iran to cooperate in hardware projects57. 
 
 
7.1.7 Some ideas to solve the problems 
 
A- The experts and implementers should share the benefits and losses of the project 
in a way, in order that they try to increase the quality and quantity of production and 
work with more hope and encouragement58. 
 
B- According to the new market of software industry in Iran and prediction of a 
good future for it, the Iranian team must be actively present in the internal market, 
along with working with other countries too, and practice critical projects under the 
real pressure. This way they will try to raise the quality of their work wile they are 
working with the foreigners and also won’t loose the profitable internal market. 
Another important aspect is that the company would be less dependent on its income 
from foreigner companies and can survive if there comes up some unexpected 
international and political tensions. 
 
C- Education of the technical team should be done both personally and during the 
work. Personal education is up to the employee and should be out of work hours. At 
determined intervals, the company should get professional tests that shows the 
employee’s knowledge and skill level and eventually will result in the professional and 
financial promotion of him/her. The education during work should be in form of 
reviewing and commenting the results of the team’s work in short intervals and giving 
consultations and recommendations by the foreigner expert team. Management 
teaching, in addition to personal studies, should be during the work with spending 
enough time from the foreigner contact and should be transferred organically to the 
lower levels of management. 
 
                                                 
56 The employees also prefer this method, as they don’t have to pay tax and insurance fee and 
apparently they get more money.  
57 Actually, Iran is very weak in hardware and hardware productions don’t even answer a small part of 
the internal need. Even very simple circuits are sometimes imported from other countries (generally 
from China) due to their low prices. I know many hardware engineers personally that work as 
programmers and software experts. 
58 This one almost never happens in Iran and regardless of how much the employee works or how 
much is the efficiency and outcome of the company, he is paid a constant salary. 
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59D- The Iranian team must be registered formally and legally  and its responsibility 
should be shared between all the team members in a way. 
 
E- High expenses and overheads of working in Iran should be covered by a proper 
choice of both internal and outsourcing projects60. 
 
F- Iranians can easily do and should do designing and programming (and not 
manufacturing) hardware systems like Firmware programming, Embedded System 
Design and printed circuit board (PCB) design in addition to software programming61. 
 
 
7.2 Case Studies 
 
In this section I review the interviews that I have done with 18 people in 17 
interviews. All interviews have been with one person except for one case with 
Shahram and Parsa. The total number of interviews has been 17, but I don’t write 3 of 
them here, because of their lower importance; and 3 others are put together in case of 
BIHE. 
 
 
7.2.1 Case 1: Interview with Thanh 
 
Thanh is from Vietnam. He studies at ifi in UiO and has come to Norway to get his 
Master and is supposed to go back to Vietnam after getting his degree. 
He has worked as a developer in TMA Solutions Co. for two years. TMA, as he 
says, is the biggest company in Vietnam that does software outsourcing and about 600 
engineers work for this company. It is planned to reach to 2000 technical staff by 2007 
with a 75% annual growth during the last eight years, since its inception in 1997 [64]. 
This company works on telecommunication with focus on networking. 
Although the owner of TMA is from Vietnam and resides in Vietnam, TMA was 
founded by oversea Vietnamese. As for now, five out of its six managers are 
Vietnamese and only one of them has studied abroad (and has of course gone back to 
Vietnam), the vice president, is a British who lives in Canada [65]. Generally the 
establishers and owners of many other software companies are those who reside and 
even work in USA or other foreign countries (the group that we call them Diaspora). It 
is very easier for them (the Diaspora) to get contracts. So it is very important for the 
                                                 
59 There are many companies that don’t register themselves in order not to pay tax and insurance fee.  
60 According to Hooman, working for foreigner companies is so problematic that hardly covers all 
expenses and the company must have also some internal projects in order to use its work time 
efficiently. 
61 This recommendation is completely confirming that they recommend Iranians to give a portfolio of 
services ( 3. Nicholson, B. and S. Sahay, Building Iran's Software Industry: An Assessment of 
Plans and Prospects. EJISDC, 2003. 13. ) 
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companies to have some foreigner contacts, otherwise they will have problems to find 
clients; and of course it is the same for TMA too. 
Also most of them sell their products to foreigner companies, in other words they 
are outsourced and don’t work to cover the internal consumption62.                     
There are two reasons that the companies generally work for foreigners and not for 
internal use. First, they don’t have contacts. Secondly, the price of the product is rather 
high and it is difficult for the internal users to buy it (this statement is still about 
outsourcing companies and not all software producers). 
But the point here is that the bigger part of the profit of this high valued product, 
i.e. software, goes to the pocket of the owner of the company, and the workers take a 
smaller share. And as most of the owners reside in US and not in Vietnam, then this 
money as an added value which is produced in Vietnam and should improve this 
country’s economy, in fact does little help to Vietnam’s economy. For example if a 
developer’s man–month work costs 5,000 US Dollars inside US, it is only about 300$ 
in Vietnam (so much like that of Iran). When the company owner calculates this 
amount about 2000$ in his product’s total cost, this difference goes to his own account 
which is in US and doesn’t reach to Vietnam. So we see that the whole procedure can 
have a very much better impact on Vietnam’s economy rather than what it has now. 
Thanh estimates that he may be able to receive up to 500$ per month when he 
returns back to Vietnam according to the higher education that he gets in Norway and 
his experience, yet we see that it is still no big deal and we should also remember that 
his calculated man-month price will increase also. 
The monopoly of the software outsourcing in Vietnam is not for Americans. There 
are also some Germans that run software outsourcing companies in Vietnam, but the 
majority of them are Vietnamese Diasporas63.  
As for the difficulties in front of software outsourcing in Vietnam, Thanh mentions 
two problems. The first one is finding well-qualified personnel, according to both their 
software development abilities and their English language knowledge. The other one is 
the high cost of internet services in Vietnam. 
Than mentions the following positive effects of software outsourcing on Vietnam 
in addition to its economic and job making effects: 
1. Transferring new high technology to Vietnam. 
2. Transferring progressive management and project management knowledge. 
3. Transferring software development and international marketing experience. 
4. It has even had positive effects on hardware infrastructure development in 
Vietnam like improvement of networking and internet lines. 
 
 
7.2.2 Case 2: Interview with Hooman 
                                                 
62 Thanh has been talking about software outsourcing companies here, and it is in contradiction with 
Hooman’s opinion that believes that outsourcing companies in Iran should work for internal market 
too. 
63 So in comparison with Iran, we understand that Iranians loose the best chances for outsourcing 
because of their dark relationships with the United States. When we compare the relationships of Iran 
and America in the 60s and 70s with that of Vietnam and America in the same time, we acquire a 
measurement of the degree of mismanaging and foolishness of the Islamic rulers of Iran. 
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Hooman is a 34 year old male software engineer who has recently gone to England 
to get his Master. He has been the manager (and founder) of a software outsourcing 
company which we call it SN Co., for about 6 years. At 2.2005 we met in Tehran and 
at that time he mentioned the following problems as the biggest ones in his job. Notice 
that a few of them are discussed in section 7.1 too, due to their importance. 
1. Transferring money from US to Iran is very difficult and it requires either a 
mediator company in another company or some other methods that anyhow, it 
raises the overhead and decreases financial efficiency. 
2. The overheads are too much. 
3. Educating software engineering is not correct. It doesn’t have a proper 
structure and follows no particular goal according to the needs of the market. Thus, 
universities should reform their systems. Those companies that know the job 
properly don’t investigate on training staff and always search to employ 
experienced experts because the private section has its own limitations. So software 
graduates get only technical education rather than empirical and applied education. 
4. Lack of proper management in all levels. An IT manager must have both IT 
and management knowledge and that is rare in Iran. 
5. Iranians can not do group work. 
6. Iranian companies look after easy money and don’t want to work hard to 
acquire a nice reputation. They are generally looking for an easy big money, so 
they look for big projects and are not content with small or hard jobs64. 
7. Required infrastructures are not built properly yet in Iran. Internet is too 
expensive and has a low quality. 
8. All hardware is Intel and IBM based and there are no sun products and 
UNIX platforms. The main problem is with Americans’ embargo on Iran. The 
popularity of Intel and IBM based PCs in Iran is because their architecture is open 
and such machines are easily buyable from any resource, but Hi-Tech hardware is 
not easy to buy. For example taking a UNIX server from US to Iran is smuggling 
from both sides, and it limits the manoeuvrability of the Iranian companies. 
In the same way, more than 90% of the available software in Iran is Micro Soft 
based. The reason is that Micro Soft products are available for free or very low 
prices in Iran; of course without copyright. This factor intensifies the 
abovementioned limitation. 
9. All economic and executive systems are under the governmental monopoly. 
This monopoly decreases the quality and increases the corruption. Thus, finally no 
project will be fulfilled correctly and in reasonable time. Khatami’s government 
tried to put and end on the government’s monopoly in many areas and privatize all 
industries as much as possible, but his policy was not successful. Because owners 
of big capitals and high specialties don’t investigate in Iran at all, and those who 
do, have no action freedom and must follow the policies that the government 
dictates to them; as if they are the government’s agents with their asset and not the 
“private section”. 
                                                 
64 Exactly confirming Nicholson and Sahay (3. Nicholson, B. and S. Sahay, Building Iran's Software 
Industry: An Assessment of Plans and Prospects. EJISDC, 2003. 13.) 
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Finally Hooman recommended that in order to provoke and ease software 
outsourcing in Iran, internet must become cheaper and more reliable. In that case, 
some people will begin to work for foreigner companies at their homes, or offices. It 
means that individual experts can work for foreigner companies whit minimum 
overhead65, which is efficient and economical for them and easy to handle for both 
sides as it does not interfere a local company and expenses for place and staff and 
insurance and many other overheads and omits the problems of management and eases 
the communication. 
This way moreover than money, knowledge and experience and education will 
enter the country and gradually these people who have begun from small businesses 
will establish companies and develop their business. Eventually this process will shape 
the portfolio of services that Nicholson and Sahay point that out in their article [3]. 
At that time he was paying 500 dollars per month for the wireless broadband 
internet service at his company. The speed of that connection was 128kbps receive and 
64kbps send that meant 4000 US Dollars monthly for each Mega bits per second of 
data66. Such high overheads and other communication problems were forcing Hooman 
to seek more internal contracts rather than foreigner ones because working for internal 
contractors was more practical for him. 
Hooman has left Iran at August 2005 to continue his studies and has bailed his 
company to somebody called Aziz; and claims that he is not aware of the current 
policy of the new manager. But he believed that the company will soon cut off its 
cooperation with the American contractor and focus on working with internal ones due 
to the numerous problems of working with outsourcers. His last sentence was this: 
“They (the foreigner contractors) were in some conditions that we didn’t understand 
them and we were in some conditions that they didn’t understand us”; and concluded 
that under such conditions it is impossible to continue cooperation. 
 
 
7.2.3 Case 3: Interview with Aziz 
 
Aziz is Hooman’s successor in SN Co. who has taken over Hooman’s 
responsibility from summer of 2005, after he left Iran. 
As Hooman predicted, the company  gives no longer any services to the American 
company but their relation is not cut off completely yet. The story is as follows: 
SN Co. has been the support group of the American company’s software until last 
year. But the Americans have recently shifted their focus to IBM RS/6000 main 
frames, or p5 and ps5 models. Their operating system is AIX or its newer version, AIX 
5L. Exporting these servers or their operating systems, or even their relevant software 
to Iran is illegal; due to the American embargo on Iran. So it has become impossible 
for the Iranian company to continue working for the American one. Thus they have 
reduced their cooperation gradually during 2005, and eventually have cut off their 
                                                 
65 As discussed in chapter 3, the relevant ministry in Iran has ensured its customers to give cheaper, 
faster and more reliable internet services in 2006. 
66 This high price is in case of a valid IP address for the customer; otherwise the prices are lower. 
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support to let SN Co. become independent and can survive only with working for the 
internal market. 
Yet the Americans are still training SN Co.’s staff in Iran through remote training. 
Their goal is “upgrading the level of informatics knowledge among the Iranian 
personnel, based on systematic principals” as Aziz says; in order to have this staff in 
Iran to use them in near future67. Thus, in fact the American company is making an 
investment in Iran with no cash response. I consider there are three reasons that the 
owner/manager of the American company does this big favour for them. First of all he 
is near relative of Hooman. Secondly he is a Baha’i, so he does it for Hooman’s 
friends who are totally Baha’is too68. Finally he is Iranian too, and wishes to do this 
for his birth place; even though it is difficult for him to speak Persian. In the absence 
of any one of these three factors, it was hardly ever imaginable for me that he was 
ready to do all these efforts without having reasonable economic benefits. 
SN Co. is now working for the internal market, yet they very well pleased to use 
the trainings of the American company. They have used the Americans’ progressive 
training and management system to implement a powerful group work in SN Co.; 
which according to Aziz’s opinion, is exclusive in Iran. 
Aziz points to low cost of workforce in Iran as its power point, and poor level of 
English language as its weak point. In addition he is still dissatisfied with the high cost 
of internet to a very high extent. 
 
In this case we are introduced to another factor in diasporas’ role and that is the 
effect of their personal beliefs on giving services to their homeland. In case 12 we will 
have another discussion, both on this factor and on the remote education in Iran.  
 
 
7.2.4 Case 4: Interview with Kovan 
 
Kovan is 31 year old man and has been born in Kurdistan, Iraq. He has come to 
Norway about 20 years ago. He has got his master (‘hoved fag’ at that time) from the 
University of Oslo in informatics (Concurrent Software Development) in 2003. At the 
same year he has established his company called G. IT S. with a friend of his, and in 
2004 a third one has joined them. 
They have started their job as a consultant company, which means that they 
consulted companies to solve their IT problems. But now their focus has shifted to 
making programs of their own, and they do much more development jobs rather than 
consultancy. 
As an Iraqi Diaspora, he has also proposed some projects to give services to 
Kurdistan. He has been in Kurdistan for two months in 2004 for three months in 2005. 
His company has presented two projects for Health Ministry and Education ministry 
(of Kurdistan) and the prototype of another one is under discussion with the 
                                                 
67 In addition to many other analysts, almost all Iranians are waiting for a fundamental change in the 
conditions in Iran in a near future. 
68 For more explanation on this factor, look at case12, about BIHE.  
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69Agriculture and Water Department . According to the safety and security problems 
and lack of a stabilized government in Iraq, Kovan has presented his projects only in 
Kurdistan for the regional government, and not in the rest of Iraq. 
After the first war of the Persian Gulf, Kurdistan acquired a kind of autonomy and 
has been controlled by local forces from that time. The parliament of Kurdistan which 
is elected democratically has the highest position in that region. But the troublesome 
point is that there are two major parties in Iraq’s Kurdistan (and in the parliament), 
PDK (the Democratic Party of Kurdistan leaded by Masoud Barezani) and PUK (the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leaded by Jalal Talebani) and each of these parties 
controls the rejoin of its own dominance in a way. The party has the role of the 
government in its region and assigns all managers to all positions. The first very big 
problem for Kovan has been the split governance of Kurdistan. If one wants to do 
something there, he must talk to the party there, so if you want to mechanize a system, 
you can do it in the region of the party that you have got its agreement, and not in the 
whole Kurdistan. Although according to the late agreements between the two groups, 
and also the stabilization of the Iraq’s central government and the late elections, the 
genenral situation is getting better and better everyday, yet it is not satisfying and 
desirable yet. 
According to IT situation in Kurdistan, Kovan describes it as very weak and 
limited. The use of PC machines is not common and widespread. Computers are found 
most of all in internet cafés, and their most popular usage is as chatting machines, 
email machines or at most as very progressive typing machines. 
“They need almost everything” as Kovan says. There is almost no infrastructure 
built in Kurdistan and they have to be built from zero, and this makes a very good 
opportunity to establish uniform standards and implement big projects easier than in 
first world countries; as they don’t conflict with any previous standards. A very big 
problem in front of making big, monolithic and all consistent systems in progressive 
countries is that almost all organizations, either private or governmental, have their 
own proprietary system. So it is very difficult and too expensive to substitute all 
existent systems with a new standard system. But in poorer countries, due to the clear 
background, it is by far easier and extremely more efficient to design and implement 
monolithic and all consistent systems. 
He believes that we must build the infrastructures by ourselves and establish 
structures similar to what we have in the West. But the government should be the 
motivator and executive force. 
Kovan distinguishes four important problems that we, as people who both have 
seen progressive countries and modern systems, and the same time have the same 
culture and language and background, have to solve before giving our service to our 
homelands. 
 
1. The first big step is making the IT understanding. No doubt, we have lots of 
IT experiences and a very profound understanding of what IT can eventually do for 
us. As inhabitants of a developed country, IT services have new become a part of 
our lives. When we go there (back to our own country), we encounter lots of 
people that are used to old methods and do their jobs through paper work and have 
                                                 
69 He was still waiting for an answer at the time of this interview. 
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very little ideas of what IT can do for their life. So this very difficult job is our duty 
to show them what opportunities IT gives them and how efficient can they do their 
jobs using IT technology. This concept is called ‘IT revolution’ in Iraq, but it is in 
fact a ‘mind revolution’. 
A very big problem in this way, as Kovan says, is this wrong belief that 
computers will do the humans’ job and substitute them, and thus cause the increase 
of joblessness. So the parties confront with IT and automation of systems very 
cautious, as they want to show that they support the ordinary people and attract 
people to themselves. On the other hand ordinary people hate computers as they 
think computers are coming to substitute them and get their jobs. Although it may 
be a true idea, anyhow the time goes forward and all nations should encounter such 
eras; the sooner they catch up with new technologies, the better for their own sake. 
 
2. The other problem is to explain why big project cost so much, and how are 
they made that is so much time and money consuming. It is strange for them to 
accept spending a big amount of money on something that is already being done in 
a way. For example if you say that a HIS costs two million dollars, while this is 
only the expenses with no or very little benefit; they say that we can build a new 
hospital with this money and it is not wise to spend such a big money for software. 
Actually, software is not touchable and even the biggest systems can be saved on a 
very small disk. 
As another example, if you say that in order to make a small utility a one year 
time is needed and it will cost 500,000 US Dollars, they will amaze so much and 
say ‘why?’! They expect the problem to be solved in shortest time with cheapest 
price. “You can install a Micro Soft Windows in less than an hour and its code 
covers a full CD and most above all it is ‘completely free’” they think70. So you 
have to explain that this package costs few hundred dollars and millions of people 
pay that money, so the company actually receives hundreds of millions of dollars 
for this ‘free’ package. 
 
3. The third problem is project management. Normally the high level managers 
are members of the party and they don’t have high education or specialty. Talented 
and qualified people don’t occupy high positions because they are not party 
members or they don’t have powerful contacts. Generally to acquire a position  it is 
not important that how much do you know or what can you do; just it matters that 
whom do you know (who is your contact).  
So, when you want to analyze a project, they can only tell you what they want, 
and show no or very little help about other requirements and details, because they 
have no vision about it. Then you have to do everything by your own and discover 
or guess all what you want; and finally after three months of work, they say: “No, 
this is not what we need or want”. So all what you have done resets and you have 
to begin again. 
 
                                                 
70 In the countries that are not a member of copyright low, almost all software are illegally copied and 
sold in the market for the price of their empty disk, so they are really distributed for free.  
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4. Finally he mentions ‘the priority of quantity (and volume) to quality, as the 
last big problem. Totally as Kovan believes, in the Middle East and our region, 
people are concerned with ‘quantity’ and not ‘quality’. It is very important for them 
that ‘how cheap’ a product will be finally and not ‘how good’. Corruption 
intensifies this situation, as corrupted managers always want to show that how 
much they have done with their budget, as the quantity is visible and the quality is 
not. 
 
My last question was: “what role do you consider for yourself to fulfill in 
Kurdistan or in the whole Iraq? 
First of all he reminds that he is not fundamentally nationalist to think of Kurdish 
interests only. He has come to Norway from early childhood, so he is as Norwegian as 
he is Iraqi and Kurd. Thus, his first priority is giving a good service to his people and 
country, not to achieve a position or something else for himself; “I think of what is 
best for the people of the region” he says. He also points to the deep and wide 
technological gap between his homeland and progressive countries and he says he can 
narrow this gap. But unfortunately those who have control over there don’t want it and 
don’t let him71. Thus, as he doesn’t want to interfere in politics, his job becomes by far 
more difficult; as he can not say whatever he thinks and give them all kind of advice. 
Yet he believes he is able to do very much for Iraq, even under such difficult 
conditions. 
 
According to what Kovan explained about Kurdistan and comparing them with 
Iran, I have to tell that more or less there are such conditions in Iran too. But the value 
of his opinions in relation with this thesis, is because of what he considered as the role 
of diasporas. 
Also I agree to a high degree with his opinion on big monolithic systems, and 
creation and establishment of infrastructures. For example in Iran, banks were among 
the first organizations that tried to automate their systems, but there was no control and 
supervision to coordinate their work. So Iran has a disastrous banking system today, 
that works with the methods and rules of a few decades ago. There exists almost no 
nationwide electronic money in Iran, and the existent plastics are extremely 
proprietary, and you can use them only in few branches of the issuing bank that have a 
cash machine. They are not usable in other banks and not in stores, as there are few 
different incompatible cards and it is not economical and reasonable for stores to use 
one or few reader machines. The lack of the relevant culture is also hindering the use 
of existent electronic money. Iran’s economy is based on payment with either cash or 
checks. But you can cash a check only in the very branch that it is issued; and even not 
in other branches of the same bank. Although some activities have been done to solve 
these problems recently, they are not generalized yet. 
Another very important point that Kovan pointed out, is the role of government to 
cooperate with and enable those expatriates who desire to do some help. In case of 
Iran, we obviously see that lack of a helpful and cooperative government has actually 
                                                 
71 First of all it is because of their lack of knowledge and their deep suspicion to every thing new 
particularly from the West. Secondly they may be simply jealous or have some benefits that are 
satisfied better when the old methods and technologies are in use. 
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paralyzed almost all those expatriates who want to give a service to their fellowmen an 
their homeland. 
Finally the most noticeable point in his opinions is this belief that he wants to 
narrow the deep gap between the two sides. It is not important that how little the 
service is that one person can give to a non-developed country. When millions of 
people do each one a small part of the job, in total it will make an enormous 
improvement in that country. In this regard, diasporas are the best group of people that 
can narrow the deep gap between their old homeland and their new country, as they 
have roots in both sides and can transfer new culture and progressive methods more 
efficiently and with less cultural conflicts. 
 
 
7.2.5 Case 5: Interview with Dr. Zarei 
 
Dr. Behrooz Zarei is the manager of the electronic government plan in Iran. The 
goal of this plan is automation and computerization of the governmental services 
respectively to governmental sector, business sector and finally to all citizens. He said 
that “we are still working on the first phase (government to government services), but 
we have made very outstanding structures in this section that can turn into 
infrastructure for other progresses in the future”. 
He gave me a few of his articles which I have used in many parts of this research. 
Moreover, my particular question of him, was about strategic research on IT issues in 
Iran. He said that there are a few running, but this amount is not sufficient at all. Ha 
also added that the efforts of Iranian researchers in foreign universities and research 
centres can be of great help in this regard; but they it can be only in performing the 
researches and not implementing relevant projects. He stated that he is aware of a few 
of such researches, but he didn’t mention them. 
 
 
7.2.6 Case 6: Interview with Shahab 
 
Shahab is 35 year old software engineer who is born in Iran, but has immigrated to 
Norway about 18 years ago. Now he works as the DB manager in a company near 
Oslo. 
His answer to my questions is short and clear: doing anything for Iran or having 
any cooperation with Iran at present time, is ‘betraying’; because it prolongs the 
Islamic regime’s life. Even, according to his opinion, staying in Iran for somebody 
who can leave it, is twice betraying. Firs, it is betraying to one’s self; then it is 
cooperation with the regime. But in case of changing the regime, “I will go there and 
do everything I can for free” he says. 
 
This case shows the attitudes of a big group of Iranian expatriates that their help 
can be very useful important for their homeland; but they are either afraid of dealing 
with the current system (and they have right to a very high extent), or they don’t want 
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to help this system at all (I don’t agree with this attitude, because the people of Iran 
suffer heavy losses this way). On the other hand this case shows the big potential of 
Iranian diasporas that can be put to use and work in case of improving the ruling 
system of Iran. 
 
 
7.2.7 Case 7: Interview with Nariman 
 
Nariman is 37 year old mail electronic engineer who works for a security systems 
company in Oslo. Despite the previous case, he has a positive mind to cooperate with 
Iranian companies and even the embassy, as he doesn’t mix politics with his attitudes 
towards his country. 
He believes that one of the main obstacles in front of working for/with Iranian 
companies is the Iranian regulation and rule system. Another one is lack of important 
infrastructures and equipments. Also, the private sector has not the proper framework 
to work with foreign companies. 
In 2002, Nariman has tried to begin outsourcing an Iranian company which belongs 
to a friend of him. They had begun with a small project for a Norwegian company, but 
the first project has been the last one too. According to the poor quality of the internet 
lines in Iran at that time, sending and receiving the program through the net has been 
too difficult. Communicate via normal mail has also been impossible because of 
wasting too much time and security problems in Iran. So he has regretted after the firs 
project. 
Thus, he concludes that the biggest problem is the lack of proper infrastructures; 
and this is due to the monopoly of the government in this field. He reminds that in 
Norway too, Telenor had a monopoly until a few years ago; and the service was not 
OK at all in Norway at that time. As we see, the quality and quantity of IT services has 
become so much better in Norway after the monopoly of Telenor has been broken up. 
In sum, he believes that the biggest problem of the economy of Iran, is governments 
monopoly. 
As mentioned above, he points to the lack of proper legal system as the other 
important issue; particularly lack of economical security: neither job security nor asset 
security. In absence of these major factors nobody will risk to invest in Iran; so the 
governmental monopoly won’t break up and the economy won’t progress. 
Nariman desires to establish his own company in Iran and outsource that branch 
from his office in Norway (he believes that one should have his own company in order 
to have full control over his job). He points out the ample highly-educated man power 
in Iran and its low cost, as the most important points for working with Iran. For 
example if an IT man-hour is 1000 NKr in Oslo, it is the same price for one day in 
Iran. But now, the risk and insecurity of working with Iran is too high, and it is not 
worthy to try. 
He suggests that under such conditions that diasporas can not/will not work with 
Iranian IT companies, they should come out in the world and establish contacts with 
the companies in Europe in order to send people here to learn the European way of 
working and doing business. This way they can adjust themselves with their would-be 
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customers. Again in this case, we see that Iranian diasporas who have lived in the 
West for a few decades and know every thing about working with the Western 
companies, their management methods and ways of doing business, can be of great 
help for Iranian companies to connect to the West. This way, Iranians save heavy 
expenses of training their staff and expatriate connections gain a good deal of money; 
but big problems should be solved first. 
As the last word on the role of diasporas, I asked him what can/should we do now 
as diasporas? He believes that we should keep our contact with managers and 
organizations in Iran and make them to do the reforms. Government should build the 
IT infrastructures and IT parks and IT cities, during a 5 to 10 year plan; and deliver 
them to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). Universities should also 
coordinate with industry and research sector. Nariman added that he has been 
following the same procedure for a few years by attending some gatherings in the 
Iranian embassy in Oslo, and some other activities. But the pressure of other 
expatriates who called them ‘betrayers’, has made the grope to abandon the gathering 
at the embassy. 
 
Here, it is noticeable that Nariman and Shahab are obviously in two opposite sides: 
Nariman belongs to that group of Iranians who still hope for the reforms inside the 
regime, and believe that all Iranians should deal and even cooperate with the Islamic 
rulers to make them accept the reforms. The other side consists of those Iranians who 
are satisfied with nothing less than the complete turn over of the regime, and in this 
way believe that even the smallest deal with anybody in Iran prolongs the regime’s 
life; so it is a betrayal and we should avoid that. 
As a Baha’i, I belong to none of these groups of course. But as an Iranian, while I 
believe that no reform in the Islamic regime is possible at all, I do the best I can for my 
country and its people regardless of the political regime or any other political factor. 
 
 
7.2.8 Case 8: Interview with Mr. S. 
 
Mr. S is an Iranian American who has left Iran long ago. He works in a software 
company where he is the manager of a section. He desires to have contact with Iranian 
companies and outsource them; his company has not agreed with it, due to the 
embargo. Even there have been some good cases that suited his friends’ company in 
Iran, but because of the embargo his company’s managers haven’t taken the risk. 
Because it needs a middle company in Europe or some other place and it won’t be 
efficient; moreover it is risky and problematic.  
 
Mr. S is another example of those who want to deal with Iranian companies, but 
they are not able. In cases 2 and 3 about SN Co., the American company had a branch 
in the Eastern Europe already, so it was possible and empirical for them to establish 
cooperation with SN Co.; moreover, the owner of the American company was a very 
near relative of Hooman and there has also been one other important factor involved 
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with the case that I am not allowed to mention. Otherwise, as said before, it was very 
improbable for them to establish the connection and continue it in long term. 
 
 
7.2.9 Case 9: Interview with Parsa and Shahram 
 
Parsa is 23 years old and Shahram is 35. Both have come to Norway from 1990; so 
Parsa has been only 8 years old when he came to Norway. Thus I expected him to be 
more Norwegian than Iranian, but he is definitely more Iranian and speaks Persian 
very well, with no foreigner accent. They have recently established a computer 
services company in Oslo, where I met them and interviewed with them. 
One of their activities is making web pages; for which they have got help of a web 
page writer in Tehran. Their correspondence is through telephone and internet; but 
despite Nariman in case 7, they are very satisfied with their connection and they have 
no problem in this regard.  
Their deal is totally based on bidirectional trust. Parsa and Shahram pay half of the 
contract’s price first and pay the other half after the completion of the job. So, both 
sides have to trust the other one for half of the amount; yet both are satisfied, because 
the Norwegian side pays by far less and the Iranian get a little bit more that what they 
should pay and get locally. 
But, as Nariman said, they wish to open a branch in Tehran to have more control 
over their job. This way they can also get benefits from the vast and expanding IT 
market in Iran. Thus they have tried to contact Sanaray to check if there are any 
services for European outsourcers that want to open a branch in Iran. But Sanaray’s 
bureaucracy and difficult conditions (as Parsa calls it) has terrified them and they 
haven’t gone forward to contact Sanaray. The firs terrifying point in Sanaray’s 
condition has been the obligation to obey the Islamic lows of business and commerce. 
Of course it is very natural for a branch of a company to be obliged to work according 
to the laws of the country where it is located. But the name of ‘Islamic low’ is 
terrifying enough for those who have had an experience with Islamic laws, to make 
them run away from Iran. So their final conclusion has been this result that finding 
business partners and connections through friendship and personal acquaintance, is by 
far easier and more reliable than working with Sanaray. 
Shahram and Parsa are from that group of Iranians who believe that if they are 
going to outsource somebody and pay him some money; they prefer to pay the money 
to an Iranian. Yet, as we saw, they are afraid of working with the government. They 
believe that the government should make an environment in which foreigners dare to 
enter and bring in their money. Foreign companies don’t feel safe and comfortable in 
Iran now, so they don’t approach it. Worst of all, lack of stability is added to lack of 
proper laws and has made Iran one of the riskiest places on the world for investment. 
 
This case is a very good example of Iranian expatriates who don’t want to 
cooperate with the current government, but they work with another Iranian and pay 
him directly. This method is a very good pattern for other Iranian expatriates to help 
development of the Iranian software industry, but it is not possible for everybody. First 
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of all they are owners of their job and don’t work for somebody else, so they can act as 
they will without having to content their boss. Secondly, sending money from Norway 
to Iran is free and has no problem. The most important point in this example is the 
small volume of the projects that enables both sides to work with each other on a 
friendly basis and without relevant bureaucracy. It is hardly ever possible to connect to 
sides in two different countries so simple, in case of a big project. Yet, this case is a 
very good pattern for beginning the job, and developing it gradually afterwards. 
 
 
7.2.10 Case 10: Interview with Shiva 
 
Shiva is a 31 year old Iranian software engineer who has come to Norway about 
eight years ago. Her husband is also Iranian, but he has been in Norway from early 
childhood. She has finished her studies in informatics in Norway and got her bachelor 
in 2003. She is now working in a software producing company, which we call it N Co., 
for less than a year. N Co. has begun its work from 1999 and its specialty is making 
web pages, but recently they have begun another very beneficial job and that is 
producing ‘Interactive TV’ Formats. 
She works both as project manager and project coordinator there. The coordinating 
position is needed as some projects are common with other companies. For example in 
interactive TV format projects, they cooperate with another company which is 
specialized in interactive media. 
The company sells many of its interactive TV formats to foreigner TV channels 
like USA, Canada, Dubai, Britain, China, and Malaysia. As interactive TV format has 
been innovated in northern European countries, TV companies often refer to 
Scandinavian companies to buy such systems. 
In answer to this question that whether they need a native member in their teem 
when they work for foreigner TVs, Shiva says that they have no or very little problems 
when they work for companies that their staff ca n speak English, according to 
language and cultural issues. She adds that anyhow, there is always somebody in the 
other side that cooperates with them and solves such cases and answers all questions. 
Also, according to the ease of communication through internet, there is no need of 
presence of a native person in their team. Yet in case of working for Dubai, Shiva has 
been the reference for some questions about Arabic alphabet and writing direction and 
such things. 
About working with Iranian TVs, she says that there is no problem to make an 
interactive TV system for any Iranian TV In case they apply for it, but they have had 
no deal with Iranians yet.  
About outsourcing she says that their job is not so much developed that they need 
any outsourcing yet, and their present personnel answer the company’s needs. 
Finally she claims that as an Iranian she wishes to go back to Iran and live there 
and give a service to her homeland, but not under present situations. She also reminds 
that her husband is more Norwegian rather than Iranian, as he has grown up here and 
he prefers to live in Norway rather than Iran. 
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In this example we distinguish the outstanding role that Iranian staff in the Western 
companies can play as a connection between their own company and Iranian 
customers or as we are more concerned, Iranian outsourced companies. Another point 
was the role of the family members in the services that an expatriate can give to his/her 
own homeland. An emigrant should make his/her family ready and get their agreement 
with what he is going to do for his homeland at present or in the future. 
 
 
7.2.11 Case 11: Interview with Aleksandra 
 
Aleksandra is a 32 year old female software engineer who comes from Serbia. She 
has got her bachelor at her homeland and has come to Norway about five years ago for 
a temporary job as a developer in a game producer company which we call it FC. Later 
on she has been fixed in that job and has stayed here thereafter. She has recently 
married to a Norwegian man. 
As a Serbian who lives in a more prosperous country, she plans to establish a 
software company in Serbia; but it won’t be possible in near future. Anyhow she 
reminds that she has married to a Norwegian and so she is not sure of what will 
happen in the future. Yet, at least she can have a software company here and outsource 
few people in Serbia, and pay them a little bit more than what they get normally. Some 
European companies use programmers in Serbia nowadays, so it is not new there. She 
cannot do it now, as FC Co. looks for people who stay in Oslo and is not interested in 
far away sources. 
In this case, again we see that family is an important factor that may conflict with 
playing a role in development of the homeland’s software industry. 
 
 
7.2.12 Case 12: BIHE, an example of remote education  
 
Baha’is in Iran have been deprived of higher education ever after the cultural 
revolution in 1981. So, from the late 80s, they have tried to establish some institutions 
in order to compensate the lack of higher education for their young generations. Baha’i 
Institute for higher Educations, BIHE, is a very successful result of these efforts. This 
institute is a university that presents more than 10 majors including Persian literature, 
chemistry, civil engineering and software engineering. Despite diverse courses and a 
few hundreds of students this university has no dedicated building. All classes and 
administration rooms are distributed between personal houses and rented rooms in 
different places all around Iran; but mostly in Tehran of course. On 1998,9,29 the 
agents of the Ministry of Information attacked the institute’s distributed sites and 
arrested tens of its administrating staff who where totally volunteer Baha’is. They also 
confiscated what ever they could. Thus the institute is a kind of underground now. 
Under such circumstances, a very big problem for BIHE has always been recruiting 
proper and up-to-date scientific staff; a big problem for Iranian universities that even 
governmental and private universities suffer from it. Thus from the early 2000s BIHE 
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has tried to establish an internet based network to recruit volunteer university 
professors from all around the world. In this regard I interviewed one of the 
administrative staff, and two of the remote professors, a British in Oslo and an Iranian 
in New Zeeland. 
The remote instructors are responsible to do everything that a normal instructor 
does; designing the course plans, correcting the homework and tests, and even giving 
lectures and teaching directly are among their duties. But the quality of the connection 
is not so good yet to let them do all these as good and as efficient as possible. The 
connection between students and instructors is established through many online 
features like E-mail, voice mail, online chat, sending lecture notes, online forums, 
conference calls, etc. 
The biggest problem here, that all interviewees mentioned, is still the low level of 
English language skills among the students. Ramez, an old classmate of me in BIHE 
and a present constructor of an informatics course, says that the students are getting 
better and their English language improves rapidly. “They are better now than what we 
were at that time” he believes. 
The other problem that Ramez mentions is the lack of correspondence between him 
and his counterpart in Iran. He says that they have had no contact with each other and 
they have done two separate jobs during the first semester. On the other hand, James, a 
British instructor of English language says that they are five persons who work with 
each other in the same group and they have a very powerful and efficient team work. 
They have also met each other once or twice in USA during the first year. It seems that 
foreigners can work in a group by far better than Iranians. 
 Another problem is lack of computer skills among both students and instructors, 
that doesn’t include our area of interest, software engineering group. Yet, difficulty of 
adapting to the system and lack of motives to follow the course online, has reduced the 
efficiency of this system for the first year. 
My contact in the administrative staff said that they expect to upload all BIHE 
courses online by 2008, using a Unified Course Structure. Ramez believes that in order 
to implement this system completely, BIHE needs a big investment to buy all needed 
equipments; and thus motivate the students to use the full capacity of the system (in 
the same way that we see in other universities all around the world). 
As this system has begun working from the autumn of 2005, it is still too early to 
evaluate and review it. It is just obvious that the system is still too young to work 
properly. 
 
This example alone, magnifies a few important problems that we have mentioned 
earlier: lack of English language skills, lack of team work abilities and lack of the 
internet usage culture. All these issues have limited the Iranian software and IT 
industry too. Iranian diasporas can play the best role in reducing these hindering 
factors. All Iranians that I have met in Europe can speak both English language and the 
local language almost as good as their mother language; even their accent is better than 
many other nationalities. Many of them have worked in western companies and have 
extremely good team work skills. And finally none of them is unfamiliar with the 
online services and usage of internet. They can transfer their knowledge and abilities 
to their fellowmen in many different ways; including direct teaching, remote teaching, 
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making websites, making TV and radio programs and above all, being a good pattern 
in front of others. The last mentioned method, is the best way to transfer a positive 
culture. 
 
 
7.2.13 Case 13: SOS Iran, an example of vision for future 
 
S.O.S. Iran is an opposition group established in Los Angeles, USA by Dr. Iman 
Foroutan, which has gathered hundreds of Iranian experts from all different scientific 
and technological fields in its well-organized network. Its members reside in all 
countries of the world, even Iran. The goal of this group is preparing transition and fast 
reaction programs to take over the control of vital activities in Iran, as soon as the 
Islamic regime falls down; in order to prevent of the happenings that took place in 
Afghanistan after Taliban and in Iraq after Saddam, to repeat in Iran. 
I tried to correspond with them through E-mail, but didn’t get much information 
finally. The only answer that I got was their conforming that they have also a plan 
about controlling IT and telecommunication centres right after the expected chaos; but 
they didn’t explain about that plan. I found the information from their official website 
and from their TV programs on satellite TV channels [66]. 
 
The important result that we can get from the case of S.O.S. Iran, is the fact that 
Iranian expatriates should be ready for the future possible activities. As we saw in case 
8 about Mr. S., there are a group of diasporas that desire to do something for the 
software industry of Iran, but due to several mentioned reasons they can not do 
anything at present. In cases 2 and 3 we observed an American company that has 
almost the same conditions; but is training a team in Iran, and is waiting for the future 
possibilities. Shahab in case 6, believes that no activity should be done before the 
change of the regime. Nariman in case 7, has tried, but problems have stopped him. 
Shahram and Parsa in case 9, have established the connection and are planning to 
develop it. Shiva and Aleksandra have married and don’t feel free to plan for the future 
alone. They cannot disregard their family’s interests and benefits.  Regardless the 
current political conditions and in spite of all difficulties and threatening dangers, 
BIHE has begun to teach and train its students with the newest methods and materials; 
using the enormous potentials of diasporas. And finally S.O.S. Iran is ready to react 
spontaneously in case of urgent need. 
All these cases remind us of the importance of a vision and planning for the future, 
even in personal level. We should not forget that in the Software Export Success 
Model, vision and strategy locate at the most fundamental level. Whoever that wishes 
success in the future, should act from today; and any action must begin with a 
determination oriented vision and a realistic planning. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Revolutionary advances in information and communication technologies have 
opened up extraordinary opportunities to accelerate social and economic development 
for the developing countries, and among them for Iran. Another very important impact 
of this IT revolution is that they create a pressing policy and investment agenda both to 
capitalize on new opportunities and to avoid the deterioration of international 
competitiveness. Although Iran has not shown up successful in any of these fields, all 
evidences show that this country has a very powerful potential to gain an important 
share in such international challenges. 
The pressing reform and investment agenda dictated by the information revolution 
aims to move countries into a different kind of economy -the information economy-
where information is the key factor of production. Trade and investment are global, 
and firms compete globally on the basis of knowledge, networking and agility. This 
agenda also leads countries into a new type of society-the information society-that is 
quite different from an industrial society [12]. An information society is better formed, 
more competitive, more democratic, more able to address individual needs, less 
centralized and friendlier to the environment. 
But there is a transformation period to pass from one era to the other; and Diaspora 
can help to pass this period and lubricate the movement to a very high extent. It is 
because they have established their roots in both the Iranian traditional society and the 
new modern information societies, and know the needs and characteristics of both 
sides. Thus they are able to adapt both conditions and match old needs with new 
methods. Their role can be compared with the role of detergents in solving oil in 
water. A detergent substance has both an OH end to be solved in the water and a CH 
end to solve oil and fat, and can cause the oil to be easily solved in the water. 
This group know the language, culture, way of living and thinking system of both 
societies (Iranian and Western), and can easily act as the representative of each side in 
the other one. The large number of the countries that Iranians have immigrated to them 
and the diversity of the new cultures that they have adopted/adapted, enriches this 
potential role that they can play to develop their homeland in cultural and economical 
aspects and lubricate the path from tradition to modernity and from old society to in 
formation society. They are the best model for adapting differences with each other. 
Though, unfortunately, the same force that has made them to exit their country and 
scattered them around the world, is still in power and hinders them of doing any favor 
to their homeland. In a world that is going rapidly towards freedom, development and 
welfare, maybe the most undesirable condition is loss of those who can be the pioneers 
of freedom, development and welfare [20]. 
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Yet, not all doors are closed to Iranian expatriates to share reconstruction of their 
homeland. Hereby, as the conclusion of this research, we can recommend a few ways 
in which Iranian diasporas can serve their country to develop its software industry. 
It is inevitable to mention here that it is not actually possible to fulfill all these 
actions in presence of the Islamic republic in Iran, because of this government’s 
destructive and hindering policies. While, of course, it is not necessary to wait for the 
change of regime to be implemented all of them. It is not in my authority to decide 
which one is practical to be done, even now; and which one is not. It depends on every 
single person’s mentality, goals and attitudes to determine which one is practical and 
which one is impossible or at least useless to do. 
In fact, the Iranian government has to create a climate in which expatriates can 
work and dare to have contacts with Iran. Otherwise they are not able to play their 
possible role, and the results of this research will not be completely useful. 
Development of Iran requires turning the current governmental hostility into people-
friendliness and world-friendliness. As all efforts to implement reforms in this regime 
have been useless, many analysts believe that there is no other way than a regime 
change. 
It is not relevant to this research to discuss which one of the abovementioned 
solutions is better or more practical. But, while the government has to improve the 
conditions and encourage all Iranians to cooperation; people and particularly 
expatriates should discriminate between political issues and giving a service to their 
country. During the case studies in chapter 7 I have tried to show that regardless of the 
political situation, there are always alternatives to take a part, even though small, in 
developing this country. 
The following activities ire the answers to the question of this research; these are 
the roles that Iranian diasporas can perform to develop the IT and software industry in 
Iran. It may seem that all Iranians or even foreigners are capable of implementing most 
of these roles; but as said earlier, diasporas have the priority that they are connected to 
both Iranian and Western sides. 
 
1. Transfer the knowledge and technology 
Transferring the knowledge and new technologies to promote the scientific ability 
of Iranian IT society, is one of the most urgent needs of the Iranian IT industry. As we 
saw in chapter 7, and Nicholson and Sahay point out too, Iranians suffer lack of 
project management techniques to a very high extent. 
Even laws and rules are a field in which Iranians need other countries experiments 
to develop both IT industry and their export; because Islamic republics rules are too 
rigid and antiquated to let developing bounds with the rest of the world. 
 
2. Preparing money resources and assets for IT industry 
Totally, as a constant rule after the revolution, the route of capitals is towards out 
of Iran. Under such conditions almost all sectors suffer from shortcoming of 
investments and many companies and industries go bankrupt every year. On the other 
hand, the same as we saw in case 1 in chapter 7 about Vietnam, the investment 
conditions in Iran is so unsafe that even those who gain money from transaction with 
Iran tend to keep their money out of that country and do not return it to Iran. 
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So it is very important that Iranian expatriates try to work with and help their 
nation; even in case they don’t trust the government and don’t want to help them, as 
we saw in cases 9 of chapter 7. Te money that enters the country this way can be of 
great importance for Iranian economy and industries. As stated earlier, it is estimated 
that Iranian immigrants only in California and Dubai, have more than 1000 billion 
dollars. 
 
3. Compensating the lack of human recourses and specialized staff 
Due to the high rate of brain drain, lack of well-trained and experienced human 
recourses and specialized staff is one the countries most important problems; 
especially in case of IT industry. Although the number of IT graduates has raised up 
during the last decade, but they are not capable of leading big projects and new 
methods of group working. Iranian it experts behave mostly like an army without 
generals. 
Vise versa there are many successful Iranian project managers and university 
professors in western countries that can both serve Iranian software industry and IT 
companies, and train the new generation of IT managers and experts inside Iran. 
  
4. Promoting the culture of using IT based services in daily affairs 
On of the biggest limitations of software industry in Iran is the lack of extensive 
usage and appreciation to IT from the majority of the people. Although the 
government has planed to increase then umber of internet users and promote the 
culture of using IT, still there is no guaranty that Iranians be able to use the internet as 
effective as it is used in developed countries, in near future. 
Iranian diasporas with vast knowledge and experiences of what is possible to do 
with computers and intelligent machines that are connected to the internet, and totally 
through the IT innovations, can bring the culture of using IT for their fellowmen to 
ease their lives and make impossible jobs possible for them. As Kovan pointed out in 
his interview, it is not a ‘can’ for diasporas, but it is a ‘must’. 
 
5. Importing the culture of obeying the rules 
This item may seem odd and irrelevant with software industry, but the fact is that 
one of the most serious problems that Iranian community suffers from is corruption, 
illegal ways of doing all activities and disrespect to the low. These problems have 
dumped all progress and once removed or weakened will let the whole country to 
come to order and healthy economy. 
Until now many negative habits have entered Iran from western societies. Yet, one 
of the most precious services that Iranian expatriates can give to their former 
fellowmen is teaching them the way that they live in their new life: obeying and 
respecting the law. I remember a very big industrial complex that its owners didn’t 
want to mechanize their systems, because computers were not easy to cheat on and 
they might reveal their economic wrongdoings and tax escapes. 
 
6. Making reform in the educational system of IT and software courses 
Iranian educational system needs such a reform according to the new goal oriented 
educational systems in developed countries, especially in the field of IT and software 
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that any material or method becomes obsolete in five years. Nowadays the software 
education system in Iran is comparable with that of eighties and doesn’t follow the 
goal to deliver professional IT experts to the market; while this intention is achieved to 
a much higher extent in western universities. 
Under such conditions, so many Iranian professors teach in the best universities of 
USA and Europe and other developed countries that it is symbolically believed that the 
number of Iranian university professors and specialist doctors only in south California 
is more than the total number of them in Iran. So, as one of their best services, Iranian 
IT professors, can and must bring the newest methods and materials for teaching 
software to Iranian universities. 
 
7. Implementing strategic research in IT-related areas 
During my research for this thesis, I met or heard of many Iranians working on 
similar researches about Iranian IT or Iranian diasporas; but not a single one of them is 
in Iran. They are all, just like me, in European universities. Also as stated in case 5 in 
chapter 7, this country lacks such researches seriously. Although there is more than 
one “strategic research center”s in Iran, they are all interested in political issues and 
other economical activities; and none care for IT and new technologies. As a proof for 
this statement we can see that Nicholson and Sahay’s traveling to Iran, shows that 
there has been nobody else in that country to implement the research that they have 
done. 
Implementing such researches is one the best services that Iranian professors and 
students in western universities can do for their homeland. 
 
8. Presenting Iranian software industry in the international markets 
This can be done through preparing software fairs, representing Iranian companies 
and other methods. In the absence of a powerful software export organization in Iran, 
Iranians can find proper partners among each other on the two sides of the border; and 
the foreign one sell the IT products of the internal one. This is the successful model of 
Iran’s carpet and fruit exportation. Afterwards these small joints can join to each other 
and shape a national organization of software exporters. 
 
9. Finding foreigner markets for Iranian products and services 
This one is the natural outcome of the previous item; and the explanation is like 
what was mentioned above. 
 
10. Establishing the linkage and trust between Iranian and foreigner sides 
As we saw in cases 7 and 9 in chapter 7, Nariman, Shahram and Parsa had worked 
with Iranian partners just because of bilateral trust; and had sold the product to a third 
company in Norway. Otherwise they were not able to fulfill the contract without extra 
bureaucracy and excessive time and expense overheads. It was also impossible for the 
Norwegian company to find and trust the Iranian side without the help of the diasporan 
connection. 
Now that the Iranian politicians try to destroy the world’s trust to Iranians, 
expatriates are responsible to revive and strengthen their trust in Iranian software 
industry. 
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11. Reducing the negative image of Iran among foreigners 
As said in above paragraph, Iranian expatriates have to show the positive face of 
Iranians and their culture. As Nicholson and Sahay point out in their article [3], the 
amount of negative information and promotion on Iran has hindered development of 
their software export. Thus it is one of the best roles for Iranian diasporas to clarify 
and enlighten the image of their country for the rest of the world, using their good 
fame and important positions. 
 
12. Teaching new management methods to the working force 
As seen in case 2 in chapter 7, and mentioned in Nicholson and Sahay’s article, 
project management is one of the weakest points of the Iranian software industry. So it 
is necessary for this industry to learn the new efficient and correct management 
methods from foreigners. Iranian managers with the common language and common 
culture and more powerful motives72 can fulfill this important job better than the 
others. 
 
13. Remote management 
One of the methods to transfer the abovementioned knowledge is through remote 
management; as discussed in chapter 7. for the reasons that are explained in section 
7.1.3, and I don’t repeat them here, Iranian diasporas are the best candidates to 
implement this kind of management.  
 
14. Teaching the methods and culture of team work 
As stated in case2 and 3 in chapter 4, “how to implement group work” is still a 
strategic knowledge in Iran. Traditionally, Iranians tend to work alone and make others 
just to obey them. Nicholson and Sahay quote from Tayeb that “Iranian organizations 
do not appear to be a fertile ground for participative decision making approaches”. 
We also saw an example of the lack of team work between only two instructors in a 
group in case 12 of chapter 7. 
Again, Iranian expatriates with their bilateral roots and interests are the best 
candidates to teach group work to their fellowmen in both decision making and 
production process levels. 
 
15. Establishing NGOs to improve their contact with Iranian companies 
This item is explained in subsection 6.2.2 of chapter 6. As we saw there Iranians of 
Orange County have established NIPOC, which is now even used for more than 
“professional” intentions. But maybe according to the US embargo in Iran, an 
organization in the USA cannot do much in order to cooperate with Iranian companies. 
Thus it is more suitable for European software activists who have no legal problem 
to work with Iran. As Nariman said in case 7 of chapter, there has been a gathering 
like NIPOC in Oslo too; but its dependence to the Iranian embassy has prevented its 
progress and success. So it is important for any gathering of Iranians to be completely 
                                                 
72 It is obvious that everybody works for money. But Iranian expatriates that teach new and important 
technologies to their fellowmen, may consider the servise aspect of the job, more than the economic 
aspect and work more efficient. 
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independent from political organizations like the embassy or any opposition group; 
and remain 100% professional. 
 
16. Discriminating between politics and serving the homeland 
The wrong political attitudes of Iranian governments during the last 3 decades and 
their hostile confrontations with the rest of the world have imposed several damages, 
and above all economical damages, to Iranian citizens. Under this condition, selling IT 
product to foreign customers, not only makes a good income for the producer, but also 
improves the total economy of the country. Thus some Iranians believe that we 
shouldn’t deal with any Iranian, lest we help the stability of the regime. 
73I have tried in all parts of this research to disagree  with this idea and show that 
there are always other alternatives to help the country and its people, without dealing 
with the government directly. Thus, this research recommends all Iranian expatriates 
to disregard political considerations and take a part in development of their country. 
 
17. Training their children as Iranian and not foreigner 
The second generations of immigrants always get the color of their new country 
more than that of their parents. The children and grand children of Iranian expatriates 
around the world, can have the same value for Iran’s development that their parents 
have; provided that they care for the old country. I have seen some Iranians that don’t 
speak Persian with their children and teach them nothing or very little about their 
mother country. These children get their information about Iran from the same 
negative propaganda that we mentioned earlier. There is a very little probability that 
these kids care for what happens in Iran in present time and in the future. 
On the other hand, many Iranians teach Farsi language and Iranian cultural 
elements to their kids and make them fell more Iranian than anything else. This group 
is more probable to contribute in rebuilding Iran in the future; and in case they intend 
to contribute, it is easier and more practical for them to work with other Iranians. Parsa 
in case 9 of chapter 7 is a very good example of this group. 
 
“Westernizing” of the second generations was one of the “should not”s in relation 
of the topic of this chapter. Here are a few other points that should be avoided. 
 
18. Encourage other Iranians to exit the country 
This is a very personal affair and nobody can recommend others to remain in their 
birthplace or leave it. But according to the development point of view, emigration of 
the elite members of the community from Iran, hinders development and intensifies 
the problem of brain drain. Thus, encouraging the Iranians to emigrate, is a help in the 
reverse direction of development. 
 
19. Taking out the capitals and assets and investing them in other countries 
Again as mentioned above, nobody can recommend the owners of capitals to keep 
them in Iran; as it is one the most improper places on the Earth for investment. But 
                                                 
73 To mention the reasons of my disagreement with this opinion does not comply with the goals and 
theme of this thesis. 
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finding a beneficial way of investment in Iran is not impossible and from the 
developmental point of view is recommendable. 
 
20. Cut off all connection with the mother land 
The last personal affair that is not recommended is cut off al connections with 
Iranian companies and industries. As mentioned above, it is not impossible to find a 
proper way to deal with an Iranian software company or with individual programmers; 
as we saw in a few examples of chapter 7. 
 
So the final word is this: if an Iranian expatriate determines to help development of 
IT industry in Iran, he can always find a way to do it. I presented only a few examples 
here, yet many other ways are possible. 
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